Perceptions of and Experiences with Contraband in Correctional Facilities: A Qualitative Examination by Dittmann, William Layne
PERCEPTIONS OF AND EXPERIENCES WITH CONTRABAND IN CORRECTIONAL 





The Faculty of the Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology 




In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 








PERCEPTIONS OF AND EXPERIENCES WITH CONTRABAND IN CORRECTIONAL 
FACILITIES: A QUALITATIVE EXAMINATION 
 
by 



















Phillip Lyons, PhD 
Dean, College of Criminal Justice
iii 
DEDICATION 
This dissertation is dedicated to my grandfather (Louis Dittmann), my 
grandmother (Loretta Dittmann), and my mother and father (Bill and Tara Dittmann). 
This accomplishment would have never been possible without your support, 
encouragement, and assistance (emotionally and financially) throughout my life and 
education. Your constant support of my educational goals and my passion for research 
and justice has finally paid off.   
iv 
ABSTRACT 
Dittmann, William L, Perceptions of and experiences with contraband in correctional 
facilities: A qualitative examination. Doctor of Philosophy (Criminal Justice), December, 
2019, Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, Texas. 
 
The presence of contraband within correctional facilities poses a considerable 
amount of danger to inmates, correctional officers, and correctional staff alike. However, 
preventing the entry of contraband into correctional facilities has shown to be an ongoing 
battle in our correctional facilities in the United States. So much so that contraband has 
remained a problem within our correctional systems for decades. Since the advent of 
cellular technology, online electronic money transfer systems, and newer and less 
detectible drugs, we have seen a major evolution in the methods used to bring in 
contraband, the types of contraband available, the methods of purchasing contraband, and 
the methods of transfer funds as it relates to contraband. There is a lack of recent 
information contained within the criminal justice literature that discusses the current 
forms of contraband in correctional facilities, newer entry methods, the relationship 
between contraband cellphones and other forms of contraband, the newer methods of 
transferring funds, the role that contraband plays in the everyday lives of inmates, and the 
ways in which prison culture and behavioral expectations are shaped by this sub-rosa 
inmate economy. This study updates the current state of the literature that surrounds the 
inmate economy and the many facets of contraband by relying on in-depth qualitative 
interviews with previously incarcerated individuals. 
 
KEY WORDS: Contraband, Inmate economy, Sub-rosa economy, Corruption, Convict 
code, Contraband smuggling 
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On September 11, 2018, 24 year old army veteran Jared Johns was found dead in 
his apartment due to a self-inflicted gunshot wound. Originally assumed to be related to 
his depression and PTSD after coming back from a deployment to Afghanistan, his 
suicide was later found to be linked to a blackmail scam set up by prison inmates 
incarcerated in South Carolina with the use of contraband cellphones. As it turns out, two 
inmates were using contraband cellphones to create fake accounts on online dating sites 
where they posed as young women targeting military personnel. Once contact was made 
with the military personnel through the dating sites, flirtatious communications began, 
and eventually nude pictures were sent. Shortly thereafter, the inmates, posing as the 
girl’s fathers, would contact the victim claiming that the girl was underage and they 
would notify law enforcement if they did not make monetary payments in exchange for 
silence. Given this blackmail threat, and the supposedly potential, yet fake, charges Johns 
was scared to face, he took his own life. Upon further investigation, a total of 442 
military involved individuals were scammed out of $560,000 over a three year period 
ranging from 2015 to 2018 through this inmate-driven scam (Farzan, 2019). 
On May 11, 2016, The Department of Justice released information related to the 
indictment of 50 members of the prison gang, The Ñeta Association, on RICO charges 
related to drug trafficking and murder committed in Puerto Rico, and within Puerto 
Rico’s prisons, in furtherance of the criminal enterprise. Of particular importance is the 
amount of drugs and other contraband that was introduced into the prisons by visitors, 
prison workers, and civilians, referred to as pitcheos, who would toss contraband over 
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prison fences to Ñeta members. This prison gang was suspected of bringing cellphones 
and multi-kilo amounts of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana into multiple prisons across 
Puerto Rico. Douglas A. Leff of Puerto Rico’s, San Juan FBI Division was quoted 
saying:  
“In reality, their conduct is more accurately described as that of an 
international mafia than a prison gang. Their network reached throughout 
Puerto Rico and the continental United States. This enabled them to order 
hits on rival gang members, corrupt two sworn officers and to move large 
quantities of drugs and other contraband, effectively turning their prison 
into a gang-controlled housing project” (Department of Justice Office of 
Public Affairs, 2016). 
These stories, and others like them, help highlight the age-old notion that the 
presence of contraband within correctional facilities poses a significant risk to inmates, 
the public, and correctional officers (Guenther, 1975; Kalinich, 1980; Williams & Fish, 
1974). Both stories also provide evidence that prison contraband can have far reaching 
and serious consequences both inside and outside of correctional facilities, and that the 
nature of contraband, especially contraband cellphones, has created new opportunities for 
criminals, and new challenges for correctional administrators. Despite the dangers 
associated with prison contraband, preventing the entry of contraband into correctional 
facilities has shown to be an ongoing battle in our correctional facilities in the United 
States, and has remained a major issue within our correctional systems for decades 
(Burke & Owens, 2010; Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, 2016; 
Kalinich, 1980; Sykes, 1958; Williams & Fish, 1974). When prison contraband is 
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discussed in passing, items such as drugs, alcohol, weapons, and more recently 
cellphones are what typically come to mind. It is true, these are forms of prison 
contraband, however, when prison contraband is thoroughly examined through a 
correctional policy lens, items that may be considered contraband become much more 
widespread and inclusive. 
Contraband has been generally defined in Koslover, Hung, Babin, and Mills 
(2017) as “anything inmates are prohibited from possessing” (p. 2). Contraband may 
essentially be any item that is not purchased by inmates through the commissary; is not 
assigned to the inmates by the authoritative agency in charge of the facility; any 
otherwise approved item that has been altered in any way, shape, or form; and any item 
that the warden does not approve of the inmates possessing, even items that, at face 
value, appear to be harmless.  
Given this broad definition, the reality is that contraband often plays a role in 
everyday life for those that are incarcerated, whether it be a cigarette, an extra cookie 
from the kitchen, or the possession of reading material that was borrowed from another 
inmate (Kalinich, 1980). Further, the buying and selling of contraband is woven into the 
fabric of socialization and relationships that are formed within this microcosm of society 
(among both inmates and correctional staff) (Clemmer, 1940; Kalinich, 1980; Sykes, 
1958). Understanding the importance of its presence (and lack thereof), role, function, 
and the method and form of transactions, smuggling, and informal governance that guide 
and protect this illicit market within the correctional facilities is of particular importance 
for the study of prison life, correctional policy, and institutional culture (Kalinich, 1980; 
Ochola, 2015; Sykes, 1958; Williams & Fish, 1974). 
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Since the advent of cellular technology, online electronic money transfer systems, 
and newer and less detectible drugs, there has been a major evolution in the methods used 
to bring contraband into facilities, the different types of contraband now available, the 
methods used to purchase contraband, and the ways in which funds are being transferred 
within, and outside of, the sub-rosa inmate economy (Applin, 2016; Burke & Owens, 
2010; Dittmann, 2015; Goldsmith, Halsey, & Vel-Palumbo, 2018; O'Hagan & Hardwick, 
2017; Northfield, 2018; Sanchez & McKibben, 2015; Waldron, 2017). There is a 
considerable lack of recent information contained within the criminal justice literature 
that discusses newer entry methods, the relationship between contraband cellphones and 
other forms of contraband, the newer methods of transferring funds, and the role that 
contraband plays in the everyday lives of inmates (Ochola, 2015). 
Current research that has examined newer developments in contraband types and 
entry methods has been mainly quantitative, focusing on the frequency of drug and cell 
phone seizures, how much or many are seized, and some of the proposed dangers 
associated with inmates having access to contraband cell phones and the internet (Burke 
& Owen, 2010; Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, 2016; Department 
of Justice U.S. Attorney’s Office, 2018; McGreevy, 2009; Noonan, 2016; Ward, 2017). 
What is missing from the current research is a qualitative examination of the perceptions 
of and experiences with contraband from the viewpoint of those who have previously 
experienced incarceration in correctional facilities. Further, correctional researchers and 
practitioners may be unaware of the intricacies and newer methods of smuggling 
contraband into facilities; the role that that cell phones play in accessing contraband and 
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transferring funds; and the relationships between incarcerated individuals and 
correctional staff that engage in the contraband market. 
The purpose of the current study is to fill these gaps in the literature. By tapping 
into the perceptions of and experiences with contraband to learn more about the role that 
contraband played in the everyday life of those who have been previously incarcerated, it 
hopes to broaden our understanding of this phenomenon. Given the many changes to 
correctional culture and correctional policy that have occurred over the past 40 years, this 
topic is worth revisiting (Clemmer, 1940; Hunt, Riegel, Morales & Waldorf, 1993; 
Skarbek, 2014). For instance, Clemmer (1940) suggests that researchers in the future may 
want to look back on the standards and values held within correctional facilities to 
examine similarities and differences that exist within prison culture. Skarbek (2014) 
contends that prison gangs now have a considerable amount of influence over what goes 
on in correctional facilities, and he suggests that these prison gangs govern much of what 
occurs within prison walls. Due to their size and influence, prison gangs are able to 
dictate behaviors among correctional facility populations because they stand to gain 
control over the contraband market where profits are large (Skarbek, 2014). 
It is argued that by conducting in-depth interviews with people who have 
experienced or engaged in criminal activity that the richest of descriptive information is 
obtained and the bigger picture of criminal behavior is uncovered (Bernasco, 2013; 
Tewksbury, 2013). The significance of this study is that it has the potential to: 1) Fill the 
gap in the literature regarding contraband in the digital age, 2) Provide a better 
understanding of the newer types of contraband within these facilities, 3) Identify some 
of the newer methods of smuggling contraband into facilities, and 4) Inform researchers, 
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practitioners, and the general public of the role that contraband plays in the everyday 
lives of those incarcerated, and potential warning signs of efforts employed by inmates to 
corrupt correctional staff and extort the public. All of these potential outcomes can be 
used to inform correctional policy in order to create a safer working and living 
environment for correctional staff and inmates. 
It is often through grounded theory approaches to qualitative research that new 
and useful information is identified, which in turn can allow for the study of dynamic 
topics, and the development of newer questions about a phenomenon to be explored 
(Charmaz, 2008). This study relies on qualitative interviews with ex-inmates, and uses a 
grounded theory approach to derive themes about their experiences and perceptions of 
contraband and the inmate economy. It aims to examine contraband and the contraband 
culture in its current state. Doing so also has the potential to provide insight on some of 
the ways in which contraband and the illicit inmate economy have changed, and how 
these changes inductively relate to, and can expand on, previous theoretical perspectives 
related to institutional behaviors. 
The second chapter of this dissertation will cover previous literature regarding 
prison contraband, including: 1) a section that defines contraband using the Texas 
Department of Criminal Justice policy as an example, 2) the prevalence of the three most 
common forms of contraband in correctional facilities (cellphones; weapons; and drugs, 
alcohol, and tobacco), 3) a description of the inmate economy, 4) contraband entry 
methods and contraband detection, and 5) theoretical perspectives related to institutional 
culture and institutional misconduct. Chapter three outlines the methodology used to 
collect and analyze the data used for this study which includes: 1) a section identifying 
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the research questions, sampling frame, and eligibility criteria for participation 2) the 
sampling method used, and the sample size obtained, 3) the data collection process and 
evolution of the sample, 4) the interview settings, and the procedures taken in obtaining 
the data, 5) the interview questions that participants were asked to answer during the 
interviews, and 6) a sections on the qualitative coding approach that is used to analyze the 






What is prison contraband? 
When examining a topic such as prison contraband, it is important to understand 
what is meant by this term. Given the broad nature of correctional policies that define 
contraband, there are a wide range of items that may be considered contraband. The 
policies that outline and define contraband are relatively stable, yet vague enough to be 
all encompassing, across local jails, state prisons, and federal correctional facilities. 
Using the contraband policy outlined in the 2017 Texas Department of Criminal Justice 
Offender Orientation Handbook as an example, contraband is defined as: 
“any item not permitted into the secured perimeter of a unit, or in 
some cases, on TDCJ property. Also, any item brought into, or taken out 
of a unit, or in the possession of an offender, visitor or employee as 
defined in the Texas Penal Code, Section 38.11, is prohibited by the rules 
and regulations of the TDCJ, may also be considered contraband. These 
items include, but are not limited to, alcoholic beverages, controlled 
substances or any drug, firearms or deadly weapons, or any item brought 
onto TDCJ property with the intent to deliver to an offender, such as paper 
money, tobacco, lighter, matches, cell phones, pagers, laptop computers, 
cameras, digital recorders or any other type of electronic or wireless 
devices” (TDCJ, 2017, p. 89-90).  
Contraband may also include: 
9 
 
“a. Any item not allowed when the offender came to the TDCJ, not given 
or assigned to an offender by the TDCJ, and not bought by an offender for 
his use from the commissary; b. Any item altered from its original 
condition; c. Any item which, in the judgment of TDCJ personnel, 
unreasonably hinders the safe and effective operation of the facility; d. 
Items in excess of the amounts authorized or stored in an unauthorized 
manner; e. Any item received or sent through the mail that is not approved 
in accordance with the TDCJ Offender Correspondence Rules; f. Anything 
an offender is not supposed to have: such as, but not limited to: (1) 
Money; (2) Items used for gambling, such as dice and playing cards; (3) 
Books, magazines or newspapers that are not approved; (4) Clothes that 
are not approved; or (5) Tobacco or tobacco related items. g. Any item 
used to violate a TDCJ rule” (TDCJ, 2017, p.12). 
Section a. of this policy includes items that an inmate brings with them from a 
different unit or correctional facility that are not allowed on the new unit or facility, and 
items that an inmate did not purchase themselves from commissary. For instance, if an 
inmate purchases a fan at Unit A and gets transferred to unit B where fans are not 
allowed, the inmate may have to surrender the fan to prison staff at Unit B upon arrival. 
Further, items that have been given by an inmate to another inmate, or items that have 
been stolen or borrowed from another inmate, are considered contraband. The transfer of 
any item from one inmate to another is prohibited and that item may be considered 
contraband and is subject to confiscation by TDCJ employees. Some items that may be 
considered contraband under section b. above may include altered clothing such as 
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cutting the sleeves off of a state issued prisoner uniform; using thread from a state issued 
item to sew, repair, or alter another article of clothing or state issued cloth; repairs to 
items purchased from commissary such as fans, radios, televisions, typewriter, etc.; and 
any other item that an inmate is allowed to possess that has been altered from its original 
state. 
Section c. provides a considerable amount of discretion as to what can be 
considered contraband as these items can be identified by the judgement of the duty 
warden so long as the item in question creates an unreasonable risk to safe and effective 
facility operations. Section d. refers to large quantities of items that can be purchased 
from commissary that exceed the amount an inmate is allowed to possess, and any item/s 
that are improperly stored. Section e. specifically refers to correspondence items sent or 
received through the mail that are not approved by TDCJ, such as letters sent to and from 
other inmates, and unauthorized letters sent to victims. These items will be discussed in 
more detail shortly. Section f. covers other items not allowed by TDCJ due to issues that 
can arise from their presence on a facility such as money, items used for gambling, 
unapproved reading material, and tobacco and tobacco related items. Finally, Section g. 
accounts for items that are used to violate any other TDCJ rule.   
Related to correspondence in section e., the TDCJ Offender Orientation 
Handbook also contains a detailed section on “Offender Correspondence Rules” (TDCJ, 
2017, p. 112-120). Some of these items that may be considered restricted correspondence 
are letters to and from other offenders. Exceptions to this policy exist if the inmates are 
immediate family members; have children together and parental rights have not been 
terminated; if the inmates are co-parties involved in a standing legal matter; or if the 
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inmate is involved in a legal matter and is providing witness affidavit. Other prohibited 
correspondence that can be considered contraband include letters sent to victims of a 
crime for which the offender is currently incarcerated; correspondence sent to, or 
received from individuals on an offender’s Negative Mailing List such as victims of the 
offender where courts strictly prohibit communication and individuals who have 
requested, via written documentation, that the offender not correspond with them 
anymore. 
 Correspondence that contains material that meet any of the following criteria are 
also considered contraband and the mail will not be delivered if the contraband cannot be 
removed from the correspondence: 
“Contains threats of physical harm against any person or place or threats 
of criminal activity; 2. Threatens blackmail or extortion; 3. Concerns 
sending contraband in or out of the institutions; 4. Concerns plans to 
escape or unauthorized entry; 5. Concerns plans for activities in violation 
of institutional rules; 6. Concerns plans for future criminal activity; 7. 
Uses code and its contents are not understood by the person inspecting the 
correspondence; 8. Solicits gifts of goods or money under false pretenses 
or for payment to other offenders; 9. Contains a graphic presentation of 
sexual behavior that is in violation of the law; 10. Contains a sexually 
explicit image; 11. Contains an altered photo; 12. Contains information, 
which if communicated would create a clear and present danger of 
violence or physical harm to a human being; or 13. Contains records or 
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documentation held by TDCJ which are not listed in the attachment to the 
TDCJ Open Records Act Manual Chapter 3” (TDCJ, 2017, p. 116-117). 
Penalties Related to the Possession of Contraband. Once an inmate is found in 
possession of an item of contraband in a TDCJ facility, the penalties can vary and the 
correctional officer can choose how they want to deal with the offense depending on the 
seriousness of the offense and their ability to informally resolve the issue (TDCJ, 2015). 
TDCJ outlines the penalties for contraband and other rule infractions in their Disciplinary 
Rules and Procedures for Offenders manual (TDCJ, 2015). TDCJ has three levels of 
offenses which are summed up below in reference to contraband violations.  
Level 1 offenses are the most serious types of offenses. As it relates to 
contraband, the possession of money in excess of $20, tobacco in excess of .6 ounces or 
20 cigarettes, and the possession or use of marijuana or other controlled substances are all 
considered Level 1 offenses. Penalties for these offenses can result in offenders losing 
good-time, or time already spent towards their sentence. The amount of good time lost for 
a level one offense depends on the number of level 1 offenses the inmate has had in the 
past twelve months, the seriousness of the offense (resulted in: threat to safety of 
property, others, unit, or order within the unit), and penalties handed down to other 
offenders with similar violations. Taking into consideration these items noted above, the 
amount of good time lost can range from 0 days up to all of their good time being taken. 
 Level 2 offenses include lesser offenses that those included in Level 1, however 
these offenses still include contraband related offenses such as use or possession of an 
unauthorized prescription drug; use, possession, or distilling alcohol; use or possession of 
tobacco products or intoxicating inhalants; and possession of tattooing paraphernalia. The 
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penalties for Level 2 offenses takes into account the number of major cases the offender 
has received in the past 180 days, as well as the seriousness of the offense (resulted in: 
threats to safety of property, others, the unit, or order within the unit), and penalties 
handed down to other offenders with similar violations. The penalties for these offenses 
range from 0 to 730 days of good time lost. Level 3 offenses are the lowest category of 
offenses and include contraband related offenses such as trafficking or trading, gambling, 
and unauthorized storage of property. The penalties take into account the same things as 
Level 2 offenses, however the range for the potential good time lost can range from 0 to 
60 days.  
One may see these penalties as necessary in order to deter offenders from wanting 
to obtain, possess, sell, or use contraband. Despite the logic that connects policies and 
punishment with deterrence, these penalties have not been assessed in terms of the impact 
they may or may not have on the amount of contraband found in correctional facilities. 
What is known is that contraband remains a continuous issue within correctional 
facilities. The following section will highlight the prevalence of three categories of 
contraband within correctional facilities to illustrate this point.   
Prevalence of Cellphones, Weapons, and Drugs/Alcohol in Correctional Facilities 
Cellphones. Despite constant efforts by correctional staff to rid correctional 
facilities of dangerous contraband, (particularly cellphones, weapons, and drugs), 
correctional facilities constantly struggle to meet this goal. A heavily redacted 2016 
Department of Justice (DOJ) Report from the Office of the Inspector (OIG) indicated that 
between FY 2012-2014, cellphones were the most common form of contraband 
confiscated in Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) facilities (Department of Justice Office 
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of the Inspector General, 2016). Burke and Owen (2010), note that 2,800 cellphone 
devices were confiscated in the California prisons in the year 2008. This number soared 
to 4,130 cellphones confiscated in the year 2009 (McGreevy, 2009). At one particular 
facility in the State of Texas in 2008, there were approximately 300 cellphones 
recovered, 18 of which were confiscated from death-row inmates (Burke & Owen, 2010). 
Further complicating the issue with keeping cell phones out of prison are that some cell 
phones that are sold on the market can be as small as a human index finger (O’Hagan & 
Hardwick, 2017). 
Contraband cellphones have been used by inmates for the purposes of planning 
and/or carrying out dangerous activities such as intimidating witnesses, murdering 
individuals including witnesses and public servants, drug trafficking, and overseeing 
ongoing criminal organizations (Federal Communications Commission, 2010). Recently, 
inmates in a San Juan, Puerto Rico correctional facility used a contraband cellphone to 
order the death of a BOP’s special investigations section lieutenant after leaving the 
correctional facility. While working at the facility, the lieutenant was in constant search 
of contraband and his efforts challenged the leadership structure of the inmates. After 
communicating with individuals in the community, a monetary amount for the hit was 
agreed upon, and the plan between the inmates and those in the free community was put 
into action. Once the lieutenant left the facility after work, a contraband cell phone call 
was placed to the hitmen who were parked on the side of the road where they tailed the 
lieutenant and used four “.40 caliber fully automatic Glock pistols” to commit the murder 
(Department of Justice U.S. Attorney’s Office, 2018, p. 1). 
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Inmates have also self-reported using these cellular devices for communicating 
with family members, viewing pornography, engaging in social media, ordering and 
setting up the processes for smuggling contraband, and for conducting electronic money 
transfers with the proceeds earned from the purchase, sale, and/or distribution of 
contraband (Dittmann, 2015; O’Hagan & Hardwick, 2017). For example, in a study that 
examined ex-inmate’s perception of their experiences in public and private prisons in the 
State of Texas, Dittmann (2015) conducted in-depth qualitative interviews four with ex-
inmates and uncovered contraband smuggling operations that used contraband cell 
phones to facilitate the process. The processes used to smuggle contraband into these 
facilities will be outlined later in this chapter.  
Weapons Outside of cellphones, other contraband items also pose a considerable 
and immediate threat to the safety and security of our correctional institutions, the 
inmates, and the staff that operate these facilities. Scholars have continued to highlight 
the inherent nature of violence and victimization within prisons (Bowker, 1980; Irwin, 
1980; Johnson, 1987; McKorkle, 1993; Wolff et. al., 2007). The DOJ found that between 
2000 and 2013, 302 homicides occurred in local jails, and 762 homicides occurred in 
state prisons between 2001 and 2013 (Noonan, Rohloff, & Ginder, 2017). The violence 
that occurs within prison takes many forms, one of which is assaults on staff and other 
inmates using weapons or other items in the commission of the violence. Weapons serve 
at least two purposes in prison, to commit pre-meditated violence, or to deter it. 
McCorkle (1992) found in a sample of 300 inmates from Tennessee State Prison in 
Nashville, Tennessee that 25.1% reported keeping a weapon nearby as a precautionary 
measure taken to avoid violence. The DOJ has noted that, second to cell phones, weapons 
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were the most confiscated form of contraband in BOP institutions from 2012-2013, with 
6,716 weapons being confiscated between 2012 and 2014 (Department of Justice Office 
of the Inspector General, 2016). 
 Lincoln and colleagues (2006) surveyed 70 prisons from 13 states in the U.S. in 
an attempted to quantify and describe the types of weapons confiscated, the types of 
weapons used on staff, the types of weapons used on other inmates, the source of these 
weapons, and the number of lost work days and cost of staff injuries due to attacks with 
these weapons over a one year period (2002-2003). Results suggested that among these 
13 prisons, there were 1,326 weapons confiscated. 203 of those weapons were used by 
inmates to injure other inmates while 37 of those weapons were used to injure staff. 
Shanks, daggers, razors and saps (something flexible with a heavy weight on the end such 
as a sock with a padlock inside of it) were the weapons most often used to injure other 
inmates, while clubs were the most common weapon used to injure staff followed by 
razors and daggers. Interestingly, the source for many of these weapon was the prison 
store, also known as the commissary. This study suggests that during this 12 month 
period, roughly 2,351 workdays were lost due to staff assaults on staff with weapons 
($403,900 in lost wages) and $721,400 was spent on medical bills associated with these 
attacks on the staff members totaling $1,125,300. This research shows that weapons not 
only pose an immediate physical threat to the safety and security of those within a 
correctional facility, but they also suggest that there are monetary losses associated with 
their use. 
Drugs, Alcohol, and Tobacco. Correctional facilities also deal with a large 
amount of drugs, tobacco, and alcohol within their walls (O’Hagan & Hardwick, 2017). 
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According to the DOJ, the third, fourth, and fifth most common types of contraband 
confiscated in federal prisons between FY2012 and FY2014 are narcotics (3,713), 
tobacco (1,797), and alcohol (1,152) (Department of Justice Office of the Inspector 
General, 2016). Although there are numerous other narcotic types, the DOJ report only 
shows data for confiscations of marijuana, heroin, and cocaine, which demonstrates that 
the report is less than comprehensive when conceptualizing the term narcotics, and as a 
result, it appears that narcotics may not be as common as cell phones and weapons. 
Despite this poor measure reported in the DOJ report and the constant efforts to curb the 
presence of inebriants in correctional facilities, drugs have remained a major issue within 
corrections, especially given the increased prevalence of less detectable synthetic drugs 
such as synthetic cannabinoids K2 (also known as spice or mamba) spice and the popular 
prescription drug for opioid addicts known as Suboxone (Bodnar, 2017; O’Hagan & 
Hardwick, 2017). Between 2001 and 2014, there were 595 reported state inmate deaths 
caused by drugs and alcohol (Noonan, 2016). Furthermore, there are considerable health 
concerns related to the consumption of prison made alcohol, also known as pruno, as the 
consumption of pruno can lead to a deadly illness called botulism (Walters et al., 2015).   
K2 typically looks like plant material or leaves that have been sprayed with a lab-
grade synthetic cannabinoid, and once smoked, produces and intense high that far out-
weight the effects of marijuana (the drug that the effects of K2 are supposed to mimic) 
and can lead to the individual suffering from severe bouts of psychosis, hallucinations, 
seizures, heart attacks, and aggressive and suicidal behaviors (van Amsterdam, Brunt, & 
van den Brink, 2015; Walker, 2018). One report suggests that K2 is the fastest growing 
type of drug-related contraband in Texas prisons, and of the 477 confiscations of drug 
18 
 
contraband in TDCJ in a 6 month period in 2017, 268 of these confiscations included K2 
(Ward, 2017). Another study found an almost %640 increase in K2  This now illegal 
synthetic drug is attractive to inmates as it does not have a strong odor like marijuana, 
and generic drug tests administered by prison officials cannot detect the substance 
(Ferranti, 2012). Additionally, this cannabinoid can be sprayed on nearly anything that 
can absorb it, including correspondence that has been sent to prisoners, thus making it 
even harder to detect (O’Hagan, & Hardwick, 2017; The RDI Blog, 2017). This paper 
correspondence, once received by the inmates, can then be smoked to produce the 
dangerous and euphoric effects of the chemical/s. 
Another popular drug that is becoming more prevalent in prisons is Suboxone 
(Bodnar, 2017). This prescription was created to manage opioid addiction and withdraw 
symptoms, but it can also be abused as it provides a high similar to opioids. Suboxone 
can be prescribed in pill form and in a dissolvable strip that is to be taken orally. In 2017, 
the most common contraband smuggled by inmates held by the Maine Department of 
Corrections was Suboxone (Bodnar, 2017). The strip form of the drug is easily 
concealable and is commonly smuggled into facilities through the mail system by placing 
the small strip under postage stamps on correspondence (Goodnough & Zezima, 2011). 
Other drugs that have been detected in correspondence include methamphetamine. 
Gearhart (2006) reported that inmates will receive correspondence that has been soaked 
in liquefied drugs, such as methamphetamine. Once received, the paper can be used or 
sold as methamphetamine and can be orally ingested, or smoked. 
Drug use by inmates, particularly injection drug use/ers (IDU/IDU’s), in 
correctional facilities pose serious health issues for correctional populations and staff. 
19 
 
Incarcerated populations have much higher rates of blood-borne infections that the 
general public such as HIV (about four time greater), hepatitis B (two to six times 
greater) and hepatitis C (close to ten times greater) (Gough et al., 2010). Furthermore, 
intravenous drug users often rely on needles shared by other inmates to administer the 
drug intravenously or intramuscularly (Mahon, 1996; Waterhouse, 1995). Mahon (1996) 
noted that cleaning supplies and bleach are not only difficult to obtain in correctional 
settings, they can also be considered a form of contraband based on correctional policies. 
It is important to note that syringes used for diabetic inmates are not left with the inmate 
after their dose of insulin has been delivered, so any inmate that is in possession of a 
syringe can receive a contraband related infraction. Correctional staff may also be at risk 
of contracting a disease if they are poked with one of these needles, get into a violent 
altercation where open wounds exist and blood may be transferred from a carrier to the 
staff member, or if they are assaulted with a weapon that was tainted with a blood-born 
infection or disease. 
Despite a lack of public support, several countries around the world have 
implemented Syringe Exchange Programs (SEP’s) in their prisons in an effort to reduce 
the public health concerns related to IDU such as the spread of HIV, and hepatitis. Stover 
and Nelles (2003) examined evaluations from 10 European prisons from three counties 
that implemented SEP’s, and found that eight of the prisons saw no increase in drug use 
after implementing the SEP’s, and two actually saw a decrease in drug use. All ten 
prisons saw no increase in the injection of drugs after implementation. Of the nine 
prisons that reported data on needle sharing, seven of them suggested that needle sharing 
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was strongly reduced while one prison reported no change and one prison reported only a 
few cases of needle sharing. 
The findings in Stover and Nellis (2003) suggest that at least some countries 
around the world are open to implementing SEP’s in their prisons (German, Switzerland, 
and Spain), the goals of these programs are being met (reduction in needle sharing), and 
initial concerns over their implementation by critics (increase in drug use, increase in 
injections) are not supported. There are some underlying themes to these SEP’s, one of 
which is the focus on harm reduction. This focus on harm reduction suggests that, despite 
strong security efforts, prisons cannot keep drugs out of prisons, so the next best thing 
would be to enact programs such as SEP’s to reduce the harms that are related to drug 
use, specifically, IDU’s. The next section will discuss the dearth of literature that exists 
on the dynamic inmate economy where contraband is exchanged and sold. 
Contraband and the Inmate Economy 
Contrary to typical licit economies where goods and services are legally 
exchanged and are regulated by a formal system, the prison economy, by virtue of prison 
policies, is illicit and lacks formal mechanisms that guide these exchanges. However, this 
is not to say that prison economies do not function in similar ways as licit economies. For 
instance, the basic economic principle of supply and demand are just as relevant to licit 
economies as they are in prison contraband economies (Kalinich, 1980; Williams & Fish, 
1974). The prison economy and the flow of goods within it, in many respects, has also 
been suggested to have a considerable impact on the stability of the prison environment 
(Kalinich, 1980; Skarbek, 2012; Skarbek, 2014; Williams & Fish, 1974). 
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The contraband goods exchanged within this economy make up much of the 
socialization that occurs within correctional institutions, and inmates must rely on the 
inmate code (set of rules and norms that dictate behavior and socialization) and other 
informal mechanisms such as coercion, threats, prison gangs and their extralegal 
governing powers, and violence to ensure that the flow of goods and services is not 
interrupted (Kalinich, 1980; Skarbek, 2012; Skarbek, 2014; Trammell, 2012; Williams & 
Fish, 1974). Williams and Fish (1974) suggest that the inmate code can be broken at 
times when engaging in the inmate economy, such as codes related to the exploitation of 
other inmates. However, Williams and Fish (1974) note that studies have failed to 
distinguish when exactly these codes can be broken, and the characteristics of the 
individuals who can break them in terms of the roles they play within the inmate culture. 
What also goes partially unexamined in current literature is how the rules of the 
contraband market overlap with the inmate code, how and when these codes are adhered 
to when engaging in the contraband market, and details about other potential rules or 
business ethics that dictate behaviors within the prison economy.  
Kalinich (1980) suggests that “the flow of contraband contributes to the stability 
in the prison community by supporting an informal power structure that supports order 
and to some extent deals with the material and psychological needs of the residents, 
giving them incentives to comply with the norms of the informal setting” (p. 5). When 
the flow of contraband is disrupted, the inmates rely less on the informal power structure, 
and are less cooperative and more disruptive, which leads to instabilities within the prison 
environment. Guards are by no means disconnected from the prison economy, as they too 
have a vested interest in maintaining a stable and cooperative inmate population 
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(Kalinich, 1980; Sykes, 1958). Inmates wish to maintain stability and order in the prison 
environment as this allows for fewer searches by guards, and less attention being drawn 
to them, which in turn allows for contraband to flow more freely (Sykes, 1958; Kalinich, 
1980; Williams & Fish, 1974). Guards, on the other hand, seek stability and order 
because they are often reprimanded by their superiors when they cannot control their 
inmate population, and disruptive and disorderly populations are much more difficult to 
handle than ones that are stable, cooperative, and orderly (Sykes, 1958). 
In fact, those inmates who have influence on the behaviors of other inmates 
within an area of a prison, and who can maintain a stable and orderly environment 
amongst the inmates, have been reported to receive special favors by guards such as 
overlooking the possession and sale of contraband and even supplying contraband to 
those influential inmates in exchange for their efforts to maintain order amongst the 
inmate population through whatever means necessary (Kalinich, 1980). This is seen as 
somewhat of a give-and-take situation, where both parties benefit. Cooperation and the 
give-and-take approach play a major role in the facilitation of the inmate economy and 
the stability of both the environment and the illicit market (Kalinich, 1980; Sykes, 1958; 
Williams & Fish, 1974). 
Almost 40 years ago, the medium of exchange that drove the prison economy 
consisted of primarily cigarettes and what Kalinich (1980) refers to as green, or real 
money, and commissary items. It was also common for inmates to have bank accounts 
that they could use to exchange funds through a request sent to an individual outside of 
the institution. These requests were typically made during visitation or through mail 
correspondence. Given the advent of technology (specifically electronic banking, prison 
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phones and contraband cell phones, and electronic money transfer systems), new methods 
of exchanging funds are becoming more popular, as the exchange can now occur in a 
shorter period of time, and depending on which method used, are very difficult to trace 
by correctional investigators. Some of these more modern methods of purchasing 
contraband and exchanging currency are discussed in the following section.   
Contraband Entry Methods 
As mentioned, items can purchased through commissary and later become 
contraband after alteration or misuse (TDCJ, 2017). Items can also be stolen from the 
different working environments in the prison (woodworking shop, welding shop, kitchen, 
etc.) (Sykes, 1958; Kalinich, 1980). Contraband also enters prisons by way of the 
correctional officers, staff, or trustees bringing in the items on their person (Clemmer, 
1940; Davidson, 1977; Goldsmith, Halsey, & Groves, 2016; Kalinich, 1980; Ochola, 
2015). Other common methods of contraband entering correctional facilities is through 
prison contractors, social visits, legal visits, new prisoners coming into the facility, court 
and hospital visits, throwing contraband over perimeter walls, commercial delivery 
vehicles, and prison staff (Gearhart, 2006; Ochola, 2015; O’Hagan & Hardwick, 2017). 
Ochola (2015) found that the three most common ways that contraband entered into 
correctional facilities in Kenya were 1) prison staff, 2) social visits, and 3) over or 
through perimeter walls. 
As mentioned earlier, drugs are also brought in through the mail (Gearhart, 2006; 
Goodnough & Zezima, 2011; The RDI Blog, 2017). More recently, drones or unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs), have been used to breach correctional facilities perimeters and 
drop packages of contraband ranging from relatively harmless items such as tobacco up 
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to weapons that can be used to cause serious injury (Applin, 2016; Goldsmith, Halsey, & 
Vel-Palumbo, 2018; O'Hagan & Hardwick, 2017; Northfield, 2018; Sanchez & 
McKibben, 2015; Waldron, 2017). Aside from drone delivery, criminals are becoming 
extremely creative with other methods of breaching perimeter security with contraband, 
for example, one woman was recently arrested in Oklahoma for shooting contraband into 
a prison using a T-shirt cannon, similar to those used at sporting event to distribute t-
shirts into the grandstands (Brice-Sadler, 2019). 
Staff Corruption and Grooming. Of all of the methods used to enter contraband 
into correctional facilities, the most common method used, correctional staff, is also, 
arguably, the most obvious (Kalinich, 1980; Ochola, 2015). Corruption among 
correctional staff is a major problem in correctional institutions around the globe 
(O’Hagan & Hardwick, 2017). Official corruption can come in many forms in 
correctional facilities, however some of the most common forms of corruption occur 
when inmates and staff engage in inappropriate relationships (Alleyne, 2012; Beck, 
Berzofsky, & Caspar, & Krebs, 2013; Blackburn, Fowler, Mullings, & Marquart, 2011; 
Dial & Worley, 2008; Worley, Marquart, & Mullings, 2003), and when correctional staff 
bring contraband into facilities (Fox, 1984; Goldsmith, Halsey, & Groves, 2016; 
Kalinich, 1980;  Kalinich, & Stojkovic, 1987; McCarthy, 1984; Ochola, 2015). 
Given that inmates and correctional staff spend a considerable amount of time 
with each other each day, and the prison itself is essentially its own microcosm of society 
where social interactions and relationships exist and further develop, both endogenous 
relationships (between staff and inmates) and exogenous relationships (between staff, and 
inmates’ friends, family, and acquaintances) are formed overtime (Goldsmith, Halsey, & 
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Vel-Palumbo, 2018). These relationships can be built slowly, or can be pre-existing. 
Together, both endogenous and exogenous relationships provide opportunities for the 
facilitation of contraband smuggling, and exchanges of contraband and currency with 
free-world actors (Goldsmith, Halsey, & Vel-Palumbo, 2018). 
Inmates will often begin endogenous relationships with staff through simple 
communicative relationships with guards, and over time, these simple communications 
may turn into small favors that later turn into big favors, and eventual breaches of 
integrity, especially as it relates to contraband (Crouch & Marquart, 1989; Goldsmith, 
Halsey, & Vel-Palumbo, 2018; Kalinich, 1980; Marquart, Barnhill, & Balshaw-Biddle, 
2001; Sykes, 1958). This process of slowly building relationships with guards until the 
relationship and blackmail opportunities are so apparent that the guard becomes, in a 
sense, controlled by the inmate, is known as grooming (Liebling, Price, & Shefler, 2011; 
Mcalinden, 2012). Goldsmith, Halsey, and Vel-Palumbo (2018), suggest that even doing 
small and menial favors can lead up to doing much larger favors that create serious 
security concerns for both inmates, staff, and the public. The gradual compromising of 
correctional staff through small steps is also referred to as a “soft capture” as the 
correctional officer is not coerced into doing favors at the beginning, but rather the slow 
corruption can occur without the correctional staff member even being aware of the 
motives behind what may at first look like simple and kind favors (McIlwain, 2004, p. 
118). 
One relatively recent and widely publicized example of this grooming process 
occurring, and the dangers associated with corruption, comes from the Clinton 
Correctional Facility in Dannemora, New York. Inmates David Sweat and Richard Matt 
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escaped from this facility in 2015 with the help of a prison employee, Joyce Mitchell. 
What began as a friendship between Sweat, Matt, and Mitchell, later turned into sexual 
relationships, which then led to Mitchell being coerced into bring in hacksaw blades and 
chisels that Sweat and Matt used to cut through cell walls, steam pipes, and eventually 
escape through an off-site manhole (Marcius, 2018). The key to this successful escape 
lies in the fact that Joyce Mitchell was slowly groomed into smuggling these tools into 
the Clinton Correctional Facility, through friendship, sexual relations, and eventual 
coercion. 
In sum, correctional staff corruption continues to be a problem in correctional 
facilities, especially as it relates to contraband and sexual relationships. By examining the 
slow evolution of the grooming process and how these relationships are formed and 
strengthened from inmates’ perspectives, researchers may be able to inform correctional 
policies, training, and identify early warning signs of these relationships occurring, and 
how to avoid these situations. After all, it is the inmates who identify their targets for 
grooming, develop the techniques for rapport building, and manipulate correctional staff 
into compromising the integrity, safety, and security of the facility. 
Contraband Detection and Disruption Methods. The presence of contraband in 
correctional facilities often goes unnoticed by correctional staff, as inmates have 
numerous methods for stowing away their contraband including but not limited to hiding 
items in mattresses, books, on or inside their bodies, furniture, inside commissary 
products, within correspondence, and in and around the facility. Inmates have all day to 
think about how to get contraband into correctional facilities, and once inside, how and 
where to hide these items from correctional staff. This section will discuss five methods 
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of contraband detection that are used in correctional facilities (shakedowns, K9’s, 
perimeter security, informants, and Concealed Weapon and Contraband Imaging 
Detection Systems), and will conclude with a brief description of the most up to date cell 
phone signal disruption technology and the current Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) regulations that serve as temporary roadblocks in implementing these technologies 
in correctional facilities.   
Shakedowns. It is common for searches to occur in correctional facilities on a 
regular basis, and when information is provided to ranking staff in regards to prohibited 
items or activities. These searches are referred to as shakedowns, and the ultimate 
purpose of these shakedowns is to locate contraband, identify its owner, identify and 
investigate structural vulnerabilities, and collect evidence that may be linked to other 
illegal activity such as gambling, escape efforts, and rackets (Guenther, 1975). 
Shakedowns refer to both searches of individuals and searches of the areas of a 
correctional facility. Regardless of the amount of time spent during a shakedown, and the 
depth and intensity of the searches, correctional officers are well aware that whatever was 
found during the shakedown is only a fraction of what is actually present (Gearhart, 
2006; Guenther, 1975). Oftentimes, inmates who have built relationships with guards will 
be informed by that guard as to when the shakedown is going to occur and which areas 
the search team will target, or the guard will simply search that inmate loosely so that 
they do not intentionally detect contraband on that inmate (Kalinich, 1980). 
K9’s. There are numerous places to hide contraband in correctional facilities, so 
search teams will sometimes use K9’s to help locate contraband items, most commonly 
drugs (Gearhart, 2006; Neocleous, 2016; Prendergast, et al., 2004). Aside from their 
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ability to detect many types of illegal narcotics, K9’s have also been trained to detect 
cellphones (Gearhart, 2006). In 2016, these K9’s were being used in California, Texas, 
New Jersey, Maryland, Ohio, Virginia, and Florida to locate contraband cell phones in 
correctional facilities (Chammah, 2016). The dogs are trained to detect specific scents 
that exist in cell phones. For instance, these K9’s will be specifically trained to detect the 
smell of lithium niobate, commonly found in cell phone batteries. 
K9’s that are used to detect contraband in correctional facilities are not always 
successful in uncovering contraband, as they are searching for a scent that may have been 
present previous to the search but the contraband was re-located before the search began. 
This is not necessarily a total loss for the dog or prison investigators, as this information 
can be used to help understand networks of individuals involved with contraband by 
gathering intelligence on where the contraband has been, who may have possessed it, and 
who may have knowledge of its origins (Chammah, 2016). Despite the excellent scent 
detection skills that dogs possess, one challenge correctional agencies face is a shortage 
of drug dogs for contraband detection in prisons (Penfold, Turnbull, & Webster, 2005). 
Perimeter Security and CCTV. Other methods for combatting both escapes and 
contraband being thrown over perimeter fences at correctional facilities is by deploying 
perimeter security units and through the use of technologies such as closed-circuit 
television (CCTV)  (Wortley, 2002). Perimeter patrol units round the perimeter of the 
facility in search of perimeter and structural vulnerabilities, escapees, and to deter or 
detect citizens tossing contraband over perimeter fences. Other target hardening options 
for perimeter security measures include seismic detection technologies and infrared 
devices (Wortley, 2002). CCTV can supplement these efforts by maintaining constant 
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visualization of the perimeter, and can also play a significant role inside the prison as it 
relates to safety, security, and surveillance. 
Although perimeter security measures and CCTV may, at face value, appear to be 
promising, CCTV displays must be constantly monitored by well-trained and attentive 
staff members, and perimeter technologies require staff training and constant 
maintenance. Furthermore, previous studies have suggested that the process of smuggling 
contraband by tossing it over perimeter fences requires diversionary tactics, in-depth 
planning, and the use of contraband cell phones for effective and timely communication 
(Dittmann, 2015; Ochola, 2015). Referring back to the use of drones for smuggling 
prison contraband, depending on the altitude of the drone, CCTV and many other 
perimeter security measures such as high fences may show to be less effective than 
expected. In addressing these shortcoming, German technology, called DroneShield, has 
been deployed in some German Federal prison (O’Hagan & Hardwick, 2017). This 
technology uses a host of signal detection methods (infrared, acoustic, wireless, and 
video) to identify and disrupt drones that approach the airspace over these German 
correctional facilities.  
Informants. Another method of contraband detection relies on informants 
providing correctional staff with information regarding individuals involved in the 
smuggling, storage, selling, and purchasing of contraband. Informants will often send 
notes to correctional officials, referred to as kites, with information regarding numerous 
types of illegal activity that is occurring in the facility including but not limited to: 
contraband, gambling, sexual victimization, planned riots and escapes, the presence of 
weapons, and planned assaults (Guenther, 1975; Worley, 2011). They can also meet with 
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correctional staff, however this may be more risky as being labeled as a snitch is a serious 
accusation and violation of the inmate code, which can put that individuals life in 
jeopardy. Guenther (1975) suggests that while some information turned over to 
correctional staff by informants can be useful, most times the information proves to be 
fruitless and of little value, which begs the question of whether or not the efforts were a 
diversionary tactic, and what kind of behavior was actually going on while the 
correctional staff was busy investigating the informants valueless accusations. 
Concealed Weapon and Contraband Imaging Detection Systems (CWCIDS). 
 The National Institute of Justice released a guide to CWCIDS for correctional 
staff and law enforcement (Paulter, 2001). CWCIDS are systems intended to help detect 
contraband and weapons, and can vary in price, effectiveness, and purpose. This guide 
outlines the many different types of detection technologies available for use including: 
hard object detectors, walk through metal object detectors, hand-held metal object 
detectors, magnetic imaging portals, MRI body cavity imagers, gradiometer metal 
detectors, gradiometer metal object locators, microwave holographic imagers, microwave 
dielectrometer imagers, x-ray imagers, microwave radar imagers, pulse radar/swept 
frequency detectors, terahertz-wave imagers, millimeter-wave radar detectors, 
electromagnetic pulse detectors, millimeter-wave imagers, infrared imagers, and hybrid 
millimeter-wave and infrared imagers. These technologies rely on several different 
energy sources to detect weapons and contraband including: acoustic, magnetic, and 
electromagnetic waves. 
As comprehensive as the guide to CWCIDS is, all of these detection technologies 
are not available at all correctional facilities, partially due to their cost associated with the 
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initial purchase and the cost associated with the maintenance of these technologically 
advanced devices. As is the case with many issues related to corrections, budgetary 
constraints often explain the lack use of these more advanced types of technologies in 
correctional facilities. Some states, such as Pennsylvania, have encountered situations 
where correspondence was being soaked in liquefied drugs. To combat this approach to 
contraband smuggling the State of Pennsylvania has partnered with the company Smart 
Communications, which scanning all of the mail, stores it electronically, and provides 
inmates with photocopies of the correspondence during mail call (Michaels, 2018). 
Cellphone Signal Disruption and the FCC. Considered one of the top issues 
related to prison contraband, cell phones pose a considerable amount of danger to the 
prison environment, the staff, and the general public. Aside from some hand held radio 
frequency detection technology that can be used during a shakedown to find contraband 
cell phones, some of the more promising approaches rely on the disruption or jamming of 
cell phone signals within a correctional institution with the use of signal jamming 
technology. These jamming technology essentially deny service to all cellphone users 
within a certain radius. At face value, this sounds quite efficient and as if it would be a 
valid option for handling issues related to contraband cell phones, but there is one major 
road block that makes this technology illegal to use, the Federal Communications Act of 
1934. 
The FCC places regulations on jamming technology in The Federal 
Communications Act of 1934 as this technology can interfere with important radio 
communications necessary for emergency personnel, law enforcement, and other 
authorized cellphone calls. These jamming technologies vary in terms of their ability to 
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identify the area in which the signals will be jammed. A test of jamming technology for 
prison cellphones conducted at one prison showed that cellphone signals were also 
jammed for close to 200,000 local residents as well (Burke & Owen, 2010), while in 
2018 in Cumberland, Maryland micro-jamming technology was able to jam signals 
within a prison, yet calls made 20 feet away from the prison were unaffected (Kinnard, 
2019).  
For close to eight years, congress has considered federal legislation that would 
allow states the ability to jam cell-phone signals for the purpose of rendering prison 
contraband cellphones useless. To date, these propositions have not been adopted, thus 
prison officials have relied on other methods of combatting the use of cellphones in 
prisons through the use of managed access technology. Managed access technology 
allows prison officials to essentially block calls that are made from unapproved 
cellphones, while allowing calls made from approved cellphones to go through. Managed 
access technology acts like its own cell tower with the strongest signal given its 
proximity to a specific location. When cell phone calls are made in close proximity to 
managed access technologies, they automatically connect to that strong signal, which 
allows for the device to filter through and determine which cell phone signals are 
approved and unapproved through a process that involves cell phone carrier companies 
(Grommon et al., 2018). 
Grommon and colleagues (2018) conducted a process evaluation on managed 
access technology used within a correctional institution, and found significant challenges 
related to implementation, cost (ranging from $200,000 - $1,000,000), routine 
management and maintenance, personnel, carrier technology upgrades, and strong 
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partnerships with cell carrier companies. Given these challenges, it is reasonable to 
assume that these technologies may be the most effective, yet challenging, method of 
combatting the use of contraband cell phones within correctional facilities until 
legislation is passed that allows states to use some of the more effective and up to date 
jamming technologies available. Recently, a companion bill introduced by U.S. Senator 
Tom Cotton and U.S. Representative David Kustoff that would allow for jamming 
technologies to be used in correctional facilities (Kinnard, 2018). Despite these consistent 
legislative efforts to allow for the disruption of prison contraband cell phone signals, the 
current state of their use is still unlawful.   
Case Studies of Two Contraband Smuggling Operations. 
One recent case study of two contraband smuggling operations comes from a 
follow up analysis of data used in Dittmann (2015), and relied on in-depth interview data 
with two previously incarcerated individuals and crime script analysis to determine the 
steps taken to successfully smuggle contraband into two different correctional facilities, 
both of which relied on the use of contraband cellphones to facilitate the processes. 
Crime script analysis essentially outlines the decisions made and the steps taken in the 
commission of a crime, and can be used to help develop crime prevention and 
investigative techniques. The first smuggling process relied on a contraband cell phone, 
the United States Postal Service (USPS), Western Union money orders, and four actors: 
two inmates (Inmate 1 and Inmate 2), one Hybrid Actor (a medical staff worker at the 
facility), and a Free-world Actor (family member of Inmate 1). The actors and their roles 
are shown below: 
• Inmate 1- contraband purchaser, contraband secondary receiver 
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• Inmate 2- contraband primary receiver, contraband distributor 
• Hybrid Actor- Western Union money order purchaser and Sender  
• Free-world Actor- Western Union money order receiver, Free-world 
contraband purchaser, contraband smuggler   
Crime script analysis identified the following actions for the first smuggling 
operation, listed in order, that were taken to successfully smuggle marijuana and tobacco 
into a correctional facility: 
1. Inmate 1 called out to a Free-world Actor on a contraband cellphone and asked 
them to purchase a Western Union money order for X amount with an arbitrary 
signature. 
2. The Free-world Actor then sent the money order via USPS to an address with a 
fake return address.  
2. The Hybrid (prison nurse) actor retrieved the money order from address, 
purchased contraband, brought contraband into facility, and handed off the 
contraband to inmate 2 who had a work assignment and routine interactions with 
the prison nurse.  
3. Inmate 2 gave Inmate 1 his desired contraband, distributed/sold the remaining 
contraband at the facility (currency = commissary items), and split proceeds with 
Inmate 1. 
4. Process repeated 
The data for this smuggling operation did not allow for the distribution process to be 
examined in depth. However, data collected about the second smuggling operation, 
discussed next, was extensive and allowed for an in-depth examination into the 
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sophistication of this smuggling operation, and the nearly untraceable methods of 
currency transfer using contraband cell-phones, pre-paid debit cards, an electronic money 
transfer system, and meticulous planning and coordination. 
The second operation, also uncovered in a secondary analysis of data used in 
Dittmann (2015), relied heavily on contraband cell phones and General Purpose 
Reloadable pre-paid debit cards (GPR’s) and an electronic money transfer system, 
specifically Greendot Gold Cards, and Greendot MoneyPaks. GPR’s are available for 
purchase at local gas stations, grocery stores, etc., and function like a debit card. These 
Greendot Gold cards can be used to pay bills, withdraw money from ATM’s, make online 
purchases, and send and receive money. The most attractive reason that these GPR’s are 
used for criminal money transactions is that the account can be set up online using false 
identities and information, thus anonymizing the actor’s identities involved in the 
transaction process. Greendot MoneyPak’s serve the same function as a money order and 
can typically be purchased at the same locations where Greendot Gold Cards are sold, 
however the money does not need to be in hand for cash-out or transfer. The Greendot 
MoneyPak contains 14 digits. Once the Greendot MoneyPak has been purchased and 
loaded with a certain amount of money at the location of purchase, the 14 digits can be 
used to transfer the money onto a Greendot Gold Card via telephone or the internet. In a 
sense, those 14 digits represent, and are worth, the same amount that has been loaded 
onto the Greendot MoneyPak. 
This smuggling operation and distribution process relied on weak perimeter 
security, contraband cellphones, and GPR and Greendot Gold Cards and Greendot 
MoneyPaks to transfer currency. The smuggling and distribution process included a total 
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of 7 actors- 3 inmates and 4 Free-world Actors. The Actors and their roles are shown 
below: 
• Inmate 1-contraband orderer, receiver and distributor 
• Inmate 2- inside contraband purchaser 
• Inmate 3-“jigger” or lookout and contraband cellphone runner 
• Free-world Actor 1- free-world contraband purchaser, sender, and 
Greendot Gold Card Holder 
• Free-world Actor 2- free-world contraband receiver 
• Free-World Actor 3- free-world contraband drop mule 
• Free World Actor 4- Greendot Money Pak purchaser. 
The actions taken in the second smuggling operation, listed in order, are shown below: 
1. Inmate 1 (distributor) would receive an order for contraband by Inmate 2 
(purchaser) and a monetary amount was agreed on. Inmate 1 (distributor) then 
made a contraband cellphone call to free-world actor 1 (contraband purchaser and 
sender) and asked them to purchase X contraband and send it via shipping 
company to another free-world actor 2 (contraband receiver) near the prison 
location. 
2. Free-world actor 2 (contraband receiver) retrieved the contraband package from 
the mail and handed it off to Free-world Actor 3 (drop mule) to repackage and 
drop over the prison perimeter fence at specified time and location provided by 
Inmate 1 to free-world Actor 1 (contraband purchaser and sender), which was 
relayed to Free-world Actor 3 (drop mule). 
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3. Free-World Actor 3 (drop mule) tossed the repackaged contraband over the 
perimeter fence at a specified location, and on a specific date and time.   
4. Once the drop occurred, Inmate 2 retrieved the package and smuggled the 
package in to the dorm on their person. 
5. Once inside of the dorm, a currency transaction occurred between Inmate 1 
(contraband distributor) and Inmate 2 (contraband purchaser) and the contraband 
was distributed to Inmate 2 (contraband purchaser). 
The actions taken to purchase the contraband once inside are shown, in order, below: 
1. Inmate 2 (inmate purchaser) and Inmate 1 (inmate distributor) met and 
discussed a date, location, and time of transaction. 
2. Inmate 2 (contraband purchaser) called out to free-world actor 4 (moneypak 
purchaser) on a contraband cellphone and asked them to purchase a Greendot 
Moneypak for X amount. 
3. Inmate 2 (contraband purchaser) called out to free-world actor 4 (Moneypak 
Purchaser) on a contraband cellphone thereafter and asked them to give them the 
Moneypak’s 14 digits. 
4. Inmate 1 (inmate distributor) and Inmate 2 (inmate purchaser) then met in pre-
determined cell at a specific time and had Inmate 3 “Jigger” (lookout and cell 
phone runner) bring the contraband cell phone into the cell and stand at a vantage 
point location to watch for correctional staff conducting rounds. 
5. On the contraband cellphone, the Inmate 2 (inmate purchaser) called the 
Greendot information line and confirmed the amount on the Greendot moneypak 
(14 digits) either on speakerphone or in earshot of Inmate 1 (distributor). 
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6. Once the amount was confirmed to be on the Greendot MoneyPak (14 digits) 
by Inmate 1 (inmate distributor), the contraband transaction occurs. 
7. Inmate 1 (inmate distributor) then immediately uses the contraband cellphone 
to call out to Free-world Actor 1 (Greendot Gold Card holder) to relay the 
Greendot Moneypak’s 14 digits to the Free-world actor 1 (Greendot Gold Card 
holder). 
8. Free-world Actor 1 (Greendot Gold Card holder) then immediately transfer the 
funds (14 digits) onto the Greendot Gold Card via the Greendot website.  
9. Once the funds had been transferred to the Greendot Gold Card, the cell phone 
call history was deleted and the phone was given to Inmate 3 “jigger” (cell phone 
runner and lookout) to remove from the cell.   
Precise coordination using contraband cell-phones proved to be quite important to this 
network for both the smuggling process, and the transaction process. The actions/steps 
taken were said to be extremely time sensitive and required a significant amount of time 
to plan and execute without running into issues, especially once the contraband was 
thrown over the perimeter fence. To expand on this point, the drop location and timing of 
the drop had to be predetermined and extremely accurate, as once the contraband made it 
over the fence, any inmate could pick it up and claim it for themselves. In other words, 
Inmate 1 had to be very quick when retrieving the package. If not, this would not only 
result in a loss of contraband, but would also result in serious violent altercations among 
different races and gangs if they claimed the package for themselves. This required 
Inmate 1 to know in advance when their dorm would be released for recreation time in 
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order to relay this info to Free-world Actor 2 (contraband receiver) which would be 
relayed to Free-world Actor 3 (drop mule). 
The interviewee mentioned other issues that could also arise that were related to 
the transfer of funds. For instance, if the 14 digits were not sent to the Free-world Actor 1 
(Greendot Gold Card holder) in a timely manner by the Inmate 1 (inmate distributor), and 
if the Free-world Actor 1 (Greendot Gold Card holder) did not immediately transfer the 
MoneyPak funds onto the Greendot Gold Card, Inmate 2 (purchaser) could try to scam 
the distributor by having the Free-world Actor 4 (MoneyPak purchaser) immediately 
transfer the funds off of the MoneyPak before the inmate distributor could relay the 
MoneyPak’s 14 digits to Free-world Actor 1 (Greendot Gold Card holder) to be 
transferred to the Greendot Gold Card. Also, if the jigger did not do their job correctly, 
then both Inmate 1 (distributor) and Inmate 2 (purchaser) could be caught with a 
contraband cellphone and large amount of contraband and could face what was referred 
to as a “free world case”, or charges that are handled in a county court of law and would 
result in extra charges and prison time added on top of the ones for which they are 
already serving prison time. This extra charge would also result in a loss of good time 
that the inmate/s have already served. 
Inmates having access to the 14 digits on the back of Greendot MoneyPaks was 
also found to create other issues within the correctional facilities related to theft, and 
corruption among correctional officers. It was reported that inmates would sometimes 
find and steal each other’s MoneyPak numbers, creating issues between inmates, and 
resulting in potential race and rival-gang conflicts. It was common for these numbers to 
be written down on very small pieces of paper, and instances were discussed where 
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guards would confiscate these numbers without reporting the incident to their superiors. 
Instead, the guards would transfer the money onto a Greendot Gold Card upon leaving 
their work assignment for the day. 
In sum, these two smuggling operations ranged from having very few actors to 
having numerous actors, and can involve quite simple transactions or extremely specific, 
time sensitive, and sophisticated currency transfer methods. What was consistent across 
both smuggling networks was the reliance on contraband cell phones, and the role that 
they played in the successful smuggling and transfer of funds within the inmate economy. 
There is a dearth of literature that examines these processes in current times, and given 
that more smart phone currency transfer applications have become more popular, there is 
room for further research to identify other methods of currency transfer into, and out of, 
the sub-rosa inmate economy. 
Theoretical Perspectives on Prison Adaptation, Culture and Inmate Roles, and 
Institutional Deviance 
Prison misconduct can come in many forms, from assaults on prison staff and 
other inmates, to not following orders, to escape, to being out of place, to discretionary 
infractions such as defiance, and possession of contraband, to name a few. Previous 
researchers have detailed explanations that describe the prisonization process and 
socialization; the liberties that inmates are deprived of upon entering prisons; the culture 
and inmate-roles that exist in prison; and how these facets of prison-life are linked to 
inmate deviance (Clemmer, 1940, Sykes, 1958). Studies have also suggested that there 
are theoretical explanations for inmate deviance that are based on pre-prison experiences 
and individual characteristics, as well as situational explanations that serve as predictors 
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of inmate deviance and misconduct (Endler & Mangusson, 1976; Irwin & Cressey, 1962; 
Steinke, 1991). This section will discuss the process of prisonization, adaptation, and the 
convict code, as well as three theoretical perspectives that may serve as explanations for 
inmates engaging in the contraband market and contraband-related misconduct: 
deprivation model, importation model, and situational model. 
Prisonization, Adaptation, and the Convict Code. Beginning with 
Prisonization, Donald Clemmer’s book, The Prison Community (Clemmer, 1940), 
highlights that over time, prisoners adapt to their incarceration, the prison culture, and 
their lack of autonomy by adopting the attitudes, behaviors, dogmas, norms, and values 
of the prisoner population through socializing with both prisoners and staff. He refers to 
this process as prisonization, which begins with the inmate being stripped of their birth 
name, and given a prisoner identification number instead (resulting in a loss of personal 
identity). Upon arrival at the institution, they are also stripped of their clothes and are 
given standardized uniforms, becoming what Clemmer refers to as “an anonymous figure 
in a subordinate group” (Clemmer, 1950, p. 315). This adaptation to prison life also 
includes the eventual understanding and adoption of terms and language used by inmates, 
referred to as argot. These steps eventually lead to most inmates assimilating to the prison 
culture as they learn how to eat, dress, speak, distrust and despise staff and the parole 
board, and engage in prison misconduct. 
Clemmer (1940) also touches on the prisoners’ code, also known as the convict 
code or the inmate code, which he suggests is a social control that is not written down, 
yet nearly everyone in prison becomes aware of the code as they are engrained in the 
culture of every prison. He suggests that this code brings a sense of stability to the prison 
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environment and includes a set of culturally defined and culturally regulated norms, 
values, and behaviors that provide a framework for social interactions among inmates and 
staff.  The codes identified in Clemmer (1940), suggest that: 1) prisoners should never 
help institutional officials or government officials in disciplinary affairs, including those 
that may lead to another inmate’s discipline, 2) there is a sense of loyalty among the 
prisoner population when handling matters amongst themselves, 3) prisoners should 
never talk to guards except for business purposes and for other necessary reasons, 4) 
prisoners should not steal from each other, 5) prisoners should not take advantage of or 
exploit other inmates by misrepresenting an item of contraband as something it is not. 
Researcher have examine prison socialization and the inmate code for decades 
(Cloward, 1960; Crewe, 2005; Irwin, 1980; Sykes, 1958; Sykes & Messinger, 1960; 
Thomas & Pool, 1975; Tittle & Tittle, 1964; Trammell, 2012; Wellford; 1967; Wheeler, 
1961), but perhaps the most up to date and comprehensive research on the convict code 
can be found in Mitchell (2018). Data used for this longitudinal mixed-methods study 
came from the National Institute of Justice funded LoneStar Project, and included 802 
TDCJ inmate participants (2014-MU-CX-0111). One of the foci of the LoneStar Project 
was to examine how inmates organize in prison and the role that gangs play in inmate 
organization. Recent research has noted that gangs play a large role in the organization of 
prisoners, and “form and operate to provide essential extralegal governance institutions” 
within correctional communities, particularly as it relates to the illicit market and 
behavioral expectations (Skarbek, 2014, p. 168). 
Important for the current study was the series of questions asked in the survey that 
attempted to quantify the convict code by measuring participant’s adherence to the 
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convict code. A portion of Mitchell (2018) explored the dimensionality of the convict 
code using 799 inmate responses to 16 survey items, and factor analyses. The factor 
analyses suggested that 12 of the 16 items intended to measure the convict code loaded 
well into 4 components: Social Distance (do your time, never talk with prison staff, never 
get too friendly with prison staff), Masculinity (strength and toughness, never show fear, 
defend your reputation), Invisibility (keep to yourself, mind your own business, do not 
leak information), and Survival (do not help prison staff, be loyal to inmates, do not help 
other inmates). 
Despite these well-understood codes, research suggests that the codes are not 
adhered to by all inmates, especially as it relates to the contraband market, but rather 
adherence to these codes is based on the situational context of the matter at hand 
(Clemmer, 1940, Sykes, 1958; Thomas, 1970; Wellford, 1967; Williams & Fish, 1974). 
What goes relatively unexplored in modern research is 1) the potential overlap between 
the convict code and the norms and typical behaviors associated with the inmate 
economy, 2) if there are specific rules or codes associated with the inmate economy that 
fall outside of the purview of the convict code, and 3) the level of adherence to these sub-
rosa economy rules among inmates, and the situations in which a lack of adherence, or a 
violation of the norms, goes unpunished by informal governing bodies such as gangs. 
Additionally, Clemmer suggests that the prisonization process and values held by 
prisoners, if fully adopted, can breed criminality and make the reentry process back into 
society much more difficult, thus leading to recidivism. He also notes that not all inmates 
will adopt the norms and behaviors of the prison population, especially if: 1) their 
sentence is short; 2) they have a stable personality formed by positive pre-prison 
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relationships and acceptable socializations before incarceration; 3) positive relationships 
are maintained with those outside of the prison; 4) they refuse or are unable to assimilate 
to a smaller social group in prison; 5) they blatantly refuse to adopt the norms and 
behaviors or the prison culture; 6) they are fortunate enough to have a work partner or 
cellmate who has not assimilated completely to the prison culture; and 7) they refrain 
from engaging in prison misconduct such as sex and gambling, and are willing to 
participate heavily in work activities and recreational pastimes. Clemmer (1950) also 
outlines the characteristics that may increase one’s likelihood to fully experience 
prisonization and the adoption of prison culture norms and behaviors, and they 
conversely mirror the above mentioned seven influencing factors. 
In sum, Clemmer (1950) suggests that prisonization is a social learning process 
that looks quite similar to what happens in any social group. It includes social 
interactions with others of a different culture and abiding by that culture’s norms, values, 
dogmas, and behaviors in order to gain the acceptance of the group by abiding by the 
inmate code. Goffman (1959) refers to these social interactions as the interaction order, 
and the process as a face-to-face performance (similar to theatre) for the purpose of 
developing and maintaining a respectable impression of one’s self in the eyes of others. 
Goffman’s comparison of these social interactions in everyday life to theatre 
performances developed into what is known as the dramaturgical perspective. 
These sociological researchers, and others, have laid some ground work for 
researchers to expand on perspectives related to prison culture, prisoner adaptation, 
prisoner misconduct, inmate socialization, and eventually the examination of the role 
prison gangs play in the inmate contraband market. Although Clemmer’s seminal work 
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was done during the mid-20th century, he suggests that researchers a century later may 
wish to look back on the standards and values that were held by the inmates in his 
research, and which governed the correctional institutions in the 1940’s and 1950’s. 
The Society of Captives and the Deprivation Model. Preceding Clemmer, 
sociologist and criminologist Gresham Sykes began research for his seminal work The 
society of Captives (Sykes, 1958) in 1954. In The Society of Captives, Sykes conducted 
an exploratory study over a three year period of the social system of the New Jersey State 
Maximum Security Prison to further uncover the patterns and behaviors of inmates within 
the prison’s social system, the failures of total control of a prison population and the 
power dynamics between the guard and the prisoners, the deprivations inmates 
experience in a total institution as compared to free society, and the various roles played 
by inmates in everyday prison life. This work builds on Clemmer’s understanding of the 
social order of prisons and extends what was known about life in prison in the 1950’s. 
In regards to the total control of the prisoners by the guards, Sykes suggests that 
the power that the guards attempt to have over the prisoners by enforcing hundreds of 
policies and regulation is complicated, and these guards often fail to establish this power 
dynamic in the way that the administration suggests it should be established. Not only are 
some prisoners deliberately defiant, they also disobey orders, constantly break minor 
rules, and test guards on their level of adherence to these rules and regulations. Important 
for the purpose of the study is the fact that guards are often unwilling to enforce certain 
rules. They may allow certain prisoner behaviors to go unpunished, and they may have 
trade-offs with prisoners in an attempt to maintain a sense of order and compromise. 
Most importantly, as it relates to this power dynamic and the failures of controlling 
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prisoner populations, is the fact that many guards, in order to reduce conflict between 
themselves and the prisoners, will deliberately ignore certain offenses or ensure that they 
are in no way visually aware that a policy is being broken. These realities, along with low 
pay, high turnover, and an unwillingness to enforce rules seriously threatens the 
authoritative regimes efforts to establish total control, and in turn,  places a large amount  
of informal institutional control in the hands of the prisoners. 
First, when guards do not enforce certain offenses, the inmates use this to their 
advantage and quickly learn what they can get away with in front of certain guards. This 
quickly develops into a type of moral blackmail, and is used to further test the guards. If 
the guard refuses to allow further or more serious infractions, they are condemned by the 
inmates on a personal level and inmates may threaten to tell the guard’s superiors about 
their inability to maintain order and enforce policies by exposing their leniency and 
behaviors that were meant to create compromise with the prisoners. 
Second, once the authoritative regimes power dynamic is corrupted in this 
manner, and the power of the guards have been subverted by trade-offs, deals, and 
leniency, the originally-intended power dynamic is threatened as social distance is 
reduced. Reducing this social distance allows the prisoners to further corrupt the guards 
through grooming processes, coercion, and blackmail. What goes unexplored in Sykes 
(1958) is the relationship between this slow and incremental reduction of social distance 
between guard and inmates and the lengths to which this loss of control can go, especially 
as it relates to contraband. 
Sykes also extended the work of Clemmer on the prisonization process. Sykes 
(1958) identifies five important facets of normal life that inmates are stripped of, or 
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deprived of, during incarceration, and he terms these deprivations or frustrations the pains 
of imprisonment. In other words, Sykes suggests that there are five categories of 
experiences or freedoms in the free society that are taken from inmates once incarcerated, 
and the deprivation of these liberties while incarcerated makes life in prison 
excruciatingly painful. These categories are 1) deprivation of liberty, 2) deprivation of 
goods and services, 3) deprivation of heterosexual relationships, 4) deprivation of 
autonomy, and 5) deprivation of security. Each of these categories are detailed below. 
First is the deprivation of liberty, which refers to the fact that upon confinement, 
prisoners are rejected from society and are restricted to the confines of the prison. They 
are not allowed to leave the facility; see their families and loved ones at will; engage in 
society as they normally would; or move freely about the facility as mobility within this 
prison was highly restricted. Sykes (1958) suggests that the deprivation of liberty 
threatens the prisoner’s self-conception and creates a sense of loneliness, boredom, and 
feelings of rejection. The fact that society has deemed these individuals, based on their 
criminal acts, as morally inferior and worthy of punishment wears on the prisoner and 
leads to them having to find ways to reject their rejectors in order to psychologically 
endure their confinement. Couple this rejection and isolation from society with the loss of 
many rights upon returning to society, and the inmate often develops a hostility towards 
both their captors and the society they were once a part of. 
The second pain of imprisonment noted by Sykes (1958) is the deprivation of 
goods and services. It is true, that while incarcerated, prisoners are clothed, given shelter, 
provided with arguably adequate healthcare, and are fed three meals a day that meet a 
standard caloric intake. When Sykes discusses the deprivation of goods and services, he 
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is not concerned with whether or not the prisoners receive these necessities of life, but 
rather he highlights that 1) These standards may not be perceived by the prisoners as 
adequate, and 2) Beyond these necessities, the deprivation of material amenities is 
perceived by prisoners as a painful loss. Given that Western societies place a great deal of 
importance on material possessions, and in turn these material possessions help one 
establish themselves in a society, being deprived of these material items in prison is 
considered by Sykes to be an attack one’s self-image. Once these material items have 
been stripped from the prisoner upon entry into a prison, this can have an effect on one’s 
feelings of adequacy, self-worth, and societal merit. Sykes suggest that prisoners cope 
with this deprivation of good and services by finding alternative ways of establishing 
merit. 
This deprivation is of particular importance for the current study, as contraband 
are highly sought-after commodities in prison that can, once received, both alleviate this 
pain of imprisonment, and establish merit in a prisoner population (Kalinich, 1980). For 
example, the possession of a pack of cigarettes in society may be seen as a normal 
possession or amenity and may provide very little in terms of one’s merit or social status 
in society. In prison, possession of a pack of cigarettes has far more symbolic importance, 
for both the possessor’s self-image (as this may temporarily reduce this pain) and for 
their merit among the other prisoners. Similar to the way possessions operate in society, 
when a prisoner possesses an amenity that is rare and valued among other inmates, they 
may too feel, in some ways, superior, privileged, or better off than their counterparts. 
Furthermore, possessing the amenity also provides them with something of tangible value 
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that can be used to bargain or trade for other amenities that may help them gain further 
comfort and merit among the prisoner population. 
The third pain of imprisonment discussed in Sykes (1958) is the deprivation of 
heterosexual relationships. Sykes suggest that this lack of access to female companions in 
a perverse male prison setting is nothing shy of dangerous, as masculinity is constantly 
challenged and homosexual relations are not uncommon. The deprivation of heterosexual 
relationships has major implications for one’s self-image, as having a heterosexual 
partner is often seen as a sign of adequacy and worthiness in a free society. Sykes also 
notes that the desire for sexual gratification creates an environment where individuals 
may be exploited for sexual favors. This not only places certain inmates in a greater risk 
of sexual abuse, but it may also place correctional officers, particularly female 
correctional officers, in a position of potential sexual victimization. In short, this 
deprivation is an attack on one’s self image and creates hostile prison environments 
where prisoners are more inclined to do what they deem necessary to alleviate their 
sexual frustrations. 
The fourth pain of imprisonment mentioned in Sykes (1958) is the deprivation of 
autonomy. Once incarcerated, the prisoner’s life is now controlled by far more, rules, 
regulations, policies, and procedures. Their daily routines, movements, and behaviors are 
strictly controlled by their captors. Sykes suggests that the triviality of many of these 
controls begins to wear on the prisoner over time as they lose any and all say-so in how 
they will go about their day, what they will choose to eat, who they will choose to live 
with, and so on. With this level of total control over them, the prisoners become 
dependent, weak, and helpless. Over time, these strictly regimented routines enforced by 
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the captors becomes monotonous, and the prisoner again loses a sense of what it is to 
make decisions for one’s self. 
Sykes suggest that this strict level of control over the prisoners leads to a lack of 
autonomy and increased feelings of hostility towards their captors. Sykes suggests that 
prisoners become increasingly hostile towards their captors when these strict rules, 
regulations, and policies simply do not make sense, and/or are not explained to the 
prisoner. This is an important point as it relates to contraband, as many material items are 
illegal to possess in a correctional institution, yet their illegality may seem trivial and 
often come with subjective enforcement and no explanation. From a prison management 
standpoint, explanations for policies may bring about feelings of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with the policy among the prisoner population. Sykes suggests that this 
lack of explanation for policies by the captor is logical, as the prisoner is in no position to 
challenge institutional polices, and because the situation may actually create further 
hostility if the prisoner population is dissatisfied with the justification given for the 
policy. Sykes mentions that the deprivation of autonomy experienced by prisoners is 
damaging to one’s self image as a self-determining adult member of society. They 
become dependent on the captors to decide their daily routines and soon forget what it is 
like to make decisions for themselves, thus making reentry back into society much more 
difficult. 
The fifth pain of imprisonment noted in Sykes (1958) is the deprivation of 
security. This pain of imprisonment refers to the constant threat to the safety and security 
of prisoners in a penal institutions. As one of Sykes study participants put it, “The worst 
thing about prison is you have to live with other prisoners” (Sykes, 1958, p. 77). Prisons 
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house criminals from all walks of life, who have criminal histories that range from fraud 
to rape and murder. These prisoners cannot rely on the correctional officers for protection 
from those who seek to abuse, violate, and exploit other prisoners. The constant reminder 
that any prisoner, at any time, may attempt to harm another prisoner is a looming thought, 
which applies to not only the weak, but the strong as well. 
Sykes suggests that the deprivation of safety and security is shared by all 
prisoners. Prisoners who do not fare well in a physical altercation or do not stand up for 
themselves will thereafter be seen as an easy target and will have to continue to defend 
themselves and their possessions. Prisoner who have developed a reputation of being 
tough are also at risk of victimization, as other prisoners may want to bolster their 
reputation by attempting to harm or exploit them in front of other prisoners. Sykes 
suggests that this constant lack of security wears on the ego of men in prison and 
challenges their ability to cope with these deprivation. 
Rarely are prisoners able to escape these derivations through psychological retreat 
or physical escape from prisons. Sykes lays out the extreme situations in which prisoners 
may find themselves able to somewhat cope with these pains of imprisonment. One 
extreme is that the prisoners could, in theory, bind themselves to one another with “ties of 
mutual aid, loyalty, affection, and respect, firmly standing in opposition to the officials” 
(Sykes, 1958, p. 82). The other extreme is that prisoners could “enter into a war of all 
against all” where the prisoners are concerned only with their individual well-being and 
possessions, and have no concern for the other prisoners (Sykes, 1958, p. 82). It is 
important to note that: 1) the patterns of daily social interactions in prison fall somewhere 
between these extremes, and 2) these pains of imprisonment cannot be eliminated, but 
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can only be, at the most, mitigated by the social interactions and patterns among the 
prisoners, and the social roles prisoners adopt in daily prison life. 
Inmate Roles. Inmate often adopt roles and engage in certain behaviors while 
incarcerated, that may or may not mirror their behaviors on the outside. Sykes (1958) 
identified a number of categories of typical behaviors and activities that inmates engage 
in. These roles, identified by Sykes, are labeled based on prison language, or argot, and 
include “rats”, “center men”, “gorillas”, “merchants”, “wolves”, “punks”, “fags”, “ball 
busters”, “real men”, “toughs”, and “hipsters”. Rats pose a considerable danger to the 
flow of illegal goods within an institution, as their role in prison is to turn over 
information to correctional officers that they would otherwise be blind to. The presence 
of rats, also referred to as squealers, suggests that the flow of communication among 
prisoners must be closely guarded and shared only with those of certain social groups. 
These individuals are ostracized from the social groups as they have betrayed their fellow 
prisoners. 
The center men are individuals who do not betray their fellow prisoners by 
leaking information to the correctional officers, but rather betray the unity and solidarity 
that they are expected to have with others prisoners as captives. The center men are 
known to share views with their captors, relate to their captors, readily obey any requests 
made by their captors, and publicly identify themselves as sharing the values and virtues 
of their captors. Although center men are not rats or squealers, prisoners despise them for 
their “slavish submission” (Sykes, 1958, p. 91). Although the reasoning behind this 
slavish submission may be a ruse to manipulate the guards, the prisoners in Sykes study 
suggest that this is not the case, and that center men actually do share the values of their 
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captors. This social interaction between these two social roles among captives (rats and 
center men) and their captors is worthy of modern inquiry and will be revisited in the 
results section of the current study. 
The argot term, gorilla, refers to those prisoners who are willing to decrease their 
pains of imprisonment (deprivation of goods and services) by taking goods from other 
prisoners by force or through the simple threat of force. Given the scarce nature of 
material goods within prison (either obtained legally or illegally), gorillas seek to exploit 
weaker inmates who will choose to meet the gorillas requests as opposed to fighting. 
These individuals who use coercive exploitation to gain material items from others have 
established themselves as violent, and are typically not a part of prisoner social groups 
due to their behaviors. 
The argot term merchant, also referred to as a peddler, is an individual who does 
not rely on coercive exploitation to reduce their pains of imprisonment. Instead, these 
individuals rely on their access to commissary items and items that have been stolen from 
the institution, and selling them to other inmates to mitigate their personal pains of 
imprisonment. Sykes suggests that it is typical for prisoners to share or gift small scale 
commissary items to other prisoners when the other inmates do not have them. He also 
found that this was not uncommon to do with items that were stolen from the institution. 
Merchants and peddlers will financially exploit other prisoners by selling these stolen or 
legally purchased material goods at high costs. The merchant is despised by other 
prisoners for their hard bargaining and impersonal dealings, especially as it relates to 
items stolen from the institution. As one inmate mentioned in Sykes study, “The man 
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stealing stuff from the institution is stealing from me. He shouldn’t try to sell it to me” 
(Sykes, 1958, p. 94). 
In other words, both gorillas and merchants violate the solidarity among captives 
in different ways, but are nonetheless hated by the rest of the prisoner population for their 
exploitative behaviors that destroy any sense of mutual-aid and understanding that exists 
among the other captives as it relates to the sharing of both commissary items and items 
that were stolen from the institution. The merchant role is also worthy of modern inquiry, 
especially as it relates to contraband items. It can be argued that desired goods in prison 
are even scarcer than before due to increases security at modern prisons and the lack of 
access to commissary items such as tobacco due to legislation that has prohibited the sale 
or consumption of tobacco in many modern prisons. Given this reality, the merchant role 
will also be revisited in the results section of the current study. 
In so far as wolves, punks, and fags are described in Sykes (1958), wolves are 
those who aggressively seek out other male prisoners for homosexual acts in an effort to 
mitigate their pains of imprisonment (deprivation of sexual relationships) by exploiting 
both punks and fags. By engaging in homosexual relations with other men, they are 
reasserting their masculinity through the only other means available, other males. This 
behavior can be coercive or based on mutual benefit such as exchanging sexual favors for 
material items, other favors, or simply for pleasure. Punks are those who are coerced into 
sexual acts with wolves either through violence or the threat of violence. Fags are those 
who are genuinely homosexual and exhibit feminine characteristics. Wolves are not 
considered feminine by their peers due to their aggressive and coercive pursuit of, by 
default, a male object to sexually exploit. However, punks and fags are not considered 
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masculine as the punk lacks the manliness and toughness to stand up for himself, and the 
fag publically displays feminine characteristics to their peers. 
Ballbusters are described as those inmates who openly defy, disobey, and often 
assault their captors, either verbally or physically. They are also the prisoners who 
frequently create disturbances in the prison and “keeps things all shook up”, resulting in 
increased surveillance and further restrictions for his fellow captives (Sykes, 1958, p. 
100). Explained by a lack of self-control, their difficulty in coping with the pains of 
imprisonment, and an outright refusal to accept their lack of loss of liberty and autonomy, 
the ballbuster essentially makes the lives of their fellow captives more difficult by 
“calling down the wrath of the rulers” for their selfish and childish behaviors (Sykes, 
1958, p. 100). This role too is worthy of inquiry as it relates to a lack of self-control and 
self-containment, and the expectation to “play it cool” in prison when engaging in the 
contraband market (Sykes, 1958, p. 100). This role will also be revisited in the results 
section of this study in light of the behavioral expectations in the contraband market and 
the outcomes that can result from defying these expectations. 
Those who do not exhibit the behaviors of ballbusters and “play it cool” are 
referred to by the argot term real men (Sykes, 1958, p. 100). Real men do their time, 
endure the pains of imprisonment with dignity, maintain self-control, and do not respond 
to their captors with either slavish compliance or explosive and disruptive behaviors. 
Those who are considered real men in Sykes’ study help maintain the behavioral status 
quo of the captives. As Sykes describes, this type of prisoner “regains his autonomy, in a 
sense, by denying the custodians’ power to strip him of his ability to control himself” and 
he is respected and gains the approval of other inmates for these behaviors (Sykes, 1958, 
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p. 102). Again, this role will be revisited in light of the contraband market in the results 
section of this study. 
The last two argot roles described in Sykes (1958) are the tough and the hipster. 
The tough is described as different from the gorilla, as the tough responds to insults 
directed towards him by other inmates with violence, while the gorilla uses violence, or 
the threat of violence, to gain material items. Considered masculine and courageous, and 
feared by the other captives, the tough is quick to respond to other captives with 
calculated violent acts when disrespected. The hipster, can be described as a wanna-be 
tough, who acts much more tough than they are in reality, and is constantly attempting to 
fit in with social groups in prison to which he does not belong. His lack of toughness, 
compare to the argot role of the tough, is evident by the other prisoners and he is often 
quickly dismissed as a fake. 
The Society of Captives (1958) provided future researchers with an understanding 
of five important deprivations felt by prisoners, general yet ever-changing argot roles, 
behavioral expectations of prisoners, a description of the us-versus-them mentality that is 
shared by many prisoners and creates a sense of solidarity and mutual aid, and the 
relationship between cohesive social interactions among prisoners that slightly reduce the 
pains of imprisonment and create an environment where further restrictions and 
surveillance can be controlled, to a certain extent, by the captives. In fact, these 
deprivations have also set the stage for numerous studies to quantitatively examine 
inmate deviance, albeit it has been argued that there is variability across these study 
findings due to issues with model specification and the operationalization of deprivation-
related predictor variables (Butler, 2017). In an effort to illustrate this point, Butler 
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(2017) provides a comprehensive list of previous quantitative studies and their findings 
that were conducted between 1980 and 2015 which examine deviance from the 
deprivation theoretical perspective. 
An area of inquiry that has remained relatively unexamined through the pains of 
imprisonment lens is how these deprivations relate to contraband in correctional facilities. 
These deprivations, argot roles, behavioral expectations, and cohesive responses to these 
deprivations and conditions provide partial grounds for theoretical explanations that 
surround the contraband market and culture that will follow in the results section of the 
current study. 
The Importation Model. Another perspective that has been used to explore the 
predictors of inmate deviance and misconduct is referred to as the importation model. 
Following Clemmer (1940) and Sykes (1958), Irwin and Cressey (1962) suggest that 
inmate behaviors within correctional institutions can be explained not by the prison 
experiences of adaptation and deprivation, but rather through the individual behavioral 
patterns and characteristics that inmates bring with them into the institution from the free-
world. This perspective quickly challenged the deprivation perspective by positing that 
although prison adaptation, socialization, and the pains of imprisonment are likely felt by 
most prisoners, it is the carry-over of inmates’ pre-prison individual, social, and cultural 
characteristics that have the greatest influence and explanatory power as it relates to 
inmate culture and deviant behavior. 
Irwin and Cressey (1962) suggest that the pre-prison socialization (especially with 
criminal sub-cultures and criminal networks) and individual histories of inmates are what 
matter far more in terms of inmate culture and deviance than the actual pains of 
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imprisonment. They also note that inmates import these characteristics which place them 
loosely into one of three sub culture: the criminal subculture, the thief subculture, and the 
legitimate subculture. Irwin and Cressey’s work outlined this importation perspective, 
and by the late 1970’s other researcher began to conceptualize and operationalize these 
pre-prison factors. 
Butler (2017) comprehensively outlines the importation variables that have been 
included in quantitative studies between 1980 and 2015. Some of these factors now 
include: age, sex, race, prior incarcerations, foreign citizen, IQ, self-control measures, 
education level, marital status, parental status, employment prior to incarceration, age of 
first criminal justice system contact, religiosity, anti-social attitudes and beliefs, pre-
prison drug, physical, and sexual abuse, time of first arrest, pre-prison single and 
comorbid mental health issues, neighborhood disadvantage, juvenile incarceration, 
severity of offense, type of offense, community supervision violations, length of 
sentence, and custody level of previous incarceration. 
Interestingly, what is missing from both quantitative and qualitative studies on 
inmate deviance and misconduct in regards to these imported characteristics, is the 
relationship between the geographic distance between the prisoner’s pre-prison residence 
and where they were incarcerated. This is of particular interest as it relates to prisoners 
engaging in the smuggling of contraband and playing a large role in the contraband 
market based on the following three logical assumption: 1) visitations are more likely to 
occur when the prisoner is held in a correctional institution that is near their previous 
residence due to the burden of travel distance, 2) criminal networks and criminal 
subcultures (including friends, family, and fellow gang members) are often developed 
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and reside near where the prisoner most recently resided (save the rare nationwide 
criminal groups and gangs), and 3) inmates who are housed in correctional facilities close 
to where they came from are more likely to have social ties (of varying degrees) with 
correctional officers that work at the correctional facility where they are housed. 
Given these assumptions and the dearth of modern prison contraband research, 
this potential relationship is worthy of inquiry from a qualitative perspective first. The 
current study will also tap into the potential for this phenomenon to come to reality in the 
results section. It is only by conducting qualitative research on this phenomenon that 
research can identify if it actually exists, if and why it matters in relation to correctional 
safety and security, and how it can be quantified in the future with statistical analyses. 
The Situational Model. Another perspective on inmate deviance and misconduct 
suggests that within-prison factors partially explain inmates’ behaviors and it is the 
situation in which the behavior developed that explains why it happened (Endler & 
Mangusson, 1976). The situational model explains inmate deviance and misconduct by 
focusing on: 1) where in the prison the incident occurred and the type of wing the 
incident occurred on, 2) when the offense or deviance occurred in terms of the time of 
day and the temperature, and 3) with whom the offense or deviance occurs, the officer 
who wrote the infraction, and if the incident involved more than one inmate (Steinke, 
1991). In other words, the situational model takes into consideration the where, when, 
and with whom the deviance or misconduct occurs (Drury & DeLisi, 2011; Goldstein, 
1994; Jiang & Fisher-Giorlando, 2002; Steinke, 1991). 
Factors such as the temperature at the time of the incident, crowding, geographic 
location of the facility (climate), staff characteristics, prison architecture, prison 
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organization and management style, and social systems between staff and inmates are all 
considered situational factors. Given some distinct differences and some apparent 
overlaps between deprivation, importation, and situational factors, it is difficult to suggest 
that one particular theory works better as an explanation than the others. In fact, it has 
been suggested that inmate misconduct of all types should be examined by including 
factors from multiple theories (Morris & Worrall, 2014; Wooldredge, 2003) and that it is 
important to consider all three perspectives when providing theoretical explanations for 
inmate behaviors. This approach is particularly relevant when examining contraband 
related activity. Unfortunately, most quantitative studies that examine inmate misconduct 
either do not include a contraband measure, and those that do typically aggregate the type 
of contraband to violent, non-violent and drug, dichotomize the measure, or simply 
include the contraband measure as a count variable. 
In short, quantitative studies provide us with very little information outside of 
whether or not someone received a misconduct ticket for contraband, and how many they 
received. What remains unexplored in modern research are the situational factors such as 
prison architecture, social systems between staff and inmates, and the importance of 
geographic location as it relates to contraband smuggling and deviance that surrounds the 
sub-rosa inmate economy. 
Current Study 
This study seeks to fill gaps in current literature regarding the role that contraband 
plays in everyday life; the prison contraband market; the contraband economy culture; the 
nature of contraband smuggling and dealing; and the relationship between staff and 
inmates who engage in contraband. This will be achieved by relying on in depth semi-
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structured qualitative interviews with male and female ex-inmates who were incarcerated 
in either jails, prisons, or federal facilities. By approaching the current contraband issue 
from a qualitative perspective, and by focusing on the perceptions and experiences of 
those who have lived and experienced the deprivations of imprisonment, fruitful 
information about the current state of the contraband market, culture, and the nature of 
smuggling, dealing, and handling proceeds can be obtained and used to inform policies, 
procedures, and methods to make our prisons safer, more secure, and less vulnerable to 









Data Collection and Methods 
The first section of this chapter will discuss the research questions, sampling 
frame, and eligibility-criteria that were used to identify potential participants. The second 
section will be followed by a discussion of the qualitative method of sampling and the 
sample size obtained. The third section will identify the data collection process and the 
data security measures that were taken to ensure that the data and the participant’s 
identities remain confidential, private, and secure. The fourth section discusses the 
interview questions that were asked to the participants and the key topics of interest that 
these questions attempted to expand on in terms of providing new and useful information. 
The sixth section of this chapter will discuss the coding approach that was used to 
analyze the data obtained from the interviews.  
Research Questions, Sampling Frame, and Eligibility Criteria 
The following qualitative research questions are addressed in the current study: 
1. What were your experiences with contraband while incarcerated? 
2. What were your perceptions of contraband while you were incarcerated? 
The sampling frame for this study consisted of both male and female ex-inmates, 
who have been previously incarcerated in at least one correctional facility in the United 
States, including facilities owned and/or operated by either a public or private entities. 
The term correctional facility includes: county jails, city jails, state prisons, pre-parole 
transfer facilities, intermediate sanction facilities (ISF), developmental disabilities 
programs (DDP), substance abuse felony punishment facilities, state jail facilities, and 
federal corrections facilities. To be eligible to participate in the study, individuals must 
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have been between 18 and 64 years of age and could not have been under any form of 
correctional supervision such as probation, parole, or electronic monitoring at the time of 
the interview. This eligibility criteria was chosen due to the fact that those under the age 
of 18 and over the age of 64, and those that are currently involved in the criminal justice 
system, are considered members of an at-risk group per ethical guidelines that dictate 
special population that are at-risk for participating in research studies. These eligibility 
criterion are put in place to ensure that the welfare and well-being of participants are 
protected, and that their participation in the study in no way interferes with their current 
status as it relates to criminal justice matters. Individuals that did not meet the sampling 
frame and eligibility criteria were not be able to participate in this study. 
Sampling Method and Sample Size 
The participants for this study were identified using a non-probability purposive 
sampling method commonly known as a snowball sampling, or chain referral sampling 
(Biemacki & Waldorf, 1981; Berg & Lune, 2012; Sudman, 1976; Watters & Beirnacki, 
1989). This sampling technique has also been referred to as respondent driven sampling 
(Heckathorn & Jeffri, 2003). The process of snowball sampling begins with asking one, 
or a few, key informants/participants, or gate-keepers, that share similar characteristics 
and are relevant to the research question/s at hand to participate in the study. Once data is 
collected from the gate-keeper/s, they are then asked to provide information about, or 
help recruit, other potential study participants to participate. This results in a sample that 




Snowball sampling is commonly used in social science research when the 
research is aimed at collecting data from hard to reach or hidden populations such as 
armed robbers (Wright & Decker, 2011), residential burglars (Wright, Decker, Redfern, 
& Smith, 1992) active crack-dealers (Jacobs, 1996), drug users (Kaplan, Korf, & Sterk, 
1987; Waters, 2015)  and gangs and gang members (Bubolz & Lee, 2018; Decker, 1996; 
Decker & Van Winkle, 1994; Densley, 2011; Fagan 1989; Tapia, 2015). Snowball 
sampling is beneficial when pre-existing datasets to draw probability samples from are 
not available, and in research studies where participants may be hard to come across or 
identify for recruitment. Thus, this sampling technique does not rely on a probability 
sampling, but rather new participants are referred to researchers by previous participants. 
This snowball sampling technique produced a total sample size of 16 participants (2 
females- 1 white, 1-white and Hispanic; 14 males- 10 white, 4 Hispanic). 
 The fact that there were no African Americans in the sample is likely an artifact 
of snowball sampling and a product of the nature of social ties, in that the gatekeeper was 
a white male and typically individuals are most strongly connected to others that are most 
like them, in this case the likeness is expressed by the color of one’s skin. When 
analyzing the interviews for this study and discussing the findings from these interviews, 
it is important to note that 1) these findings in no way reflect the experiences and 
perceptions of anyone outside of the participant’s, including African American males or 
females, since, unfortunately, none were interviewed for this study. In other words, this 
study does not tap into any perceptions or experiences of African American’s in any way, 
and findings only apply to the perceptions and experience expressed by the participants 
who all happened to be White, Hispanic, or a mixture of White and Hispanic. Also, given 
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the size of the sample used for this study, it would be unreasonable to suggest that the 
findings are in any way generalizable to the larger population of ex-inmates experiences 
and perceptions, nor is that the purpose of this study.   
Data Collection Process 
Data collection for this study began with an initial phone call to an acquaintance 
of the principle investigator requesting their participation in the study. The researcher’s 
acquaintance agreed to participate and serve as the solitary gate-keeper for the rest of the 
sample. A time and location where the interview took place was agreed upon between the 
researcher and the gate-keeper. Once the consent form was read and consent was 
obtained (See consent form in APPENDIX A) and interview had taken place, the 
principle investigator gave several recruiting flyers to distribute to those individuals that 
the gate-keeper thought might be interested in doing an interview (see recruiting flyer in 
APPENDIX B). Potential recruits were either introduced in person by the gatekeeper, or 
were asked by the gatekeeper to contact the principle investigator via telephone to discuss 
the purpose of the study and set up an interview time and location, if they were interested. 
The interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 1 and a half hours, depending on how 
much the participants elaborated on their responses to the questions, and how much 
experience the participants had with contraband and the sub-rosa contraband economy. 
Once those interviews took place, the same recruiting process was explained to those 
participants and they were asked if they knew individuals who fit the selection criteria 
and may want to participate. This process continued until a sample size of 16 was 
reached. Figure 1 below provides a visual representation of the evolution of the snowball 
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Figure 1. Evolution of Snowball Sample.  
 
Interview Setting and Procedures 
The interviews occurred in an agreed upon private setting (residences) where only 
the principle investigator and the participant were present. The location was determined 
based on the level of convenience for the participant in terms of travel and the level of 
privacy provided by the location. The researcher did his best to ensure that the agreed 
upon interview settings provided a highly private environment that significantly reduces 
risks associated with breaches of privacy and confidentiality when compared to 
interviews collected in public settings where others may see, overhear, audio-record, or 
video-record the conversation. Upon arriving at the interview locations, the researcher 
formally introduced himself and the purpose of the research. They were then asked to 
read the informed consent document explaining their rights as a participant. After the 
participants read the document, they were told that they were be free to ask questions 
before the researcher asked them again if they were willing to participate. 
Pre-determined protocols were in place in the event that the individual, for any 
reason, did not decide to participate after the interview instructions. If this occurred, the 
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protocol was to provide them with a copy of the "Consent for Participation in Research" 
document to keep for their records. At that time, the principle investigator was to thank 
the participant for their time and depart the meeting location. However, all participants 
that the researcher met with chose to participate in the full interview. Once the 
participants agreed to participate, they were asked to check the box on the back of the 
informed consent document that states: I understand the above and consent to participate. 
The participant were not asked to provide a signature as this would increase the risks 
associated with breaches of privacy and confidentiality. Once the box was checked, the 
audio recordings and interviews began with the principle investigator reading the 
interview instructions to the participant. The interview instructions are as follows: 
I will be asking you some questions about your perceptions of, and 
experiences with, contraband while you were incarcerated in a correctional 
facility. I want you to understand that your participation is completely 
voluntary, and that the information collected during this interview will be 
kept confidential and your identity will remain anonymous. I will not be 
asking you for any names of inmates, correctional officers, correctional 
facilities, or any identifying information that can be traced back to you or 
anyone else. There will be no incentives given for your participation and 
you can choose to not answer any questions during the interview. You 
may also choose to stop the interview at any time. This interview will be 
audio recorded using a password protected Ipad. The audio files will then 
be transferred to two encrypted external hard drives until they are 
transcribed into text. At that time the original audio file will be deleted 
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from the IPad. The two encrypted hard drives containing the audio file 
will be stored in a secure location under lock and key until they have been 
transcribed into text. Once the audio files have been transcribed and any 
identifying information has been anonymized, the audio files will be 
deleted from the external hard drives to ensure confidentiality. 
At the beginning of each section of questions, the principle investigator, per IRB 
request, reiterated the individual’s rights as a participant to ensure that informed consent 
had been maintained throughout the interviews. Upon completion of the interviews, the 
audio recording was stopped and the participant were asked if they knew other 
individuals who might fit the selection criteria and may be willing to participate in this 
research. Participants that stated that they did know other who may want to participate 
were given as many recruiting flyers for the study as they felt needed to pass on to those 
individuals. Those participant that did not know anyone else that may want to participate 
were still given 3 recruiting flyers in case they later thought of someone who may be 
willing to participate. The participants were also be reminded that the study will be 
available for them to read upon its completion and they were left with a copy of the 
informed consent form for their records. 
Interview Questions 
There were 27 interview questions that the participants were asked to answer, two 
of which were demographic questions that asked the participant to self-identify their 
race/ethnicity and their gender. The other 25 questions were separated into three general 
sections. Given that these interviews were semi-structured, probing questions and follow-
up questions were often asked when appropriate so that the most detailed and used data 
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could be obtained. The first section of questions focused generally on perceptions of 
contraband and included questions that aimed to tap into the role that contraband played 
in everyday life while incarcerated, the perceived relevance of the type of correctional 
facility, and other relevant factor such as race and gang membership that the participants 
perceived to be related to the availability, accessibility, and pricing of contraband. 
Questions for Section 1 (perceptions of contraband) are listed below: 
1. What role, if any, did contraband play in your everyday life while incarcerated? 
2. Did the custody level of the unit or wing you were on play a role in the type of 
contraband available? If so, in what way? 
3. Did the type of facility (either public or private) play a role in the availability of 
contraband? If so, in what way? 
4. Did the type of facility (either public or private) play a role in the price of contraband? 
If so, in what way? 
5. What factors do you believe had the most influence on the price of contraband in 
correctional facilities? 
6. Did ones gang membership or affiliation seem to matter in terms of accessing 
contraband? If so, why do you believe it mattered? 
7. Did race play a role in access to contraband? If so, in what way? 
Section 2 questions are related to participant’s knowledge of contraband and 
contraband networks. These questions aimed to tap into specific details about the 
knowledge participants had in regards to the methods that were used to bring contraband 
into facilities; methods of contraband purchase and distribution among the offenders 
including specific details about the use of electronic money transfer systems; any 
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knowledge of corruption occurring among correctional officer or staff that involved 
contraband; the relationship between these officers and contraband involved offenders 
and any common individual traits that were apparent among correctional officer and/or 
staff and the inmates that were involved in contraband (race, gender, age, years of 
service, gang affiliation, family ties, neighborhood ties, proximity of facility to 
residence); and any knowledge of unwritten rules that govern contraband access, 
purchasing, possession, or distribution. Questions for Section 2 (knowledge of 
contraband and contraband networks) are listed below: 
1. Do you have any knowledge about how contraband was being brought into the 
facility/ies where you were incarcerated? If so, could you elaborate on how this task was 
carried out? 
2. How was contraband purchased by other inmates once it entered the prison?  
3. Do you have any knowledge of the use of electronic money transfers to pay for 
contraband, including but not limited to JPay, Greendot cards, PayPal, or any other form 
of electronic money transfer? If so, can you explain how this works and any issues with 
doing so? 
4. Did you have any knowledge of corruption occurring among the correctional officers 
or staff at any of the facilities you were incarcerated at that is specific to contraband? If 
so, could you elaborate on your perception of what happened? 
5. Can you describe the relationship between the inmates and the correctional officers or 
staff members involved in the contraband market? What did this look like? 
6. Do you have any knowledge about how these relationship were formed? 
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7. Was it common for the inmates to know which officers or staff members were 
involved in corruption as it relates to contraband? If so, did these correctional officers or 
staff members behave any differently than correctional officers or staff members that 
were not known to engage in contraband? 
8. Do you believe that the gender of a correctional officer or staff member is in any way 
related to the probability that they will be corrupted into engaging in the contraband 
market? If so, can you explain why and how you believe the gender of the correctional 
officer plays a role? 
9. Were there any common traits among the correctional officers or staff that were 
involved in corruption as it relates to contraband such as race, gender, age, years of 
service as a correctional officer, family member of someone incarcerated? 
10. Was there anything in common among the inmates involved in the contraband 
smuggling such as gang membership/ affiliation, race, family ties, neighborhood ties, 
number of previous incarcerations, or the proximity of their residence to the facility/ies? 
11. Do you have any knowledge of “unwritten rules” that govern contraband access, 
purchasing, possession, or selling? If, so, what were some of these un-written rules? 
Section 3 questions pertained to participant’s personal feeling and experiences 
surrounding contraband. These questions touch on the relationship between violence and 
contraband, and the dangers of engaging in the contraband market while incarcerated; 
whether or not the presence of correctional officer or staff corruption, as it relates to 
contraband, had an impact on the way they viewed their punishment (incarceration) and 
the criminal justice system as a whole; and their beliefs about how offenders’ and their 
institutional behaviors may change if it was possible to completely eradicate contraband 
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from prisons. Section 3 questions (personal feelings surrounding contraband) as listed 
below: 
1. Can you describe the relationship between contraband and violence within correctional 
facilities? 
2. Are there any dangers of engaging in the contraband black market in correctional 
facilities? If so, can you describe the potential dangers of doing so? 
3. Did the presence of corruption among correctional officers or staff have an impact on 
the way you view incarceration as punishment?  If so, in what way? 
4. Did the presence of corruption among correctional officers or staff have an impact on 
the way you perceive the criminal justice system? If so, in what way? 
5. Based on your perception of the role that contraband plays in everyday prison life, if it 
was possible to remove all contraband from a facility, how do you believe the inmates 
would respond to this? 
6. Based on your perception of the role that contraband plays in everyday prison life, if it 
was possible to remove all contraband from a facility, do you believe this would change 
inmates’ institutional behaviors, and if so, how? 
7. Do you have any ideas about how correctional facilities can best keep contraband out 
of prisons? 
Qualitative Coding Approach 
Grounded Theory Qualitative data can be coded and analyzed from many 
different angles and can take many forms. Qualitative data analysis approaches help the 
researcher outline the method used to organize and make sense of qualitative data. 
Qualitative interview data that is collected is oftentimes analyzed using a grounded 
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theory approach (Glasser & Strauss, 1967). This method of qualitative data analysis, and 
the modified version of it, are suggested to be extremely common in qualitative research 
(Charmaz & Belgraves, 2002). Grounded theory is very much an inductive approach to 
research. Contrary to deductive research designs where hypotheses are developed and 
tested based on pre-existing theories, inductive researchers “take empirical social 
phenomena as their starting point and seek through the process of research and analysis to 
generate broader theories about social life” (Gilbert & Stoneman, 2015, p. 99). 
In other words, deductive research takes a data-first approach to theoretical 
development, while inductive research is developed based on pre-existing theory/ies. The 
current study relied on the grounded theory approach to qualitative data analysis, which 
suggests that theories that describe or explain a phenomenon will be grounded in the 
qualitative data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). By coding the data, interpreting the codes, and 
re-reading and comparing these codes and interpretations researchers are able to draw 
theoretical explanations for the responses provided in the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
The idea behind grounded theory approaches to data analysis is that the researchers will 
read a piece qualitative data, then re-read the data while simultaneously gathering and 
coding the data into categories and concepts that will be compared across other pieces of 
data in hopes of developing a theory that explains the social phenomenon or behavior, or 
relating the findings back to pre-existing theories. 
When analyzing qualitative data using grounded theory, the process begins at the 
outset of the first interview or piece of qualitative data and is an ongoing process as more 
data is collected. Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) grounded theory has been well accepted by 
many fields that use qualitative data and has experiences some modifications since its 
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inception (Charmaz, 2014). The current study relies on one of these modifications 
presented in Corbin and Strauss (1998) and is referred to as the three-step method.  The 
first step to this three step process is known as open coding. Open coding begins by 
reading the first qualitative document and identifying and labeling concepts and 
properties that are related to the research questions at hand. As the researcher continues 
on to reading the next interview, conceptual codes will be created for this interviews as 
well and will be constantly compared to previously-identified conceptual labels, altering 
these labels as necessary. This process will result in new concepts, conceptual labels, and 
concept properties which are key to making sense of qualitative data when using this 
method. 
The second step is referred to as axial coding. During this step of the analysis the 
researcher will compared the conceptual labels and combine them into larger overarching 
categories. (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). These categories are also constantly being 
compared with other conceptual concepts to determine if and how they can be combined 
into other larger overarching categories. The last step to the three step process is referred 
to as selective coding. This step requires the researcher to reexamine all of the conceptual 
labels, and categories for the purpose of identifying main categories or themes that 
develop from these overarching categories. The idea here is to collapse the categories into 
main themes or “central categories” that address the research questions at hand and can 
be used to develop new theory or theories or to relate back to pre-existing theories if no 
new theories or explanations for the phenomenon arise from this process. 
The key to the grounded theory approach is to constantly compare concepts, 
conceptual labels and their properties, and collapse these concepts into larger categories 
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which will then be further collapsed into larger over-arching themes. Throughout this 
process, it is possible that the researcher may identify new concepts or areas of inquiry 
that may drive the interview questions in slightly different directions or provide insight 
on questions that were not included in the original interview questions. Semi-structured 
interviews, as oppose to structured interviews, allow for these new concepts and areas of 
inquiry to be explored with the use of follow-up questions and/or probing questions. The 
constant reexamination and analysis of the data as the data is being collected provides the 
researcher with this insight and the opportunity to explore these concepts further (Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967). 
Crime Script Analysis Section 2 of the interview questions asked participants 
about their knowledge of contraband and contraband networks while incarcerated. Aside 
from using grounded theory approaches to analyzing qualitative responses, qualitative 
data that examines the detailed involvement of actors, their roles in a scene, processes, 
and actions taken to complete a task can also be analyzed using script analysis (Schank & 
Abelson, 1977). Schank and Abelson (1977) define a script as “a predetermined, 
stereotyped sequence of actions that define a well-known situation in a particular 
context” (Schank and Abelson, 1977, p. 41). When researchers attempt to use script 
analysis to further understand the process of criminal activity, this is referred to as crime 
script analysis. 
As noted in the literature review section of this dissertation, crime scripts are used 
in “highlighting the procedural aspects of crimes” (Cornish, 1994, p. 175). Crime script 
analysis can be used to further understand the steps taken in crime-commission and can 
be used to create crime prevention techniques. Given that the actions that were discussed 
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in each interview are criminal in nature, when appropriate, crime script analysis will be 
applied for the purpose of understanding the ties between actors, the processes involved 
in smuggling contraband, and the process of contraband distribution and transferring 
money out of the correctional facility to the free-world in an effort to inform crime 
prevention methods as they relate to contraband in correctional facilities.  
This process may involve identifying the actors involved, their roles, the flow of 
resources and/or communications, and any decisions made about when and how to move 
forward with, stall, or abort these criminal operations. If data obtained from the 
interviews is shown to be fruitful after analyzing the data in detail, link analysis (using 
UCInet software) will also be used to visualize the smuggling network, the actors, and the 





The following chapter of this dissertation will discuss findings from the 16 
interviews that were collected, beginning with a brief description of the types of facilities 
participants experienced. This chapter will then outline the main themes and subsequent 
sub-themes that emerged from the data. A total of seven main themes were discovered 
from the data, which include: the role of contraband in everyday life; the inmate 
economy; the unwritten rules of the contraband market; grooming and inmate-
correctional officer relations; contraband smuggling methods; the impact of contraband 
and corruption on perceptions of punishment and the criminal justice system, and 
perspectives on curbing contraband in correctional facilities. These themes are ordered in 
a way that allows readers to understand prison contraband and the inmate economy 
phenomenon from a bottom-up approach. In other words, the order of the main themes 
are not reflective of their importance or frequency of mention, but rather they are 
presented in a way that introduces readers to these phenomena and then progresses in an 
orderly narrative interpretation of the participant’s perceptions of and experiences with 
contraband in correctional facilities as the chapter progresses through the main themes 
and subthemes.      
Although interview questions did not focus specifically on the types of units 
participants were incarcerated in, it was common for participants to name both the unit 
and the type of facility in an effort to provide context as they discussed their perceptions 
and experiences surrounding contraband. Out of concerns for anonymity and 
confidentiality, and in accordance with Sam Houston State University IRB protocol, the 
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names of facilities and locations will not be discussed. With that said, participants 
experienced numerous types of correctional facilities including small county jails (3 
participants), large county jails (14 participants), court-mandated county drug 
rehabilitation facilities (2 participants), state prisons across 4 southern states (13), and 
federal correctional facilities in two southern states (2 participants). It was common for 
participants who experienced state and federal prison to also have experienced county 
jails as well, as participants are held in these types of jails upon arrest and after 
conviction in a court of law until they are transferred to either a state prison or federal 
prison. In other words, all of the participants did not experience prison, but every 
participant experienced either a small or large county jail at least once. Only two 
participants were held in privately owned correctional facilities (pre-parole transfer 
units). 
Main Theme 1 - The Role of Contraband in Everyday Life 
The first theme that emerged was the role that contraband played in everyday life 
while incarcerated. The interview data suggests that contraband indeed played a large 
role in the lives of the participants. This is not to suggest that each participant actively 
engaged in the buying, selling, and/or smuggling of major contraband every day 
(although six participants were heavily and constantly involved in at least one of these 
activities). However, all 16 participants, at one time or another during the interviews, 
made it a point to note the breadth of items that can be considered contraband, and given 
this reality, nearly everyone in prison, including hyper-religious inmates, were perceived 
to engage in the contraband market to some extent, which highlights the first sub theme: 
contraband’s wide net. 
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Subtheme 1 - Contraband’s wide net. As mentioned in the literature review 
section of this dissertation, based on correctional policies, contraband essentially includes 
anything inmates are not allowed to possess. In other words, if an inmate did not 
purchase the item from commissary, or was not given the item by the correctional 
agency, the item was considered contraband. For instance, one participant mentioned: 
Chris: The guys in the kitchen will cook extra cookies and sell them out of 
the kitchen floor for a couple of stamps. That’s one of the little contraband 
hustles. Or cheeseburgers – guys in the kitchen, you know, whatever the 
guys in the kitchen cook, the guys will work it out so that they are 
throwing a bunch of cheeseburgers, patties of cheese, throw that together, 
then they give it to the guys working out on the floor in the kitchen, ten of 
them selling them for three stamps a piece which is $1. You keep $7 and I 
get $3 – whatever. That’s a form of contraband – illegal cheeseburgers, 
cookies, brownies, shit like that. Almost everybody in there is going to – 
you know, even the hardcore, dedicated, carry a Bible with them 
everywhere they go, they will buy a cookie from the kitchen. 
Other forms of contraband that were not necessarily considered major contraband 
by the participants included Koolaid; bleach (highly sought-after item); any food items 
from the kitchen including meats, yeast, sugar, vegetables, and desserts; books with 
someone else’s inmate ID on them; magazines over 3 months old; pornographic images 
showing penetration; any commissary items that were exchanged between inmates for 
which the recipient did not have a receipt; a free-world click pen; wife beaters (tank 
tops); non-issued thermals for the winter; and altered agency-distributed clothing. Both 
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female participants highlighted the value of small “girly stuff” such as women’s head 
bands, good hair ties, and the necessity for higher quality free-world tampons compared 
to the cardboard applicator tampons given out by the correctional agencies. One female 
participant discussed issues related to women’s menstrual cycles and the value of high 
quality women’s products. 
Kim: you have to use these cardboard applicators, as a female they’re 
horrible, the tampons there are absolutely terrible, they don’t work so if 
you do have heavy periods like, some of the girls there would take and 
make diapers out of pads because the tampons sucked so bad… ya and 
some of the girls there have endometriosis where it like, you have a 
miscarriage pretty much (heavy bleeding), so I felt really bad for them 
once they stopped the tampons from coming in, some of them really 
needed them, some of them were crying like “what the fuck am I going to 
do?” It was just horrible it really was, like I felt sorry for the laundry 
people. 
Although all of these items were considered contraband, these items were not 
always confiscated and disciplinary cases were not always written for possession of these 
items because their presence was either of little consequence to the safety, security, and 
order of the prison, or because the participants had good rapport and/or pre-existing 
relationships with the correctional officers. Participants also suggested that contraband 
was a form of entertainment (especially sports gambling), a way of getting to know the 
inmate population and who is in charge,  and a way of passing time or staying busy, 
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which highlights and introduces the next subtheme: contraband as a form of 
entertainment and socialization. 
Subtheme 2 - Contraband as forms of entertainment and socialization. 
Nine participants discussed the entertainment role that contraband played in their 
everyday life while incarcerated. These participants suggested that contraband provided 
them with an outlet and something to think about and look into besides the rumors and 
gossip of everyday prison conversations. Gambling, sports betting, and the wheeling and 
dealing of commissary items also allowed them to spend their time doing something 
other than politicking and fighting. Prison was described by several (n=8) participants as 
being especially boring, and contraband helped alleviate their boredom by giving them 
something to do. Interestingly, two participants (Chris and Jack) mentioned the age old 
phrase, “idle hands are the devil’s playground,” in that when inmates were engaged in 
some form of contraband, they weren’t fighting and causing larger problems within the 
facility. As one participant noted, contraband simply keeps inmates busy: 
Frank: You know, if you have never been inside, you don’t see how much 
of the day is controlled by fucking contraband. Look, everybody in jail 
wants to believe they are a hustler. These people will fucking hustle over a 
goddamn packet of salt. You know? “No, no, it’s soup. It’s two soups.” I 
mean, they just want to argue and talk and fucking deal and wheel about 
everything. Literally from a fucking toenail clipper to a $500 cell phone. 
They will hassle and deal and that keeps them busy and gives them 
something to do. It might not be the most constructive thing to do but it’s 
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keeping them from killing each other… If I can talk to you about making 
money off you, I don’t want to kill you. 
Contraband was also expressed to serve as a way to socialize, network, and 
understand the nature of the pecking order among the inmates. This was said to be 
important since inmates must get along (to some extent) with each other, even if they do 
not particularly like each other. The presence of contraband and the existence of this sub-
rosa system allows for inmates to network and socialize with each other, even if this 
socialization occurs only for the purpose of making a profit and establishing a sense of 
credit and respect among the other inmates. Contraband also served as a way to get to 
know who is in charge in a particular part of the facility, who to watch out for, and who 
you would need to get to know if you wanted a particular type of contraband. Being able 
to “read a hustle” was expressed by four participants as a very important skill when it 
comes to socialization, gaining access to contraband, and self-preservation.  As Frank put 
it: 
Frank: it’s a good way to network. Anytime you hit a new block, you need 
to find out what’s going on, who is in charge, who does what, who runs it, 
and an easy way to find that out is through contraband. Aside from tattoos 
and simple stuff like that, the easiest way to find out who is in charge is 
through the contraband game. If you can read a hustle in the free world, 
you catch onto it sooner or later. You would figure it out sooner or later. It 
might take you two or three weeks. If you are young – you are 17, 18, 20 – 
whatever, you know, you are not necessarily going to be able to pick up on 
it quick. Somebody is going to have to tell you, but if you’ve seen it in the 
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free world, it’s easy enough to pick up on after a couple of weeks if you 
are paying attention. 
 The presence and availability of a wide range of contraband items within 
correctional facilities allow inmates numerous opportunities to engage in socialization, 
profit-making, and activities that keep them entertained. However, some participants 
mentioned that both the presence and absence of contraband can also vastly impact the 
culture and order within a correctional facility as well, which lead to the next subtheme: 
contraband, culture, and order. 
Subtheme 3 - Contraband, culture, and order. Perhaps one of the most 
interesting subthemes of main theme 1 is the ways in which both the presence and 
absence of contraband shapes the culture and order of correctional populations. 
Participants were asked probing questions in regards to the ways that contraband affects 
everyday life while incarcerated when it is both present and abundant (referred to as 
“flooded” by some participants), and when contraband is absent or scarce (referred to as 
“dry” by some participants). Not surprisingly, inmate culture, behaviors, and order within 
the prison are all shaped in drastically different ways when correctional facilities are 
flooded with contraband when compared to when facilities that are dry. Almost 
unanimously, participants suggested that inmate culture and the correctional environment 
is calmer and less violent when correctional units have a large quantity of contraband 
within them. There were two reason given that explain this phenomenon. 
First, when inmates have access to contraband (particularly marijuana),  six 
participants suggested that others would keep to themselves and not cause many issues 
because they are high, and for those few hours, simply zoned out and enjoying 
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themselves. Frank discussed his experience in a large county jail where marijuana was 
not only readily available, but correctional staff were aware of it and did nothing. Juan 
considered the change in inmate culture and the lack of correctional staff response to the 
marijuana to be a win-win for both inmates and staff. 
Frank: When we had marijuana on my block, we didn’t have a fight for 
four months. And not everybody was smoking every day. I mean, to them, 
that’s a benefit. That’s a net gain to a correction officer. “I don’t have to 
go in there and whoop anybody’s ass or worry about me getting hurt.” My 
experience, however, personally, was when marijuana was available and 
freely available, violence went down significantly. Like I said, this is a 
place where fights happen twice a day and in a block of 50 people twice a 
day somebody is beating the shit out of each other. 
 Second, when contraband was available, particularly drug-related contraband, 
five participants noted that inmates would not want to draw any attention to their area of 
the facility by fighting and causing disturbances because those behaviors would likely 
lead to shakedowns and lockdowns, which in turn would result in their contraband being 
confiscated. Not only would these shakedowns and lockdowns upset and discomfort the 
inmate population because they would be confined to their cells and would no longer 
have access to these luxuries, but this often resulted in numerous inmates getting caught 
with contraband, and a scarcity of contraband thereafter until more contraband was 
introduced to that area of the facility. In sum, the presence of contraband was seen by 
numerous participants as a way of establishing normative and acceptable behaviors, and 
keeping order within the facility, especially as it relates to violence. 
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On the contrary, when contraband was not readily available, especially drug-
related contraband, nine participants suggested that the environment becomes more 
hostile and violence was much more common. There were four reason given that explain 
this phenomenon. First, and related to subtheme 2, when contraband was not readily 
available, inmates needed to fill the extra time they would spend entertaining themselves 
through wheeling and dealing contraband with other activities such as conversing and 
arguing over politics and getting into physical altercations. Juan discussed what happens 
when contraband is scarce and inmates have extra-time on their hands. 
Juan: So, when you take away all that time and you take away all that 
communication, you literally leave hours and hours and hours of the day 
for the inmate to, you know, find what else they need to do to supplement 
that time for, and when you are in a jail and there ain’t nothing to do. Can 
you imagine what trouble you could probably get into if you have an extra 
four or five hours?… What am I going to do to kill five extra hours? I 
guarantee you, it isn’t reading. So, you know, they are going to talk to 
each other and when inmates talk to each other… they don’t agree on 
something and the next thing you know it starts getting loud and they start 
arguing with each other and one person wants to be physical with the other 
and the next thing you know a fight is breaking out over Donald Trump or 
Hillary Clinton, who should be the president, and the next thing you know 
you have a big brawl.  
Second, it was expressed that inmates have an incentive to behave when 
contraband is readily available because poor behavior and disturbances will lead to 
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shakedowns, lockdowns, and free-world charges (charges handled by local county 
courts). When contraband is not readily available, or the area is “dry,” inmates have very 
little incentive to behave because they have very little to lose in terms of those 
contraband luxuries. Third, when contraband is not available, participants noted that 
inmates do not have their escapes and ways of relieving the deprivations of prison life. 
The effect of being deprived of those contraband luxuries was described by Chad as, 
“taking a bottle away from a baby, they'll cry, and it leads to a lot of violence because 
there’s no reason to act right anymore.” Fourth, when contraband is scarce, or the unit is 
dry, especially regarding drug-related contraband, the heavy drug-using inmates begin to 
withdraw, which can lead to violent outbursts and fights over the very few drugs that are 
available. 
This change in behavior and culture based on the presence or absence of 
contraband (particularly marijuana) is partially illustrated in the following comments 
made by Jake: 
Jake: When you have weed on you, you aren’t going to pick a fight with 
someone and let these guards rush in on you... What are you going to do? 
You got it in your sock or something and now you are busted. You got a 
free-world charge, so you aren’t going to dabble around and do anything 
stupid. And when you don’t have it, it’s just like I said, idle hands are the 
devil’s playground. You are going to find something to entertain you or 
give you some kind of emotion and whether it’s nervousness, fear, or 
adrenaline, or whatever it is, you know, you push buttons. 
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The reasons given for buying, selling, and using contraband while incarcerated were wide 
spread, but two thing that were relatively consistent across the interviews were the feeling 
of relief that participants got from having certain luxuries (n=10), and the desire to make 
money (N=6), which leads to the next subtheme: motivations for engaging in contraband.  
Subtheme 4 - Motivations for engaging in contraband. Throughout the 
interviews, participants discussed why they engaged in contraband, and what purpose it 
served in their everyday lives while incarcerated. The most common response (n=10) was 
that contraband items made them feel that as if they had some attachment to the outside, 
as it provided a sense of freedom and comfort in a place of deprivation, where freedom 
and comfort are highly sought-after feelings, yet rare to come by. Contraband was also 
suggested to serve as an escape from prison, and an avenue to remove one’s self from the 
realities of incarceration. The following quote sums up these feelings held by many 
participants:  
Jake: So contraband is kind of your hold on the outside world. You feel 
kind of normal when you can smoke weed or smoke cigarettes or dip, you 
know, because you can do that in the world. It gives you a little freedom. 
So, I think that contraband is kind of a way to escape prison. 
Aside from alleviating their boredom and creating an avenue for entertainment 
noted in sub theme 2, participants suggested that having contraband, especially drug-
related contraband and cleaning products (bleach), gave them some form of control over 
their situation and allowed them to do things that they would normally do in the real 
world, such as using drugs and tobacco and cleaning their own clothes. As mentioned in 
the literature review and Subtheme 1, bleach is a hot commodity in correctional facilities, 
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and something as simple as bleach in the free world can make all the difference to an 
incarcerated population. One participant, Todd, discussed his obsession with washing his 
own clothes and how the simplicity of doing so made him feel especially hygienic, 
different from a large portion of the prison population that did not do so, and gave him 
some form of agency over his own health given the lousy nature of prison laundry 
services. 
Another participant, Jack, went into depth in regards to the value he placed on 
consistently making prison wine (3 gallons every 3-4 days) and trading a portion of his 
yield for marijuana. These illegal luxuries allowed him to escape from the deprivations he 
experienced in solitary confinement.  
Jack: So, if I had some gallons, one was usually for a joint – to trade for a 
joint and the other two or three gallons would be sold and me and a dude – 
a [name of prominent prison gang] next door to me on this side we would 
all get drunk, fucking talk shit, and be drunk and there was that escape. Or, 
I could light up a joint, drink me some wine, put on my headphones, and 
I’m out of prison. It’s that escape, I can put on my headphones and listen 
to my music and be stoned, drink me a fucking glass of wine and have me 
a buzz, and for a few hours, I’m cool. I feel good…  It just gives you that 
feeling of a joint that’s going to make me feel like I’m not in there for a 
little while. 
Some participants (n=6) were motivated to engage in contraband because it both 
provided a sense of excitement while incarcerated and made them feel as if they were 
getting over on the correctional officers when they got away with buying, selling, using 
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contraband, and engaging in illegal activities. Referring back to the extreme boredom that 
participants experienced while incarcerated, the consumption of contraband such as 
drugs, alcohol, and tobacco gave them something to look forward that was exhilarating 
and fun. One participant, Blake, mentioned that he made a phone call on an 
administrator’s office phone while working as a floor worker. He was not motivated by 
the nature of the phone call per se because he was set to be released within two weeks 
anyways, but rather he was motivated by the excitement of sneaking into the office, and 
getting away with making this illegal phone call. Blake also discussed the excitement he 
got from getting away with smoking cigarettes and marijuana, and taking pills. 
Blake: In a way it was a little exciting, you know, to be able to get away 
with doing something like that. I mean, just the character that I am. It’s 
like a little rush, man. Now, we do it because as I said the sense of 
adventure and to get away. I was fortunate. I smoked tobacco in there. I 
took pills in there, you know? I smoked weed in there and I never got 
caught with it. I didn’t put myself out there, but it was a little exciting to 
be hiding and be smoking. 
Another motivation for engaging in contraband was for the potential to earn 
profits from the sale of contraband and to survive in prison if they do not have 
commissary money. Depending on the contraband item being sold, one participant 
reported making up to ten times his initial investment after selling the contraband to other 
inmates. Jordan mentioned, “I made a killing on things like spice and marijuana, like ten 
times as much as you can on the streets.” Several participants (n=6), were continuously 
involved in the selling of contraband. They ran what was referred to as a “store box” or 
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“store.” A store was described as a one stop shop for scarce commissary items, and 
numerous other forms of contraband. These participants sold contraband in order to 
afford commissary (n=3), purchase or trade their contraband for other contraband for 
personal use (n=4) (as shown in Jack’s quote above), and/or to make money that they 
could give to their families during visitation or send to their families through other means 
that will be discussed later in this chapter (n=3). For example, Frank mentioned why 
other inmates would sometimes engage in the selling or trading of contraband.   
Frank: I mean, there is a lot of people in there that don’t have money on 
their books, that don’t have ways – the way they survive and get 
commissary and get food is by fucking doing contraband. 
Carlos specifically mentioned that he himself sold contraband so that he could purchase 
and eat food that was sold in commissary instead of relying solely on the regular daily 
meals provided by the correctional agency.  
Carlos: It played a big role in my life because for a large time while I was 
incarcerated, I sold contraband, or I would get contraband in to sell it just 
so that I could eat. You know? 
Chris told a story about a fellow inmate who saved a large sum of earnings from 
selling contraband cellphones, and was able to smuggle the earnings to his family 
during visitation. An excerpt from this story is shown below. 
Chris: The largest amount of cash that I have even seen in my life was in 
prison. He had $10,000 in cash. He had been there like 20 years and he 
had just been saving money and he got out of seg [solitary confinement] 
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and he finally got visitation, so he was going to take all that money and he 
was going to give it to his family. 
In sum, motivations for engaging in contraband ranged from feelings of escapism 
and normalcy, to individual survival and familial financial support. 
Main Theme 2 - The Inmate Economy 
Interview data suggests that the sub-rosa inmate economy operates in a somewhat 
similar fashion as licit economies in the free-world. Similar to economies in the free-
world, in the inmate economy there are several factors that direct business practices. One 
large difference is that licit economies are often regulated by regulatory agencies and 
legislation that comes with specific penalties for illegal business practices, while the 
inmate economy is a self-regulating economy with a large amount of variation in 
discretion and potentially life threatening penalties enforced by those who control this 
sub-rosa economy. Main theme 2 and its sub-themes shed light on the current state of the 
inmate economy in terms of who governs this economy and why; the characteristics of 
those who typically sell contraband; the types of major contraband that are available; who 
can buy contraband; factors that dictate how much an individual is charged for 
contraband; and the means by which contraband is currently purchased. 
Subtheme 1- The governing body. Male participants unanimously (n=14) 
mentioned that the governing body/ies of the contraband market are typically prison 
gangs. These prison gangs vary mainly by race/ethnicity, however several gangs do exist 
within each race/ethnic category. Furthermore, some prison gangs are not race specific at 
all, but rather defined by one’s religion. For example, Chris stated that, “Religion, 
religions are gangs in prison now [Muslims]. They are definitely like a militarized 
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criminal organization in the penitentiary. They have a whole ranking structure. They do 
things like sell drugs even though it’s completely against their religion.” These prison 
gangs are not only largely in charge of gaining access to contraband, but they also 
dominate the market, control the flow of contraband, govern the dealing within the 
inmate economy, and maintain order within the facilities by correcting behaviors through 
the enforcement of punishments handed down for frowned-upon business practices. As 
Jessie explained, “it is basically run by the gangs, it’s all gang related, ya, gangs have 
power over the contraband market for sure.” Jordan mentioned that, “A lot of it was race 
and gang related, they just had the connects [resources to smuggle and deal] and the 
power.” Participant also suggested that both the power of numbers and the threat of 
violence that prison gangs exhibit allow them to rule over the inmate economy. One 
participant noted:  
Jake: Yeah, typically all gang. You know, it’s kind of like with the 
mafia… the mafia is just known to deal in criminal activities and 
organized crime. Same thing in gangs. Just because if you are not in a 
gang in prison, you really have no power, or you have no say-so. You are 
just overpowered. It’s kind of a monopoly… So, I mean, every single time 
that I have ever seen or purchased or dealt with contraband, it’s always 
been with someone who has been affiliated with it just because you have 
the power. You are the ones. It’s kind of like if someone was solo or by 
himself that did it, you know, I mean, people are just going to – who is to 
stop anybody from coming to take his stuff? Nobody, because if they did, 
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nobody is going to back him up unless he’s paying someone, of course. 
So, it’s pretty much 100 percent run by the gangs.   
These prison gangs were said to dispute over contraband related issues, however 
this was often settled through discussions among the leaders, since money is involved and 
these issues can escalate quickly into seriously dangerous situations, as Chris mentioned: 
“But yeah, that [unresolved contraband issues between gangs] would just be a war and it 
would probably turn into a killing war. And that is what keeps most of the violence from 
happening”. Despite the extremely violent nature of prison gangs, and their hunger for 
power over the inmate economy, Chris mentioned that it is in the best interest of the 
prison gangs and the inmate economy to avoid violent confrontation, as this only created 
issues with gang and race relations, lockdowns, shakedowns, and disruptions in the flow 
of contraband, all of which negatively affect their profits. Certain prison gangs especially 
dominate the inmate economy near facilities where a large portion of their members lived 
or did business previous to their incarceration. As one participant noted: 
Jake: So there are so many of them, [prison gang name], on the unit and 
there is going to be a ton of them from [large city], and that’s a major city 
and they typically tend, not to sound prejudice in any way, but they 
typically tend to deal in the world in drugs and trafficking and buying and 
selling and so they know all these people and they live right there so they 
can get them things [drug-related contraband (Xanax)]. 
Furthermore, several participants (n=8) suggested that the proximity of an 
inmate’s residence to the correctional facility was a major indicator of whether or not 
they were getting contraband brought into the facility, or if they were involved in the 
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smuggling and selling of contraband, especially as it relates to gang members. Frank 
mentioned that, “Ya, the proximity of their residence to the actual facility was a factor at 
times…. the neighborhood they were raised in was also factor.” This was explained to be 
due to the fact that these individuals simply had connections to the outside world near the 
facility, and they had much more access to a large number of known associates who 
might be willing to help them get contraband into the facility. Three participants 
discussed situations in which guards and inmates knew each other from neighborhoods, 
high school, and family. These ties between inmates and correctional officers were 
important in regards to contraband, and will be discussed later on in this chapter. 
When situations arose where two or more gangs wanted to sell the same type of 
contraband, conversations between gang leaders occurred in an attempt to reduce gang 
conflict, maintain respect, and mitigate risks associated with potential interruption in the 
flow of contraband. Todd illustrated this point clearly in the following quote: 
Todd: I know [prison gang name] brought in a shit load of weed, but they 
had to make sure it was cool, they didn’t have to make sure it was cool 
with everybody, but they had to make sure you know the three [prison 
gang name] dudes, or the [prison gang name] dudes didn’t have a problem 
with it. 
 Four participants suggested that certain gangs had power over certain types of 
contraband. This was first determined based on who had the connection to the free-world 
actors who would help get the contraband inside the facilities, and then by negotiations 
between two separate gangs if both had a particular type of contraband for sale. For 
instance, Frank mentioned that the gang who is in charge of a particular type of 
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contraband, “is based on who is bringing in the contraband.” Jake mentioned that, “and 
with Whites, I would say the majority of them were more meth – with meth, you know.” 
Carlos said: 
 Carlos: The ese’s [Latinos] had the fucking tattooing and the fucking 
cigarettes where I was at. Let’s see – tattooing, cigarettes, and the weed. 
The brothers [Blacks] had the fucking dope and cigarettes. The [White 
prison gang] and all them had the fucking, you know, the white girl – 
crystal [methamphetamine]. 
Unsurprisingly, the two female participants did not experience prison gangs while 
they were incarcerated. Instead of being governed by gangs such as in male correctional 
facilities, the inmate economy in female facilities was described as more of a barter 
system, where favors were common and hard bargaining and set prices were rare, 
especially for hygiene products. Dialogue from the interview with Kim (shown below) 
illustrates these points. 
Kim: Girls were pretty cool about not charging but they’d just let you use 
it, if they did charge you anything it was like a Snickers bar or something 
like that, it wasn’t like a “hey give my money now.”… Ya, but that would 
be for little stuff, like, that was more like “if you let me use this I’ll let you 
use this,” it’s just girls, the way they barter and trade is not like the men, at 
all, like the men have like a set price, “this is what you are going to pay,” 
it’s not really like that with girls. Girls are more of a, “I’ll let you use my 
lotion, I’ll let you use my tampons because we’re females,” you kind of 
have to understand that. 
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The main reason given (n=13) by male participants for why prison gangs run the 
inmate economy was because they had the numbers and power to informally enforce 
order within the facilities through violence or the threat of violence. Jessie suggested that 
without contraband, it would “remove organization and reduce the power and control that 
the CO’s have over inmates… gangs would have to find small shit to enforce and 
maintain order.” The relationship between contraband, prison gangs, and order was quite 
evident in the interviews, and given the level of power that these prison gangs had over 
the inmate economy and other gang members in the free-world, it appeared that nearly 
any item of contraband was possible to bring into a facility. 
Subtheme 2 - Types of major contraband. When participants were asked what 
types of contraband were available, common responses can be summed up in one quote 
provided by Jessie, “If you can afford it, and you can find someone to get it to you, it’s 
available.” All participants mentioned either seeing, buying, selling, or playing some role 
in smuggling some of the following major contraband items: cocaine, marijuana, heroin, 
methamphetamine, LSD, Suboxone, Xanax, alcohol, tobacco, K2 or spice, Creatine, cell 
phone with and without internet access, cell phone sim cards, hooch, real-world cash, 
knives and shanks, guns, and zip guns (homemade guns). Chad noted: 
Chad: I saw more drugs and more types of drugs in prison than I’d ever 
seen on the outside, and I sold drugs, that’s why I went to prison, that shit 
was crazy man, anything you wanted you could get if you knew who to go 
to. 
Jordan discussed a situation that occurred while he was incarcerated in a state 
prison that led to a prison lockdown and the then Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
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Firearms (ATF) agents spending hours searching the recreation yard for a particular item 
with shovels and metal detectors. As it turned out, an inmate had tipped off correctional 
officers that there was a gun buried somewhere in the recreation yard. Jordan said that 
after the ATF agents had torn up nearly the entire recreation yard, they finally located a 
pistol with one bullet in it. Described as likely gang related, the pistol had not been used 
inside of the prison, but the fact that it was inside the facility and buried in the recreation 
yard was shocking to the participant. Probing questions during the interview did not lead 
to the origins or purpose of the pistol, but rather a humorous response of, “I have no idea, 
but it probably wasn’t for show and tell.” 
Another participant discussed that while he was in a high security prison, he saw  
high ranking gang members of a particular prison gang in possession of zip guns 
(homemade guns), Todd said, “Ya, I saw like 3 zips… ya homemade pistols, seeing the 
zip guns was probably the craziest shit I’ve ever seen in my life.” These instances and 
others further support the common notion that if you can afford it, and find someone to 
get it to you, it’s available. One female participants told a story about two female inmates 
who bunked across from her in a rehab correctional facility, and how they would stay up 
all night consuming methamphetamine and coloring in the dark. Other contraband that 
was common among the male inmates were cell phones, which could be purchased in the 
free-world for less than $100 and would range in price in the inmate economy from $200 
to more than a thousand dollars depending on the type of phone and whether or not it had 
internet access. Along the lines of contraband access and pricing, participants discussed 
at length the factors that are considered when an inmate or prison gang considers selling 
contraband to an individual, and for how much. 
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Subtheme 3 - Pricing dynamics and contraband access. Interestingly, and 
different from most real-world economies, there are several factors that come into play in 
the inmate economy when it comes to pricing and the decision to provide a service. For 
example, it would be illegal for a company like Walmart to deny a sex offender the 
opportunity to purchase a particular item, or to charge him more for that item than 
someone who was not a sex offender. Similarly, it would be illegal for a Texaco gas 
station to charge a White man $2.50 for a gallon of gas and a Black man $10 for that 
same gallon of gas, or to deny him the opportunity to purchase that gallon of gas based 
solely on the color of his skin. However, in the sub-rosa inmate economy, individual 
factors such as race, gang affiliation, previous criminal history, and other individual 
characteristics can dictate how much an inmate will have to pay for a particular item of 
contraband, and whether or not an individual can even purchase contraband. 
First and foremost, it was noted that the price of contraband is based on the age-
old economic law of supply and demand (n=13). It was common knowledge among all 
participants that the price of contraband was first based on how much was available and 
how sought-after a particular item of contraband was by the inmates. This applied to 
major forms of contraband as well as scarce commissary items such as toothpaste, ice 
cream, and deodorant. One participant mentioned that he would purchase a lot of the rare 
commissary items that he knew would later become hot commodities. Bernie Madoff’s is 
also known for doing this in the prison he now sits in. Madoff is known for buying up all 
of the hot chocolate and later naming his price on the prison yard (Marks, 2017). Doing 
so allowed him to sometimes triple his investment once the supply of that contraband was 
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low and he could name his price. Another participant explained the pricing dynamics 
based on supply, demand, and risk: 
Jake: You know, if there is very little bit on the unit obviously you are 
going to pay higher prices. When it’s flooded, it’s just if everybody has 
got it and you can get it from each one, you know, nobody wants to hold 
onto it because it’s free-world time, so prices start lowering and they are 
getting rid of it quick, you know. 
Outside of the principle of supply and demand, participants noted that there were 
individual characteristics that determined what a particular inmate would have to pay for 
a given item of contraband. Some characteristic that played a role in the price of a 
particular item was if they were a prison gang member or not (n=4), what gang or race 
the seller and buyer were a part of (n=5), and if there were any internal conflicts between 
the buyer and the sellers races or gangs, or within the same races or gangs (n=3). Both 
Frank stated that, “yeah, gang affiliations and color affiliations do affect your access to it 
[contraband].” Jack described the pricing difference for fellow gang members as a 
discount in the following quote:  
Jack: So, yeah, and then if you are in a gang, it’s cheaper…. because he’s 
your homeboy, he’s going to give it to you for 75 cents or 50 cents. You 
are automatically going to get that discount because you are in the gang. 
 Chris mentioned that gang members would often sell the contraband to 
their fellow gang members at a discounted rate for the purpose of providing their 
fellow gang members an opportunity to make some money as well by selling the 
contraband to non-fellow gang members at a higher rate.  
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Chris: All right, so if the [Black prison gang] have the plug [person 
bringing in the contraband], the Blacks are going to get cheaper prices. 
They are the people that are going to get it, but anybody else that wants it 
is going to have to buy it from them second-hand or third-hand. When I 
was getting things, all of my homeboys would get a good deal on it. But 
anybody that bought from them, they are obviously going to charge more 
and I’m not going to skip them to go to anybody else. 
Carlos (among other participants) noted that even within gangs and races, there 
was sometimes conflicts that led to pricing differences.  
Carlos: It can, yeah, especially if there was like beef [conflict] or 
whatever. This dude said this about this or this clique, or you got the big 
group but then you have the little sections inside of each one of them, 
sometime they fight with each other or they fight with another section or 
another group or whatever and, you know, if they have what you need or 
whatever and they just happen to be beefing at the time well, then you are 
probably going to pay for it more than you would at any other time. Yeah, 
internal conflicts within the races or within their own organization made a 
difference in getting it at a good price, or if they’d sell it to you at all. 
Based on some of the interviews (n=4), loyalty to one’s gang or race played a 
pivotal role in pricing and access to contraband in correctional facilities. However, one 
participant suggested that sometimes it wasn’t about deciding whether or not they would 
sell the contraband to an individual because they were unlike them by race or gang 
101 
 
affiliation, but rather the decision was based on the threat of what that gang or race might 
do once they know who has the contraband. Todd mentioned that: 
Todd: you could say ya race was definitely a huge factor, but you know it 
wasn’t necessarily “oh they are Black I won’t sell it to them,” it was a 
misconception of “oh they don’t have access to this so if we did give them 
access what would be the side-effect if they did snitch or if they did try to 
blackmail in a way,” and now you have a full scale riot on your hands, 
over a cell phone or over a thing of bleach or, you know.    
There were also exceptions to the race and gang loyalties that sometimes 
superseded these powerful access and price-dictating standards of inmate business. In 
some instances, the decision to sell contraband to another inmate was based on 
preconceived notions and stereotypes of particular races. For instance, Jack mentioned:  
Jack: But you will give preference… I would rather do business with you 
bro, say you are a White dude. I would rather do business with you rather 
than deal with these fucking Black dudes because you know they are 
going to fuck you over or whatever. You know what I mean? And then 
there are times where, I’ve seen this, where Black dudes would rather do 
business with a White dude or a Mexican dude because they have a higher 
moral standard or ethics. They would say, “I don’t want to fuck with these 
niggas, man. They liable to not have – but I know if I front you something 
– I know if I give a White boy something, he’s going to pay me. He’s 
going to have the money. I know if I front a Mexican something, he’s 
going to pay me.”  
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Completely separate from one’s race, level of gang affiliation, and preconceived 
notions about one’s morals, ethics, and ability to settle a debt, participants also mentioned 
that there are some inmates who have undesirable individual characteristics that will 
completely remove their opportunity to engage in the contraband market. For example, 
some participants (n=8) mentioned that, depending on the crime the individual is 
incarcerated for, the entire population of inmates would not be allowed to do business with 
them. This was particularly true for inmates convicted of crimes against children such as 
molestation and rape, and other sex crimes such as sexual assault and rape against women, 
as Jack stated, “nobody is going to go in business with a child molester on contraband.” 
These individuals were known as “no sales” or referred to as “off limits.” One participant 
explained how and why this decision was made by those involved in contraband:  
Juan: There was one guy who was brought in and we ended up finding out 
he was a child molester because they laid the paperwork out on his bed 
before he even showed up to the unit and every guy in the unit got to read 
the paperwork and, you know, when we found out who the guy was, 
nobody sold commissary to him – not a single person. He wasn’t allowed 
to converse with anybody selling any type of contraband. That’s pretty 
much, you know, the people that have the contraband – they talk to each 
other and they know who each other are. So, when one person says, “I’m 
not selling it” usually, most of the group talks about it and they agree as a 
group that they aren’t going to sell anything to this type of person.   
 Another group of inmates that were described as being “no sales” and were “off 
limits” were inmates suspected of snitching, or telling correctional officers about dealings 
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that occur among the other inmates (n=9). If there was one type of inmate that 
contraband-active participants appeared to dislike most, it was snitches. These individuals 
were not allowed to engage in the contraband market for obvious reasons. As Carlos 
mentioned, “But if you have that bad rep about you or if somebody knows something 
about you, like you a snitch, you ain’t getting shit, bro.” The results that come along with 
dealing contraband to snitches, and the violence that snitches experience due to their 
behaviors, will be covered later in this chapter, but for now, it is important to note that 
these individuals are, to say the least, not well-liked by the rest of the inmate population, 
especially those who stand to gain financially from the sub-rosa inmate economy. 
Subtheme 4 - Financial transactions. When participants were asked about how 
contraband was purchased from other inmates, every participant suggested that for most 
contraband items (outside of high ticket items) commissary items were the main form of 
currency and payment. Another form of payment was other contraband (n=11), as Jessie 
explained, “Mostly it was contraband for contraband or commissary for contraband.” 
Commissary also served as a symbol wealth or prestige, however having too much 
commissary was considered risky. The following quote explains this issue in a story told 
by Jack during a time when he and another inmate were selling large quantities of 
tobacco. 
Jack: So, it was just a lot of commissary – if you had too much 
commissary that you couldn’t eat, too much coffee that you couldn’t 
drink… So, it just got to where it was too much… In a sense, you are like 
what’s his name, Johnny Depp on Blow [movie about a cocaine kingpin]. 
You got too much money and you got nowhere to put it. That’s how it 
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was, you got so much commissary and then if they come in your cell and 
they don’t have a receipt, if you’ve got $300 worth of fucking commissary 
in your cell, they can take all that shit because you don’t have a receipt for 
it. 
Another method of purchasing contraband was to do what participants (n=9) 
commonly called “putting money on someone’s books.” “Books” equate to one’s 
commissary account, where money can be sent or transferred to in order for inmates to be 
able to purchase items from commissary. Money can be placed on an inmates books 
electronically in modern times. Juan explains the process below:  
Juan: Yeah, and say I wanted to, you know, get rid of some pills but the 
guy didn’t have no commissary, but he has a friend that he talks to on the 
outside that is willing to put money on my books. I just give them my 
book information and hold the item until I get confirmation of the 
commissary balance – which I can do almost daily. So, once I found out 
that the balance has been updated in my account, I go ahead and give him 
what we agreed on. 
Jake mentioned how the communication with a free-world actor could occur 
during visitation and how the money could be placed on one’s books. 
Jake: You just write, you know, whoever you are going to have do it or on 
the phone you just kind of work it out in visitation. Say, “Hey, I’m going 
to tell you a name and SPN number and we aren’t going to elaborate on it 
anymore.” So, you just write it to them and put their name and SPN 
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number or their TDC number and they will wire the money onto their 
books with that information. 
 
Kim discussed another method that she used to put money on other’s books, but 
for the purpose of being able to obtain extra commissary.   
Kim: My mom would send e-coms in other people’s names and I would 
give that person so much money off of that just so I could get it because 
you were only allowed a certain amount of money on your spend… I 
would just write her a letter and put it in someone else’s name and give 
her their TDC number and do it that way.  It’s $30 I think or $60, ya $60, 
and you would just give them like $10 of that and you’d keep $50 for 
yourself. 
Modern money transfer systems and the ease and brevity of transferring funds to an 
inmate’s books has changed over the years. Jack, who had experienced the before and 
after of these new commissary account systems, describes how transferring money onto 
someone’s books used to be much more difficult and slower (compared to Juan, Jake, 
Kim, and others’ experiences), thus affecting the timely nature of selling contraband.    
Jack: Back then when I was in there, all you had was money slips [used to 
transfer money across books] and while I was in there, they started coming 
up with a way where somebody could just send money without a money 
slip, just send it to you, but now there is all kinds of different ways. There 
is a bunch of different shit now the email and the JPay… so it was a hassle 
and it took a while. Yeah, you had to have a money slip and you had to 
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send that home. You know, and that had to be filled out and sent in with 
the money order to a place in Huntsville and it took a couple of weeks for 
that to process sometimes. That’s the way it all went then. You know, I’m 
going to write this letter and I’m going to wait for this letter to get there 
and if your people were reliable enough and they got this letter soon, they 
would put money on somebody’s books and you would hope that it would 
be before the next commissary day and then go, “Yeah, the money is 
there.” And if not when I went there was no money on my books, so that 
was a hassle back then. Now they got JPay (electronic commissary 
system) where it’s like shit happens a lot quicker… it’s like a whole 
different world. 
The newer methods of transferring money onto someone’s book also comes with some 
risk, as this is often not allowed based on correctional policy. One participant described a 
situation in which he had someone transfer money onto his cellmate’s books and the 
actions resulted in negative formal consequences. 
Jake: And you just couldn’t be blatantly out in the open and say, “Hey, I 
need you to send money to this guy in here.” Because you can get in 
trouble, and I actually almost got in trouble one time. [Name of friend] 
had put money on my cellie’s books and got caught. He got the case and I 
didn’t because there was nothing saying that I actually sent it to him, but 
we had the same transactions from the same person in the same cell… He 
ended up getting a major case for it. 
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Although illegal to possess in a correctional facility, actual U.S. currency in the 
form of cash was also used as a form of payment. Despite the scarcity of cash in newer 
units due to updated security measures during visitations, cash was described as the best 
form of currency to have as it was worth twice the value of that same monetary amount 
of commissary. In other words, it was described as having more purchasing power when 
compared to commissary, thus appearing as if the purchaser was receiving a discount on 
the contraband by paying with U.S. paper currency. Cash was also described as being 
more enticing to correctional staff to accept as a form of payment for smuggling in 
contraband when compared to other methods of payment because it was easy to transfer, 
easy to hide, and easy for the correctional officer to use to purchase the contraband in the 
free-world. Participants shed light on the phenomena that surrounds the value of U.S. 
paper currency and the impact its presence was described to have on the flow of 
contraband and order within correctional facilities. 
Jack discussed the relationship between the age of the correctional facility and the 
amount of cash that was in circulation.  
Jack: If you were on an older unit, everybody had cash.  Like me, 
whenever my dad came to see me every once in a while, he would bring 
me $40, $50, $60. Because on certain units and certain farms, the 
visitation is different. So, if you go to older units like [name of facility] or 
[name of older facility], whether you are on closed custody or you are on 
minimum custody, you can get money slipped to you through the screen in 
visitation. Whereas if you are on a new unit, when I say newer, they were 
built in the 90’s… the only way you can have contact and get something is 
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minimal custody visit, a contact visit. Other than that, it’s all Plexiglas. 
That’s what affects contraband, the flow of contraband, is cash.  
 
 
Jake mentioned the benefits of having cash as it often led to discounted prices due 
to its value.  
Jake: There was not a lot of cash flow in prison… So, cash was king to be 
honest with you because when you are dealing with a guard and you don’t 
have someone out there that is going to take care of you and meet up with 
them and send money to them or wire or whatever, you got to have cash. 
And cash would also get you a discount. So, whereas, if you were going to 
buy a pack of cigarettes, it would cost me normally $50 commissary for 
one pack whereas I would get three packs for sometimes even four packs 
for a 100-dollar bill. Just because it’s easier for them to get their cartons 
with that… I would say the value of cash to commissary, like, would be 
probably, I mean, two to one. I would say it would take you $200 worth of 
commissary to get $100 cash. 
Jack further elaborated on the relationship between cash flow, contraband, and 
levels of violence and disorder among the inmate population.   
Jack: On [name of prison unit] when I was there, there was all youngsters 
and there was a lot more fighting, a lot more stabbings, a lot more shit 
going on there and there wasn’t much cash flow on that unit because it 
was a newer unit so there was a lot more shit, whereas [name of prison 
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unit] where there was more cash flow and there was more contraband, 
there wasn’t as much shit happening violent wise but when it did happen, 
it was bad. 
When cash was not available to use as a form of payment to purchase contraband, 
or when the contraband items or quantity of contraband far exceeded a feasible amount of 
commissary for trade, electronic money transfer systems were often used to exchange 
funds. The electronic money transfer systems that were discussed during the interviews 
included PayPal (n=3) and Greendot cards (n=4). Jessie noted, “for bigger ticket items, 
they used Greendot because it was "untraceable". These methods of transferring funds 
oftentimes relied heavily on having access to contraband cell phones in order to transfer 
the money, especially when paying with Greendot cards. Greendot cards were described 
as being the most preferable source electronic money transfer as they provided more 
anonymity when compared to other sources; they provided a very quick way of handling 
monetary transaction within the sub-rosa contraband economy; and they were easy to 
hide since the 14 digits served as actual digital currency and could be written down on 
something or even memorized in some instances. 
The following quotes and conversation describe the benefits of using Greendot 
cards and the phenomena that surrounds this newer, rapid, and nearly untraceable form of 
monetary transfer. Jordan mentioned that, “Greendots were the main way to send money 
for the big stuff. It’s just some numbers and that’s money. I knew some people who 
memorized the Greendot and the Gold card numbers so they couldn’t get caught with 
shit.” Chris explained the security and brevity that comes with having a contraband cell 
phone to do these types of monetary transactions.   
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Chris: Most of the people that are doing the contraband are the ones that 
are going to know where to get it and they will have phones. You will 
have to have a phone with the Green Dot because you will have to call to 
verify the numbers… I mean, I guess you could use the payphones and try 
codes, or you could use letters and wait days, but if you want to do a drug 
transaction, you don’t want to wait three to five days. You don’t want to 
send somebody the money and then have to wait five days for them to 
verify it or give somebody the stuff and then three to five days to see if the 
money actually comes. So yeah, that cell phone plays a big part. 
Tucker described how he would check the Greendot numbers for funds when he 
did not have a contraband cell phone to use and how he was eventually able to get the 
funds into the hands of is family members.  
Tucker: Ya Greendots and PayPal were a thing, but PayPal was pretty 
easy to trace. When I took Greendots and I didn’t have a cell phone, I had 
a guard that I was cool with check the numbers for me to make sure the 
money was right. I couldn't check the money or transfer it without a cell 
phone, so I just gave the numbers to my family when they visited and 
they'd do the transfer. 
It was evident from the interviews that monetary transactions could occur in many 
different ways and these methods of transferring funds have changed over time. It was 
also clear that some methods of transferring funds were more suitable and/or less 




Main Theme 3 - The Unwritten Rules of the Sub-rosa Inmate Economy 
Similar to most business dealings in free-world economies, in the inmate 
economy there are also business ethics, etiquettes, and standards of behavior. When these 
standards are not followed in free-world economies, the consequences may range from a 
loss of opportunity for repeat business to rumors, gossip, and the seller or company itself 
earning a bad reputation. However, when these standards or rules of business are not 
followed in the inmate economy, the consequences can be much harsher. There is no rule 
book for these standards of business in the inmate economy, but rather these rules are 
assumed, taught to newer inmates by older inmates, or are learned through trial and 
consequence. Furthermore, these rules are not always set in stone and exceptions to these 
rules may exist. 
Finding for main theme 3 are derived from participants’ responses to question 11 
in section two of the interview schedule (Do you have any knowledge of “unwritten 
rules” that govern contraband access, purchasing, possession, or selling? If, so, what were 
some of these un-written rules?), follow-up questions, and other instances during the 
interviews where participants discussed things that you do and do not do when engaging 
in the inmate contraband economy. Ultimately, participants suggested that the unwritten 
rules of the inmate economy are based on a need for respect, and are in place to ensure 
that inmates respect each other and their respective races and prison gangs in order to 
avoid conflict and unwanted attention. Participant responses were categorized into the 
following subthemes which identify 14 unwritten rules of the contraband market, when 
exceptions to these rules may exist, and for some rules, the consequences that inmates 
may expect to face when they are broken. Again, the following subthemes are not ordered 
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by their frequency of mention per se, but are rather presented in a fashion that allows 
readers to understand the culture that surrounds the inmate economy in a logical and 
orderly narrative fashion. 
Subtheme 1 - Rule #1 Don’t snitch. Explained as the golden rule of prison in 
many respects, snitching, or sharing information with correctional officers, is highly 
regarded as a behavior that is disliked within the prison culture, especially when it comes 
to the contraband market. When asked about the unwritten rules, or the do’s and don’ts of 
the sub-rosa contraband market, every participant (N=16) mentioned that snitching, and 
even being falsely labeled as a snitch, was something that was to be avoided at all costs. 
Despite this being the golden rule of behavioral expectations in prison, snitching does 
occur, however this snitching behavior is often times handled through severe informal 
punishments handed down by the other inmates. Jake mentioned, “Of course, no 
snitching. That’s golden rule in prison, period. But it happens, of course.” This rule was 
unanimously suggested to be an obvious rule of prison life in general. 
Participants (n=9) also suggested that once a person was labeled as a snitch, that 
individual would be ostracized from the rest of the inmate population; would not be 
allowed to converse with or engage with anyone who was involved with contraband; and 
would not be allowed to purchase or sell contraband to any other inmates. Harsher forms 
of punishment for snitching were also discussed by participants, especially in relation to 
their actions interfering with the flow of contraband. For example, Jack discussed a 
collective action that was taken by numerous inmates in order to address the impact that 
snitches were having on the flow of contraband”  
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Jack: We would talk about how everybody was so respectful on that wing, 
but that was the wing that came up with the idea of this cleansing of 
getting rid of a bunch of known snitches and child molesters because they 
were slowing down the flow of contraband and there were dudes on that 
wing that were going, “Look, what we need to do, you know this dude is a 
snitch but he’s still here. Why? This dude over here in this wing we know 
he’s a snitch.” There were known snitches, and nobody was doing nothing 
to them, and it was those dudes on that wing that called a little pow-wow 
on the rec yard amongst the Whites and the Blacks and all the gangs and 
goes, “Look man, there are too many snitches. When was the last time you 
got 10 packs of cigarettes for $100? Right? So, it’s slowing it [contraband] 
down. Let’s do something about this. Let’s do a cleansing.” It was that 
wing that came up with that idea. 
The actions taken by the group of individuals that enforced this rule in Jack’s experience 
were described to have a temporary negative impact on the flow of contraband as 
everyone was placed on lockdown. However, after the lockdown was lifted, the flow of 
contraband increased as a result of the snitches being removed from that wing of the 
facility, albeit for their own safety. Along the same lines as unwritten rule #1 (do not 
snitch), is rule number two: own up to your mistakes. 
Subtheme 2 - Rule #2 Own up to your mistakes. The inmate economy is a risky 
business that comes along with harsh formal punishments and sometimes informal 
punishments administered by other inmates. Rule number two shed light on what 
participants (n=7) suggested an inmate must do if they are caught by correctional staff 
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with contraband, commonly referred to as “taking your lick.” If an inmate is caught with 
contraband, or has broken any other unwritten rules, they must “take their lick,” or take 
their formal or informal punishment, accept full responsibility for the contraband, and 
should do whatever is necessary to reduce the chances that others will get caught due to 
their mistake. This included willfully giving one’s self up and walking their property out 
of their cell towards the correctional officer that witnessed them with contraband. Frank 
describes how this is supposed to play out based on his experience: 
Frank: Yeah, if you get caught and there is fucking people sitting right 
next to you doing the same thing, but they caught you, you walk the fuck 
out in that main room and take their attention away and ‘Yeah, it’s me, 
fine. You got me.’ I mean, it’s the same thing as snitching, man. If I 
fucking sit there – it’s just a different version of snitching. 
Frank expanded on this and explained that not owning up to your mistakes can lead to 
other’s not trusting you in future deals within the contraband market, and perhaps being 
labeled as a snitch. He also suggested that you can earn some respect from other inmates 
by “taking all the heat” in order to save others from getting caught, almost like a self-
sacrifice for the greater good of the rest of the inmates. Frank said, “When they see that 
you handle up and take the heat, they know you can be trusted.” 
Also falling under the notion of taking one’s lick, is the requirement for inmates 
to accept their informal inmate-administered punishment for their wrongdoings. 
Regardless of how connected, respected, or important an inmate is in the eyes of other 
inmates, according to Todd and others, inmates were still required to take their lick, 
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sometimes in the form of an informal punishment administered by an individual’s own 
prison gang, or family, as described in the quote below: 
Todd: No matter who you were or who you were connected with, you’d 
take your lick, you could be the speaker (wing leader) of the [name of 
prison gang] but you got someone caught up, they’ll [your prison gang] 
handle you in their own way … and you have to respect that, especially 
through family [prison gangs]. 
Blake mentioned that informal punishments administered by inmates or gangs 
was necessary to reduce tension between inmates after a conflict, or to reduce tensions 
between gangs and races by “bringing everything back to zero.” He suggested that when 
an inmate feels offended or disrespected, they must take their frustrations out on the 
offender and the offender must take his lick in the form of an informal punishment. 
Participants (n=9) mentioned that fights would usually be arranged between the offender 
and the offended and they would settle their differences through physical violence, 
usually in the form of a quick scuffle. Once those differences were settled, Blake said that 
the inmates would often be seen a few days later hanging out together, as the issue was 
considered “handled.” 
Subtheme 3 - Rule #3 Don’t ask or go looking for contraband. Still related to 
snitching, Rule #3, identified by nine participants, suggests that inmates should not go out 
of their way to ask to purchase contraband. This refers to inmates that are seeking to find 
a particular type of contraband when they do not know where to find it, or who to talk to 
in order to find out who is selling the desired item/s. As Carlos put it: 
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Carlos: It’s one of those things or one of the rules that you don’t ask type 
of shit. It is what it is. Just let it be. If you happen to come across a 
connect or whatever, then so be it, but don’t go asking about it 
(contraband). 
Todd described the nature of inmates coming across contraband for sale in a 
correctional facility, suggesting that sometimes inmates hear about contraband being 
available, or are told that it may be available, but to never go out of your way by asking 
inmates if they can find or sell you contraband. 
Todd: you didn’t really ask for it, it was kind of like one of those untold 
things like, I know this person and they are like “on Tuesday shop is 
open” or something like that, maybe not that exact words, but you did not 
go up (to someone), you’d be like can anyone get me Kool-Aid can 
anyone get me bleach, stuff like that, but when we get like drugs or 
whatever usually, one person would be like” hey I’m taking orders, it’ll be 
here in two weeks” and then that was it, you didn’t fuck with anyone 
anymore, you didn’t “hey man is it still coming, is it going, like blah blah 
blah,” “hey you said on Monday”, it was more be approached than 
approach. 
Exceptions to this rule existed if an inmate was already well connected or is a 
well-respected prison gang member. One participant, a well-respected prison gang 
member during his tenure, noted the difference between his situation and a child 




“If I rolled up on a wing and I had $100, I could talk around, “Hey, does 
anybody got this? Can I buy some cigarettes? I got some money.” And 
you can do a deal. Child molester rolls up on a wing and he couldn’t do 
that. He couldn’t just find somebody to do a deal with him. You know, he 
would have to take a lot of time to build trust with somebody. 
The above quote provides the context for situations where this rule may not apply. 
When inmates have a well-established history of trust and/or are gang affiliates, they are 
allowed to ask around for contraband, while inmates with undesirable characteristics and 
a lack of trust by other inmates may not be able to do the same. Doing so may suggest to 
other inmates that the inmate is a potential snitch and should not be trusted. Also, asking 
around for contraband can lead to violent altercations. The following quote sums up this 
unwritten rule and what can happen if this rule is violated by someone who is not trusted: 
Carlos: Yeah, you can’t just walk up to somebody, “Hey, let me get some 
dope.” They will fuck you up. Yeah, like get the fuck away from me, or 
I’ll split you, or I will fucking fuck you up… you fucking cop or snitch, 
narc. You can’t just go up to somebody and be like, “Hey, man, do you 
got this?” You have to know somebody that knows somebody that 
basically knows somebody. I saw somebody get poked (stabbed) because 
they were like, “Hey man, somebody told me that you got fucking tattoo 
ink.” He was like, “get the fuck away from me.” “Yeah, I got this piece 
(tattoo) I’m trying to get.” He was like, “get the fuck away from me, 
dude.” “Dude, I need it.” Popped him one good time right in the fucking 
right here (pointed to kidney area)…. Yeah, with a little fucking shank… 
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he just fucking popped him because he was like, “dude, get the fuck 
away” and he kept on. I guess he knew there was something up so he was 
just like, yeah. It was just a little pop, “mother fucker.” 
 In regards to inmates that may have a harder time than others gaining access to 
contraband, lies Rule number 4, don’t sell to those who are off limits. 
Subtheme 4 - Rule #4 Don’t sell to those who are off limits. It is beneficial for 
inmates to sell contraband to other inmates as there are many incentives for doing so, 
however, there are also inmates who are not allowed to purchase contraband and were 
referred to as “off limits” or “no sales” by ten participants. Some of these inmates who 
are cut off from the inmate economy were identified as snitches; those who had done bad 
deals in the past; those who disobeyed orders from those who ran the contraband market; 
those who were out of control in terms of their desire to have a particular item of 
contraband; and those inmates who were incarcerated for undesirable crimes such as sex 
crimes involving children. For instance, Jordan mentioned, “child molesters and snitches 
couldn't get contraband, and if you sold it to them the other inmates would, or they could 
if they chose to, cut you off too.” Those who run the contraband market decide who can 
and cannot purchase contraband, and who other inmates can and cannot sell contraband 
to. The quote below helps illustrate this rule. 
Juan: There was one guy who was brought in and we ended up finding out 
he was a child molester because they laid the paperwork out on his bed 
before he even showed up to the unit and every guy in the unit got to read 
the paperwork and, you know, when we found out who the guy was, 
nobody sold commissary to him – not a single person. He wasn’t allowed 
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to conversate with anybody selling any type of contraband. That’s pretty 
much, you know, the people that have the contraband –(gang members) 
they talk to each other and they know who each other are. So, when one 
person says, “I’m not selling it.” Usually, most of the group talks about it 
and they agree as a group that they aren’t going to sell anything to this 
type of person, or this person is getting too crazy over cigarettes, you 
know, nobody sell him cigarettes because he’s probably going to rat 
everybody out and nobody is going to get any type of contraband or 
commissary that way.      
 In concert with what Jordan suggested may happen, another participant discussed 
what happened to him when he did sell contraband to someone who was “off limits” after 
being told not to by those who ran the contraband market in his particular area of the 
facility: 
Diego: They (gang members- those who ran the contraband market) would 
say, “Hey, don’t trade with this motherfucker, period.” “Don’t sell him 
shit and don’t accept nothing from him.” I remember one time I was like, 
“Fuck that, who are you to tell me who the fuck I can trade with?” So, I 
did and that actually ended up causing some shit between me and one of 
the guys. He came up to me and was like, “Hey, did you give him this?” 
And I’m like, “Yeah, what’s it to you?” and he was like, “Oh, it’s this.” 
And he went and took some of my shit and he was like “whenever you go 
get that shit back then I’ll give you your shit back” and I was like, 
“Damn.” So, yeah, I had to go over there and talk to old boy and I was 
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like, “Look, apparently people in here don’t like you.… So, you are cut. I 
can’t trade with you. I can’t sell to you. I can’t buy from you.” You know? 
And he was like, “Yeah, shit. My bad. Sorry, I didn’t know they were 
going to get on you like that.” They were like, “Hey, man, you know, 
don’t do this.” And he was like, “No, fuck y’all.” So, he did it and they 
were like, “Well, now you are cut, and nobody is going to fuck with you, 
and nobody is going to give you shit.” And I became him basically next 
because I fucking traded with him. They were like, “Don’t fuck with him 
now.” 
Similar to the Diego’s experience, Todd provided an example of what may 
transpire if an inmate sold contraband to another inmate who was “off limits,” using the 
principle investigator as an example:  
Todd: If you got caught messing with them you were now cut off too, you 
know what I mean so, so if I was like “hey Layne (principle investigator) 
no one is fucking with you, but here is some shit, I got you,” and someone 
found out, they’d be like “oh we are going to beat your (principle 
investigator) ass if you don’t tell us where you got it,” and you were like 
“oh [Todd] gave it to me,” that’s it, now I’m done, and now I’m under 
scrutiny or whatever. 
Interestingly, the informal punishments for not following this rule were handed 
down by those who were in charge of the contraband market, which were typically gang 
members. However, these punishments discussed (being “cut off”) were dulled out in a 
way that did not bring formal authoritative attention to the issue, yet they resulted in 
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further deprivations being felt by the inmate who did not follow this rule by removing 
their opportunities to purchase contraband in the future. When an inmate does 
successfully purchase, they are held to a standard of secrecy, which leads to rule number 
five, don’t show and tell. 
Subtheme 5 - Rule #5 Don’t show and tell. Six participants suggested that once 
they had purchased contraband they were told to not show anyone their contraband and to 
remain quiet about where they obtained the contraband. This rule emerged as a way of 
reducing their chances of getting caught with the contraband and as a way to protect the 
seller. This rule was also followed for the purpose of protecting the price of the 
contraband as illustrated in the quote below. 
Todd: Ya and don’t show and tell, there would be dude that would just “ya 
man I’ve got this bud (marijuana)” and they bring it out under their bed 
and now they are getting a million and eighteen questions “how’d you get 
it, do you have any more, how much is it,” and if you think about it the 
dorm room is the size of where we are at right now, a couple TV’s, tables, 
whatever, so if I asked you where you got it from and you are like I can’t 
really talk about it, and you get up and I’m watching you and I see you 
went to [cell number]. Like okay [cell number] is the guy that now has it, 
so it’s one of those, just be careful with what you have an you don’t want 
to talk about it, you don’t tell anybody who you are getting it from, you 
don’t want anyone to see you because that could screw you over, it’s like 
buying stuff in the outside world, you know? Say I’m only buying a joint 
from you for me every week, the guys that just asked where I get my weed 
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from he me say “I want to buy an ounce,” so what are you going to do? 
You are going to sell the guy the ounce to get rid of all of your contraband 
because that’s a free-world charge, you are going to get rid of it like that 
and then I’m gonna go, “ok you, you just bought all this shit from him and 
I used to get a joint for ten bucks, and now you want to sell me the joint 
for 20?” So, it was one of those, you kind of, you want to be secretive 
about who you have. 
 Participants often mentioned that the contraband market was one where if you are 
in the know, then you are in the know, and if you are in the know, you do not let others in 
on what you know, unless they are trusted potential buyers. Likened to organized crime 
activity in the free-world, Chris mentioned that, “from like an organized crime 
perspective, it’s the same, you just keep your business to yourself, it protects you and 
your business.” 
 Along the lines of protecting business and maintaining a desired free flow of 
contraband in a correctional facility is rule number six, don’t bring attention to your 
living quarters. 
Subtheme 6 - Rule #6 Don’t bring attention to your living quarters. As noted 
in the literature review section of this dissertation, it is suggested that maintaining order 
in a correctional facility allows for the flow of contraband to go relatively uninterrupted. 
The interviews for this study suggest that order maintenance, especially at the individual 
level, is an unwritten rule of engaging in contraband. Ten participants mentioned the 
importance of engaging in contraband without the knowledge of correctional officers, and 
when consuming contraband (especially odorous contraband like marijuana), doing so 
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without bringing attention to that area of the facility. Fighting was also halted when 
contraband was available, as this behavior also brought unwanted attention to an area of 
the facility. When inmates did not follow this rule, it resulted in everyone paying the 
consequences as these behaviors would lead to shakedowns and lockdown which 
significantly affect the flow of contraband and increase the deprivations of prison. Jake 
sums up this rule and provides a great example of the relationship between order 
maintenance and contraband in correctional facilities in the following quote:  
Jake: And then, like a dorm rule will be do stuff responsibly and that you 
don’t do what you call crash dummy stuff. I’m not going to go blow up the 
dayroom full of weed smoke (make the dorm smell heavily of marijuana) 
knowing the guards are going to come through because that’s going to 
bring heat to the dorm. It’s going to bring them in there to do shakedowns 
and stuff. Also, like fighting or heart check stuff (testing a new gang 
member’s ability to stand up and fight), we are going to put those on hold 
until this (contraband) isn’t circulating around. 
 Not abiding by this rule led to consequences for all of the individuals in that area 
of the facility, and would lead to everyone getting caught, or what Todd referred to as 
“crashing out.” When this happened, Todd and Jake suggested that the individual/s that 
were responsible for bringing what they referred to as “heat” (unwanted negative 
attention by the guards) to the area, were dealt with through violence and/or were 
ostracized. 
Subtheme 7 - Rule #7 Do square business. When engaging in the illicit 
contraband economy, five participants mentioned the importance of doing fair business, 
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or what Frank referred to as “square business.” This was explained as a necessity in the 
contraband market as it created a sense of trust among the inmates and was associated 
with repeat business. Given that in many correctional facilities, the only way an inmate 
can earn money is to sell contraband or scarce commissary items. If an individual is 
known for selling tainted products or misrepresenting an item as something it is not, then 
they reduce their chances of having future customers and repeat business, and will often 
be avoided by other inmates thereafter. For instance, Todd mentioned a situation in which 
fellow inmates were taking stamps off of envelopes using steam, washing them off, and 
selling them as unused stamps. Once it was found out that the inmates were doing this, no 
one trusted those inmates, no one would purchase anything from them, and no one would 
sell anything to them. 
Todd: There would be people that would take hot water cups and try to 
steam off stamps from envelopes and they would try to reuse them, so then 
you found out a couple of days later this stamps is not real this stamp has 
already been used, cool, so now it’s you know that so and so screwed you 
over, and everybody now knows, and they won’t fuck with them (sell or 
trade with them).  
As it relates to repeat business, Frank explains the importance of repeat business 
in correctional facilities in the quote below: 
Frank: If you do square business, it’s just like any business. You know, if 
you give people what you tell them you are going to give them for a price 
that they agree to pay, you will get repeat business. You know, and repeat 
business in fucking jail, there is nothing else to do except repeat business. 
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 Along the lines of square business is understanding the going rate for certain contraband 
items that are available on the market and understanding who else is selling that type of 
contraband. In other words, if an inmate obtains a certain type of contraband and wants to 
sell the contraband, there are two important things that the inmate must do, which leads 
to rules eight and nine. 
Subtheme 8 - Rule #8 Don’t step on others’ toes. In the case that there is a gang 
that is already selling a particular type of contraband in a part of a correctional facility 
and another inmate obtains and wants to sell that same type of contraband, four 
participants noted that they must first get permission from the other gang in order to sell 
their contraband. Not getting permission was suggested to be a form of disrespect and can 
lead to pricing conflicts, inter-racial and inter-gang conflicts, unwanted attention by 
correctional officers, and potentially violence. Todd describes a situation that he saw 
unfold where permission was necessary for more than one gang to sell the same type of 
contraband. 
Todd: I know [prison gang] brought in a shit load (a lot) of weed, but they 
had to make sure it was cool, they didn’t have to make sure it was cool 
with everybody, but they had to make sure you know the three [another 
prison gang] dudes, or the [another prison gang] dudes didn’t have a 
problem with it, because when you do that you could crash out 
everybody… If you crash and get caught they’ll lock down the unit and 
we’ll be on lockdown for a month, and you got to own up to that, so it’s a 
lot on the seller, the buyer, and the bringer, to the finder, everyone 
involved has to follow the rules. 
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In fact, Frank suggested that price fixing happens in this sub-rosa economy and is 
actually a good thing as it reduced potential conflicts. Aside from tattooing, which was 
expressed as an art form without a set price, a price structure existed for most 
commodities and deviating from that price, especially when there is more than one gang 
selling the same contraband, can be problematic.  
Frank: Yeah, price fixing happens all the time. Hell yeah. Not so much in 
the tattoo thing. That’s more of an artistic process. People can name what 
they want for tattoos. That’s different. But as far as commodities like, you 
know drugs, tobacco, shit like that, yeah there is a set price understood. 
 Another participant discusses one way in which conflict can arise when more than 
one gang is selling a particular type of contraband at the same time, even after prices 
have been fixed.  
Jack: Or this one gang is selling this much and doing this kind of business 
and then somebody else comes along and starts doing it too and starts 
making just as much money or making more and taking away from that 
and the next thing you know it’s like, oh no… the ego of the two gangs are 
going at it. 
Despite rivalries between prison gangs, two participants suggested that rival 
gangs would often agree on prices and agree to allow each other to sell the same 
contraband to avoid conflicts and maintain a flow of contraband, however, as shown in 
the quote above, the egos of competing gangs sometimes get in the way. Not separate 
from an understood pricing structures for most typical contraband items, is rule number 
nine, don’t undercut the market. 
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Subtheme 9 - Rule #9 Don’t undercut the market. In licit businesses, reducing 
the price of your product can be an effective way to capture more market share and is 
considered a common business practice. However, in the inmate economy, this practice is 
highly frowned upon. Similar to licit businesses, reducing the price of your product can 
help you sell your product quicker, but in the inmate economy, doing so can come with 
consequences handed down by those who manage the market (prison gangs). Exceptions 
to this rule do exist in cases where the seller is respected by the inmates, is a high ranking 
gang member, or when it may simply be too much trouble to address their business 
practices. Jack discusses this phenomenon by using the example of papers that are used to 
roll tobacco and marijuana cigarettes, which often times were fashioned out of blank 
pages from a Bible. 
Jack: Don’t try to fuck up the market that there already is. If we are selling 
Bible papers for 75 cents… even though it’s pure capitalism, it’s kind of 
fucked up for you to come in here and start selling Bible papers for 50 
cents. People get pissed off about that… but if you got enough respect and 
you are too much to fuck with, nobody is going to do nothing about it, but 
if you are a little punk-ass dude trying to do that, they (prison gangs) are 
going to shut you down (tell you to stop or correct the price). 
This phenomenon was further discussed by Frank as he mentioned the nature of 
undercutting the market, and how this is handled.  
Frank: I mean, yeah, tomorrow this guy might have cigarettes for one soup 
versus two, you know, but that’s not going to last because they (prison 
gangs) are going to talk to him. “No, our price is two and your price is 
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two, you aren’t going to come in here and undercut the market.” Yeah, 
when there is supply, the price goes down and when there is not enough 
supply, the price goes up, but they (prison gangs) regulate it so they can 
keep making their money. 
These findings suggest that prison gangs not only dominate the contraband market, but 
they also govern the dealings in terms of dictating the price that should be charged for 
certain contraband. 
Subtheme 10 - Rule #10 Don’t steal. Similar to the free world, stealing is 
frowned upon in correctional facilities. Eight participants noted this as an unwritten rule, 
some of which suggested stealing another inmate’s commissary or contraband is a major 
form of disrespect, and must be handled through violence or some form of compromise. 
As previously noted in Diego’s situation where his property was taken because he traded 
with another inmate who was off limits until he retrieved what he had traded, stealing 
does happen. Also, stealing may happen if an inmate has too much contraband or is a 
vulnerable/undesirable inmate, such as in the case of inmates who were charged with 
child molestation, commonly referred to in the interviews as “chomos”, short for child 
molesters. Frank suggested that, “if you have too much contraband, you are a target.” 
Jack mentioned that: 
Jack: A child molester, they are going to jack (steal) you for your shit, and 
nobody is going to care. Nobody is going to stick up for you and nobody is 
going to give a fuck that you just got jacked for $100. Nobody is going to 
care, and if you try and do something about it and you are a child 
molester, it’s going to be even worse for you. 
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Frank also mentioned what can happen if an inmate has too much contraband for personal 
use, and the dangers of stealing from another inmate:  
Frank: If you screw up bad enough or you steal from somebody you can 
get fucking killed. Very quickly, if the wrong person sees you, or you 
know, the thing about jail is not letting people know what you have. It’s 
kind of a dance because you got to let them know what you have so you 
can sell it, but you don’t want them knowing how much you have because 
if they think you have too much for your personal use they could come 
take it, and if enough people want to, they are going to take it. 
Even in cases where things are stolen from inmates and the inmate stands up for 
themselves, the property is not always returned and the action can go unpunished, such as 
in the case of Blake. 
Blake: I got stuff stolen from me, but I didn’t cause a riot. Yeah, I fucking 
caused a fuss in my tank and I fucking called people out, but I lost my shit 
(contraband). You know? And I know who it was – the floor workers. 
When they came in to do the fucking raid that followed the cops, but any 
way, so, you know, shit like that would happen. 
Chris described stealing as an inherent aspect of prison life, given the criminal nature of 
the inmates and the fact that inmates aren’t going to say anything to the correctional 
officers if they are stolen from. In other words, theft happens and it is up to the victim to 
handle the issue as noted in the quote below. 
Chris: They are murderers, thieves, rapists, they are selling drugs to each 
other and they know that they don’t call the cops. So, a lot of people just 
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try to jack people (steal), so that happens too, and when that happens 
usually violence occurs somewhere because you don’t let people 
disrespect you. 
Protecting one’s self from theft was much easier if the individual was a part of a 
prison gang, as their gang status provided protection from others as noted by Chris, “I 
mean, because if you are not (in a gang) or if you don’t have somebody backing you, 
what’s going to keep somebody from just coming and taking everything, you got?” These 
findings suggest that stealing another inmate’s contraband is frowned upon in 
correctional facilities and can result in severe consequences, however, there are 
exceptions to the rule, especially for “chomos”, those who are not in prison gangs, and 
those that have too much contraband that a larger group of individuals (prison gang) 
desires.  
Subtheme 11 - Rule #11 Don’t get in debt with guards or inmates. 
Unsurprisingly, and consistent with previous studies, study participants also noted that 
guards were largely responsible for bringing contraband into correctional facilities 
(n=16). In doing so, a financial transaction must occur between the guard and an inmate. 
Rule number eleven, mentioned by four participants, deals with this situation and 
participants warned about the dangers of getting into debt with guards who are bringing 
in contraband. An inmate with debt owed to another inmate is also not something an 
individual wants looming over their head either as unpaid debts can lead to violent 
altercations, while getting into debt with guards can have retaliatory formal 
consequences. Jack mentions: 
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Jack: You know, getting in debt with a guard, and you don’t have the 
money to pay the guard and the guard gets mad, all that guard has to do is 
go shakedown your cell and say “look, ‘I found this joint.” Next thing you 
know you have more time. A joint out here, that is a misdemeanor, in 
there it will get you more time in prison. You could get a couple more 
years stacked on top of your sentence.  
    
Debt owed between inmates was suggested to result in violence, as owing money 
to someone and not paying them is a form of disrespect, and the longer the debt is held 
the more disrespect the debtor is exhibiting. Jack describes what happens when debts are 
owed and go unpaid between inmates in the quote below: 
Jack: Ya there is a lot of violence due to contraband for people not paying 
debts… Pay up or shit is going to be done, or you know, you get so much 
in debt because your addiction – yeah, “I’ll pay them this later” and then 
the next thing you know you are owing a bunch of money and there is 
violence behind that. 
Carlos discussed the potential consequences of not paying debts that were owed to other 
inmates as well.    
Carlos: If you don’t pay your shit, you will get split. It’s that simple. If 
you don’t pay up, you will get split or you will be in debt big time and you 
will be doing favors. You will be somebody’s bitch, holding on to their 
fucking pant loop type shit (suggesting sexual victimization). 
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 Participants made it very clear that owing money to both guards and other inmates 
was not a favorable position to be in, and the consequences for not paying one’s debt can 
range from formal administrative punishments and free-world charges to physical 
violence and sexual victimization.  
Subtheme 12 - Rule #12 Don’t interfere with correctional officer and inmate 
dealings. Another unwritten rule of the contraband market deals with staying to yourself 
and not interfering with other’s business dealings, especially when these business dealing 
are between inmates and guards. Jack noted that interfering with an inmate and a guard’s 
business dealings is considered to be extremely disrespectful. The time and effort that 
goes into building a business relationship with a guard is something to be cherished, and 
when that guard is helping inmates make money in the contraband market, they are well 
guarded by that inmate and his fellow gang members. As Todd notes: 
Todd: “Say the [prison gang] had the officer (guard who was bringing in 
contraband), like, if I went and tried to, “Hey, will you bring me this?” 
They are going to have an issue with it. If you weren’t aware and say, that 
officer pissed you off and you slapped him, the next thing you know, you 
are getting beat up by a bunch of [prison gang members].” 
Jack discussed how interfering with an inmate and guard’s dealings was a 
significant form of disrespect and how this could lead to violence. 
Jack: You don’t want nobody knowing about your business because if one 
guy thinks you got guards bringing in stuff for you, he can go to that guard 
and be like, “Man, you are bringing in something for him.” Which is a 
major form of disrespect. If I got a lot of respect and I can handle my 
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business right in there and I found out that you are going to my guard and 
putting my “Hey, man, you are already bringing it in for him.” That’s a 
major form of disrespect. I recorded prison rules and ethics. I got the right 
to put something upside your head for disrespecting me and my game or 
my hustle. You are fucking with my hustle by doing that. 
What this relationship looks like, how they are formed, and how this relationship 
turns into a moneymaking adventure for both the inmate and the guard will be 
covered in main theme four of this chapter, but for now, it is important to note 
that interfering with this relationship can be dangerous and is a major form of 
disrespect. 
Subtheme 13 - Rule #13 Always have a fall guy. When selling contraband in 
correctional facilities, emphasis was placed on never getting caught with that contraband, 
especially contraband such as drugs and large amounts of tobacco as these can result in 
free-world charges. In attempting to avoid being caught in possession of contraband, 
those who are the main sellers of contraband will often have what was referred to as a 
“fall guy,” discussed by four participants. This person would be responsible for 
possessing the contraband, and sometimes selling it on behalf of the main seller. In other 
instances, individuals may be set up to take the fall for contraband without knowing it. 
Jack discussed how he was the fall guy and was responsible for selling a higher ranking 
fellow gang member’s tobacco, from which he made profits as well. 
Jack: Yeah, I would have a bunch of packs of cigarettes and weed on me 
and I would be selling it and [higher ranking gang member] would be like, 
“No, I don’t fuck around no more (sell contraband), but [Jack’s prison 
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nickname] does.” That was my nickname, “[nickname] got it.” Then I 
would do it and I would sell ten packs or whatever and give the money to 
[higher ranking gang member] and I just stayed in weed and a house full 
of commissary. 
In regards to having a fall guy who was either willing or unaware that contraband 
was being planted on them, Frank discussed the following situations: 
Frank: …Always have a fall guy. There is always some bitch on the block 
that is stupid or that is young or that doesn’t fucking know or that wants to 
act cool. You know what? The shit stays with him because in case 
something fucking happened, you guys get raided or they come in 
unannounced, you know, that’s your fall guy, man. They don’t know. 
They think they are being cool, and they think they are playing their 
part… You know, occasionally they would throw a red herring out there. 
“Man, this guy has been fucking up on the block, nobody likes him, fuck 
that shit. We are going to set his ass up and send him down.” So, they put 
some shit, you know, in his bag. They know we are getting searched 
tomorrow, so they put all the shit in his bag and hang him out to dry and 
the fucking detention officer is in on it because they know, okay, if we 
move him out and he catches a case then they are going to lay back on the 
whole block and everything will be okay. 
In this instance, a fall guy could serve as what Mexican drug smugglers call 
decoys, or what are commonly referred to as suicide loads or blind mules; 
effectively serving as a proxy or cut-out in network analysis positioning terms. 
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This person may not have been chosen for the exact purpose of being a cut-out in 
the same way that drug smugglers would considered one, however, the concept is 
very similar.  
Subtheme 14 - Rule #14 Keep the peace. Although problems between 
individuals and groups may occur within correctional facilities in regards to the inmate 
economy and contraband dealings, five participants specifically mentioned that 
maintaining some sense of peace was necessary. Doing so allowed for fewer issues to 
arise and for problems to be solved without drawing unwanted attention from guards. It 
also provided opportunities to access contraband and for life while incarcerated to have 
as few deprivations as possible. Some participants noted that although you are 
surrounded by people in prison that you do not like and would never associate yourself 
with in the free-world, getting along with fellow inmates was expressed to be important. 
For instance, Blake discusses a time where his cell was out of view of the guard shack, 
and thus his cell and bed was a desirable place for other inmates to do tattoos. Although 
he wanted to sleep on his bed at times, he simply allowed the other inmates to use his bed 
to tattoo in exchange for commissary. 
Blake: I let them use my bed and sometimes they would turn me on to a 
soup or a spread – make friends. A lot of times in jail, man, you got to 
make friends with people you don’t even want to make friends with just to 
keep the peace and to get commissary too – contraband, you know? 
It was not only the inmates that wanted to keep the peace in regards to 
contraband, but guards also wanted to keep the peace and would let inmates trade 
commissary, as noted by Blake below:  
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Blake: Trading, that’s contraband and as soon as you trade something 
that’s contraband, but there were guards to keep the peace in the tank and 
to be cool because there were some guards that made friends with you. 
You know? They just do it and keep an eye on the tank and learn what’s 
going on in the tank. You know, there is people that talk. There is talkers. 
I’m pretty sure they got to know you from intel and also to keep the peace 
in the tank, but they would let guys trade shit. 
In sum, the unwritten rules of the contraband market, as identified in the 
interviews, suggests that they were mainly established to reduce conflict; reduce 
unwanted attention that may lead to shakedowns; protect one’s profits; ensure personal 
responsibility; protect knowledge and assets from snitches and thieves; established fixed 
prices; ensure respectful dealings; provide justifications for informal punishments and 
consequences; ensure self-preservation; and to maintain a steady flow of contraband. 
Interestingly, after the twelfth interview, no new unwritten rules emerged or were 
mentioned by the rest of the participants, suggesting that at least as far as the unwritten 
rules are concerned, saturation was likely reached. 
Main Theme 4 - Grooming and Inmate-Correctional Officer Relations 
Main theme four that emerged from the interviews surrounds the relationships 
that are formed between correctional officers and inmates as it relates to contraband and 
contraband smuggling. As noted in chapter two, inmates and correctional officers spend 
several hours per day, and several days per week, together, so it is only natural for 
communication to take place and some form of relationship to exist. The extent of this 
relationship and how these relationships are formed were one of the main focuses of 
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inquiry in the interviews, particularly as it relates to contraband. The most fruitful data 
obtained from the interviews regarding these relationships were collapsed into four 
subthemes: 1) rapport building, 2) the grooming process, 3) blackmail, and 4) the ties that 
bind. 
Subtheme 1 - Rapport building. As noted in chapter two, grooming refers to the 
process of slowly corrupting guards in an effort to receive favorable treatment, whether it 
be something small like extra time out of the cell, or something more severe and illegal 
such as smuggling in contraband for an inmate. When asked about the grooming process 
and how the process unfolds, seven participants provided some insights on how grooming 
is often done in correctional facilities, either because they themselves had groomed 
correctional officers or they had witnessed someone they knew grooming correctional 
officers. Consistent with previous studies, all seven of these participants mentioned that 
this was a gradual process that began with rapport building. As Jack mentioned, “You 
can’t groom a guard in a day. It takes a little while. It takes some work and it takes some 
talking to.” Jordan said, “Ya you would just talk to them, try to build a relationship 
slowly overtime.” Todd mentioned the following approach at rapport building: 
Todd: It just started off normal like if you were on the streets or 
something, if you think about it this way, out of a seven day work week, 
you are seeing this person 5 days a week 12 hours a day, so eventually 
there is conversation that happens, I’ve conversated with plenty of guards, 
you know “what are you in here for?” “What are your plans when you get 
out?” You know, that just starts the process and it keeps going, and you 
see how far you can get with them, like hey “tell me more about you 
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guard, are you married, do you have kids, how many kids do you have, do 
you have boys do you have girls how old are they, blah blah blah, where 
are you from, do you live around here, why did you do this (job)?” 
 Participants also noted that simple conversations about something the inmate and 
correctional officer may have in common is often a good way to begin the rapport 
building process that leads to eventual grooming. For instance, Chris suggested that: 
Chris: You just talk about the same things and just happen to get on the subject… 
Yeah, especially during football season it gets real easy, but especially as 
(resident of a particular state). You know, everybody is either [name of city and 
football team] fan or [name of city and football team] fan. 
Making small talk and connecting on something like football was a common way of 
building the rapport necessary to begin the grooming process. Connecting with 
correctional officers about football and sports was also mentioned by Jack as a way to 
build rapport: 
Jack: Whatever the sports team the C.O. would like, he would look them 
up real good. Yeah, man, we watched so and so run the ball last night, and 
like groom people into making it seem like that’s your homeboy or your 
friend, convince him that hey, we are cool.  
Another common method used to build rapport was through making sexual 
comments to female guards, letting the female guards know that the inmate finds them 
attractive, and/or letting the female guards know that they are interested in them. This 
was suggested to be done for the purpose of building rapport that could lead to grooming 
for the purpose of trying to convince a guard to provide sexual services to an inmate or to 
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convince them to smuggle contraband into the facility. This was suggested by seven 
participants to be most successful on female guards who were unattractive, had low self-
esteem, or who were not given enough attention at home. The following three quotes 
illustrate this phenomenon.  
Jack: You always seen females get in trouble for (bringing in contraband), 
and it sounds fucked up, and I hate to say it, but if you are an unattractive 
woman by whatever standards you want to call attractive and you come in 
there and you all of a sudden you are getting attention – you got to 
understand, you are coming in a place full of dudes and a lot of them are 
in shape because that’s all they do is work out. They are not ugly dudes, 
and you got this dude that would never talk to you in the free world and 
now he’s just talking to you, saying the sweetest shit. The best 
conversation, always got something nice to say. You are pulled into that. 
You know what I mean? 
Frank also discussed why he believed female correctional officers were easy 
targets.  
Frank: She could be 450 fucking pounds – somebody has been in down 
(incarcerated) for ten years is still going to talk to her and smell her when 
she walks by. You know? They like to flirt, you know, maybe they feel, 
for whatever reason, maybe they don’t get enough attention at home or 
whatever fucking reason it is, but they’re easy targets. 
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Jack’s comment below also sheds light on this phenomenon as he explains the 
thought process held by those inmates who wished to begin the grooming process 
on unattractive female correctional officers, and why. 
Jack: There was a lot of dudes that were into that (pulling female guards 
for sexual purposes). If you can get a female guard, you know what I’m 
saying? “Oh, the CO’s are coming in. She’s a short little fat one. I bet I 
can get some pussy from her. She probably has low self-esteem… short, 
fat, probably ain’t that good looking, I can get pussy from her.”… Now if 
you have one that is going to start giving you pussy, what else will she do?  
When asked about grooming, Chad suggested that I talk to his friend Tucker (who 
was later interviewed) about grooming, as he described him as having, “a silver tongue” 
when it came to grooming female guards. Chad said: 
Chad: Man I never did it (groomed a guard), but my friend [Tucker] was 
the king of doing that, he had a silver tongue and he would have these girls 
(female correctional officers) bringing in food, candy bars, all kinds of 
shit, he had one bring in a Reese’s (peanut butter chocolate candy) for me 
once. 
During the interview with Tucker, he mentioned that he indeed had a way with talking to 
female guards and having them bring in numerous forms of minor contraband for him 
including Fabuloso (cleaning product), shrimp gumbo, women’s perfume, and 
pornography. Tucker said, 
Tucker: when no one is around, you just chop it up with them (start up 
conversations), the fat chicks were really easy to pull, you just show them 
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compassion and make them feel like your conversation is special. People 
at the end of the day want to feel special and wanted, you know, put them 
on a pedestal. If they like it you might show them your dick, get sexual 
with it over time, you know? If they like it you’ll know it and then you 
just work them from there, the fat ugly ones were the easiest (to groom 
and corrupt)… 
 Presenting one’s genitalia to a female guard during the rapport building process 
may seem to be absurd, but Tucker was not the only participant that mentioned this as a 
form of rapport building in the grooming process. In fact, five participants noted that this 
was a method used in rapport building. Jake suggested that it was sometimes an effective 
way of building rapport and starting a sexual relationship, whether it was only visual or 
evolved into something physical. Jake said, “Sometimes you have these guys that 
masturbate on these women and they don’t care and there are women that let them do it 
and they are into it, and it works.” Jordan also told a story about a female correctional 
officer (described as an “ugly ass bitch”) that would do favors for inmates if they would 
masturbate in front of her. 
 From small talk about a football game, to common connections about similar 
interests, to sexual and esteem building comments and behaviors exhibited by inmates, 
these techniques were discussed as ways to build rapport with correctional officer with 
the ultimate goal of eventually grooming the guards into bringing in contraband and/or 
providing special favors for the inmates. Once the rapport was built and trust was 
established between the correctional officers and the inmates, the grooming process 
would proceed.    
142 
 
Subtheme 2 - The grooming process. Once a sense of trust was built between 
inmates and guards, participants suggested that the small favors would start. The 
participants (n=7) who discussed grooming in-depth, said that it typically started with 
something small like a cheeseburger, cigarettes, or a can of snuff tobacco. Jack 
mentioned what this looks like in the following quote. 
Jack: So, when you get them started with something like cigarettes, or I 
know one guy he would talk to a guard and tell him like, “Man, I know we 
ain’t supposed to have no money in here, but I got cash and I just want a 
fucking bad-ass cheeseburger. If you bring me a fucking cheeseburger, I’ll 
give you $50.” Dude (correctional officer) thinks,” man it’s just food… 
fuck it, man.” And whatever amount the dollar is, he brings him in a 
cheeseburger and fries, now you have that guard on your hook. He just 
broke a rule for you. He just brought in something that is benign and 
harmless. It’s redundant, I guess, but something that’s harmless as a 
fucking cheeseburger, now this guy got it. Now he’s got that trust. Now 
they crossed that line. Now you can be like – and you get to talk to him 
more and, you know, “I got some more cash, and I want some cigarettes.” 
… It starts out with some food, then cigarettes, then whatever. 
Frank also provided an examples of what this grooming process looks like and describes 
using little tests to identify their “trigger points”. 
Frank: Yeah, grooming might have been as little as escorting the nurse in 
one day. You know, the first she escorts the nurse in to dispense 
medication or something, and he knew goddamn well that guy got two 
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doses. He was standing right there but he doesn’t say anything. That could 
have been the first step. Okay, well now we know he’s looking but he 
doesn’t care or for whatever reason he didn’t report it. If that’s step one, 
step two might be that I’m going to smoke a cigarette in front of him from 
50 feet away and see what happens. You know, and if he doesn’t say 
anything about that – okay, cool. Now we are going to talk and see what 
we can do. And it’s an incremental step-by-step process… You just have 
to figure out what their trigger points are. 
Todd talked about ways that inmates can feel out a correctional officer’s level of integrity 
and policy enforcement in an effort to determine how likely it is that the correctional 
officer will let them do something contraband-related that is against policy. Todd 
provided the following dialogue as an example:   
Todd: Ya, and it’s almost like you are dry testing them, to see what they’ll 
say, like “hey I’m gonna bring in some bleach” 
Officer: “Oh no nah you are not going to fucking do that,” okay cool, now 
I know this guard is not about it (willing to allow it). 
 
Todd: or “Hey I’m gonna bring in some bleach.”  
 
Officer: “Alright man as long as it’s not a lot.” 
 
Todd: “Okay cool,” and now you know, you can work on him. 
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Another participant had groomed a guard over a period of time into bringing in 
snuff tobacco for him to sell. In this instance, this correctional officer was an avid snuff 
tobacco user and would often bring snuff too work and use it while he was inside of the 
prison, which was against policy. Overtime, the inmate developed a relationship with this 
guard that evolved from the correctional officer bringing in one can of snuff, to seven 
cans, and later other forms of contraband. This participant referred to tobacco as the 
“gateway contraband,” which led to correctional officers bringing in other forms of 
contraband. In other words, they would sometimes start the grooming process with 
something relatively minor such as tobacco and slowly groom them into bringing in other 
forms of contraband. 
Chris: Like the dude I brought up, he dipped snuff so he could understand 
wanting one. And that’s exactly how it started. So, he brought it in. Yeah, 
that’s how it started (one can of snuff) and then after, I guess, he just got 
used to it. He got comfortable with it so that it wasn’t a big deal to bring 
anything in. So yeah that’s exactly how it started. That gateway drug, 
tobacco, was that gateway contraband. It started him off. It was that and 
Creatine. We had him start bringing that because we worked out a lot. 
Yeah, even that, he was worried at first, but we talked him into it… Like 
we see him every single day at work for six out of his twelve-hour shift. 
We were his friends… 
 Another effective way of beginning the grooming process after rapport building 
was discussed by Jack. Jack suggested that “money talks” and the dialogue he provided 
highlights a more brazen attempt at grooming a guard and how this transpired. 
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Jack: [name of cellmate] just started talking to him (correctional officer) 
and working with him and mentioning shit, and this, that, and the other, 
and at one point when [name of cellmate] felt like he could trust him… his 
simple move was like. 
 
Cellmate: “Man, I just want to get some cigarettes in here and make some 
money.” 
 
Jack: And he showed him a wad of money. Dude (correctional officer) 
was like, 
 
Correctional Officer: “Wow, shit, how much is that?”  
 
Cellmate: “Don’t worry about it, but if you want to make some money, 
you can make money and all I want is some cigarettes.” Do you know 
what I mean? If you can help me out, I can sell cigarettes in here for cash 
and we can keep it rolling and we can make extra money.” 
Again, what began as simple conversations quickly evolved into a situation where 
both individuals benefitted financially. The rest of this story will be told in main theme 
five, as a detailed explanation was provide by Jack about the creative method used to 
smuggle this tobacco into the prison. Ultimately, many ways of grooming guards were 
discussed by participants. The participants also discussed methods that were used to 
coerce the guards into bringing in other forms of contraband, despite the correctional 
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officers desire to stop smuggling contraband, which leads to the third subtheme of main 
theme 4, blackmail. 
Subtheme 3 - Blackmail. Of the seven participants that discussed the grooming 
process, five mentioned that blackmail played a large part in coercing the correctional 
officers into continuing to do favors and smuggle contraband into correctional facilities. 
As described by Todd below, once they break one rule for an inmate, the inmate might 
use the threat of telling the warden about their behaviors if they choose to stop helping 
the inmate. Todd uses an example based on Greendot money transfers, and describes 
what this blackmail looks like after transactions have been made. 
Todd: but a lot of them (guards) would do it, it was just how far could you 
push that person (guard) to go, and then once they start obviously you 
have blackmail on them, you have proof that “hey my family has wired 
this guy this money, okay you want to stop? Okay cool, now we are going 
to go to the warden.” I’ve never seen a crooked warden, so, it one of those. 
Chris discussed how this transpires in relation to male inmate and female 
correctional officer relationships in the quote shown below. Chris suggested that a 
combination of a weightless threat of blackmail and a guilty conscience on the part of the 
female correctional officer for having sexual relations with an inmate was enough 
“leverage” to have the correctional officer continue to bring in contraband for an inmate. 
Chris: Like I said, it starts with like a relationship. Some sort of flirting 
with some sort of guy who just happens to have enough of a mouthpiece 
(smooth talker) to talk her into whatever. Maybe some sexual relationship 
and then after that he’s got leverage to get her to bring things in… Like I 
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said, that sexual relationship starting it and giving leverage played a big 
part. They would just feel some sort of attraction that they shouldn’t have 
and cross a line and after they cross the line, there is no going back. Right? 
Or they would feel that way, and like realistically, they (female 
correctional officer) couldn’t get in trouble anyway because what’s the 
guy (inmate) going to say, “oh, I had sex with her.” Prove it. All she has to 
do is deny it, but just the guilt of it makes it leverage enough to get them 
to do something else. 
Jack also talked about how sexual relations between female guards and inmates were a 
form of blackmail and how this blackmail was used. 
Jack: If she will come to your cell and blow you real quick (oral sex), or 
pull down her pants and let you fuck her real quick, what else will she do? 
It’s like, “You are already fucking me, you might as well be bringing me 
in some cigarettes.” 
Chris further discussed how he coerced the guard who brought him snuff and 
Creatine into continuing to bring in contraband. In the following quote, Chris mentions 
that personal information about the guard’s life outside of prison was helpful in 
blackmailing the correctional officer into bring in more contraband, as it provided him 
with more money to spend during his leisurely, yet nefarious, activities on his days off. 
Chris: His four days off – he was taking all the money he made (from 
contraband), and he was laying up in motel rooms smoking crack with 
prostitutes. He would come back and tell us (the other inmate workers) all 
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about it. Yeah, so after that like we busted him wide open (used this 
information, along with rapport, as leverage). 
The grooming process in Chris’ case began with a common bond over snuff and later 
evolved into other forms of contraband with the looming threat of blackmail based on 
what the correctional officer’s personal life and leisurely activities included. When asked 
about ways of obtaining blackmail, Carlos mentioned that a good way to gather blackmail 
was to have a way to prove communications had occurred outside of prison between an 
inmate and a female correctional officer via telephone. 
Carlos: Ya it’s like, you know, talking to them on the outside type shit or 
getting a cellphone brought in, getting their number, and then you calling 
them off the phone that they brought in for you at their house while they 
are off shift, that’s good blackmail, now you got her.    
There were some instances that were discussed throughout the interviews, where 
blackmail wasn’t necessary, in fact, some correctional officers were reported to have pre-
existing ties with inmates (endogenous relationships), which leads to subtheme four, the 
ties that bind. 
Subtheme 4 - The ties that bind. It was not uncommon for participants to see 
other inmates who either knew correctional officers from school, the neighborhood they 
were raised in, correctional officers that were family members, and even correctional 
officers that were gang members in the free-world. These endogenous relationships 
between inmates and guards came along with pre-existing loyalties and levels of trust that 
did not require rapport building, grooming, and blackmail. Jordan mentioned, “ya if you 
were from the area that the prison was, and you had people (correctional officers that you 
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knew), you could get damn near anything over that fence.” Frank discusses this 
phenomena based on what he experienced in a large local jail. 
Frank: a lot of correction officers that I ran into had ties to the 
communities that these people were from. You will have correction 
officers, like I said earlier, that have neighborhood ties – even gang 
affiliations. There were multiple former blood detention officers. It was 
pretty freaking obvious, you know, once you observe the relationships and 
how the stuff came it that way… Definitely community ties with that guy.   
Chris discussed how female gang affiliates and members would get jobs at 
correctional facilities on behalf of the gang in order to operate prostitution business 
within the walls of correctional facilities. He too mentioned that proximity to one’s 
residence played a large role in these inmate-guard relationships that could potentially 
lead to contraband smuggling. At the very least, the endogenous and/or exogenous 
relationships made it okay to ask the correctional officer without fear of being reported 
for the solicitation.  
Chris: Like a lot of the women that were prostituting, they were part of 
like some [gang name] or [gang name] and they, you know, some chick 
was told to get a job here and make money or whatever. Because, I mean, 
that’s a big money-making opportunity, too. $200 a pop. You know what I 
mean? For a blowjob. Five minutes, 200 bucks. Especially these people 
who have been in prison for years, it doesn’t take long… A lot of times, 
the people had some sort of relationship prior to that. Or, like the male 
officers would have known the person before, or known somebody that 
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knew them and that makes it, you know, that’s another thing that makes it 
okay to kind of ask (for them to bring in contraband) and if they shoot you 
down, they are not going to put you on blast (tell their superiors about the 
solicitation)… because they know your family, or they went to church 
with your grandma. A lot of people got sent to the small-town prisons 
where they were living in that small town… So then you are in your 
hometown and if your hometown is [name of small town], that small little 
town where everybody either works in the prison or knows somebody who 
does, yeah.  
Along with neighborhood ties and gang ties, Carlos discussed situations where he 
would see other inmate and correctional officers from previous facilities where he had 
been previously incarcerated, and the endogenous relationships would follow and benefit 
him as it relates to contraband. 
Carols: Yeah, if you knew somebody from like before – if you saw 
somebody from a previous bid, if you are on your same bid and you saw 
somebody come back in from a previous bid, yeah, y’all are going to kick 
it (be friends) right off the bat. If you saw somebody from your 
[neighbor]hood that got transferred onto your unit, yeah, y’all are already 
in good. Same thing with like CO’s and shit like that. If you knew a CO 
from the street and you got incarcerated, he is going to look out for you 
type of shit – most of the time. I saw the CO that was at the jail, at that 
prison that I was at and he was like, “Yo, what’s up, dude. Do you need 
anything? I got you”… because he saw me from before. 
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As mentioned in main theme two subtheme one, neighborhood ties and gang ties 
played a large role in gaining access to contraband by having guards that knew the inmate 
or their family before incarceration, and the closer an inmate was to their hometown, the 
better chances they have of getting a correctional officer to help them get contraband into 
the facility. Taken together, these results suggest that smooth talking, the power of large 
amounts of cash, manipulation, sexual relationships, blackmail, and endogenous and 
exogenous relationships all play a large part in inmate-correctional officer relationships 
that were associated with contraband. It was evident from the interviews that building 
and/or exploiting endogenous and exogenous relationships was an effective way to get 
correctional officers and free-world actors to agree to bring contraband into correctional 
facilities. However, the process of doing so was considered the main challenge and the 
most risky for all actors involved, which leads into main theme five, contraband 
smuggling methods. 
Main Theme 5 - Contraband Smuggling Methods 
Despite the existence of high perimeter fences, metal detectors for correctional 
officers as they enter correctional facilities, surveillance cameras, watchtower, and 
correctional officer’s supervising inmates in the agriculture fields, contraband still finds 
its way into correctional facilities. Participants were asked if they had any knowledge of 
how contraband entered correctional facilities, and several methods were discussed. 
These methods will be grouped into three subthemes that are separated by the main 
smuggling actor/s involved: 1) employees, 2) free-world actors, 3) inmate trustees. To be 
clear, these smuggling methods and operations may involve more than one actor type 
(identified above) to complete the successful smuggling of contraband, so they are 
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separated not by who was involved per se, but rather who was responsible for actually 
smuggling the contraband into the facility. Unfortunately, the smuggling networks and 
processes discussed in the interviews either did not include more than 3 actors, or 
extensive knowledge of the parties involved was not provided. Thus, social network 
analysis and link analysis will not be used to analyze these operations. However, crime 
script analysis will be used to outline the processes when appropriate and when 
substantial knowledge of these operations was provided. 
Subtheme 1 - Employees. As previously noted, a large amount of contraband that 
is found in correctional facilities is indeed smuggled in by employees and correctional 
officer based on arrangements made with an inmate or inmates. As previously noted, 
participants suggested that guards were mainly responsible for the majority of contraband 
in the facilities where they were incarcerated. Chris describes the nature of correctional 
officers bringing contraband into facilities and how easy it was for correctional officers to 
bring in even large amounts of contraband at a time. 
Chris: They (guards) don’t have to worry about getting strip searched. 
There is so many things that a woman can fit between her breasts or a guy 
can fit between his legs and just walk in, especially if it’s not metal 
because they go through a metal detector. This guy (correctional officer) 
brought in a pound of marijuana one time compressed, strapped to his 
stomach. He pretended like he had a backache when he walked through 
and walked hunched over to cover the bulge in his stomach and walked it 
all the way through and ended up burning (getting someone caught) [name 
of prison gang] and then quit like two weeks later. 
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Going back to Jack’s situation in main theme two subtheme four where he and 
another inmate were able to get large amounts of tobacco brought in by a correctional 
officer, he described the elaborate process the correctional officer went through to 
package the tobacco in a way that was inconspicuous to other guards. A lengthy excerpt 
from Jack’s interview is provided below for this process followed by a step by step break 
down of the actions taken in the form of a crime script analysis based on further details 
he provided.   
Jack: He would bring them (packs of Bugler tobacco) in in sets and he 
would make a vest out of bugler. He told us that he would drive to an 
Indian reservation a little ways away and buy them because them because 
it was cheaper and no taxes and he would buy them by the case… and he 
would make a little bitty pin hole in each one of them and then drive over 
them with his car real slowly to where it would smash them down even 
flatter and then he would take five of them and stack them on top of each 
other with a little piece of tape so that it wouldn’t go in different directions 
and roll over them again to where they were even flatter and then put tape 
around that and he had a vest and it was like four rows – four or five rows 
across its belly and one like mid and one across his chest and the same 
thing on the back and then two straps made with five here and five here on 
his shoulders and then the same thing on the back. Picture a bulletproof 
vest going over you. And you would tape it around the sides with a little 
small piece of tape here so that it was all formed to his body and he would 
wear that in, and I remember sitting lookout. I would go to the cell door 
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and he would step in the cell and [inmate nickname] would help him take 
it off and it would be so tight that you would have to get a razorblade and 
cut the tape on the sides and pull it off of him like a bulletproof vest and it 
would be all these cigarettes, and that deal was done and we had to hide all 
those and then start selling them. 
The following crime script analysis based on the interview with Jack is provided 
below beginning at the stage of agreeance to smuggle tobacco in to the unit 
between the inmate and the correctional officer:  
1. A monetary amount and amount of tobacco was decided on between the 
inmate and the correctional officer and the money was exchanged. 
2. The correctional officer would travel to an Indian reservation and 
purchase the tobacco, tax free. 
3. The correctional officer would then make small holes in each Bugler 
package and then run them over with his vehicle tire to flatten them. 
4.  The packages were then taped together in groups of five and flattened 
again with a vehicle tire. 
5. Multiple groups of five packages were fashion with tape into what was 
described as a tight fitting bullet proof vest. 
6. The correctional officer would enter the facility and go to the cell of the 
co-conspirator inmate. 
7. While Jack would serve as a look out, the correctional officer would 
enter the co-conspirator’s cell and he would use a razor to cut the vest off 
of the correctional officer. 
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8. The tobacco was then distributed.  
Jack also described a time where a parole employee was bringing in water 
bottles full of vodka that she had repackaged to look as if they had not been 
tampered with. Jack describes how she did this in the excerpt below and what led 
to her getting caught for this behavior.  
Jack: the representative for your parole visit… she got busted bringing in 
shit. She was going and buying Ozarka water and opening it up and filling 
the bottles up with vodka and then shrink wrapping the plastic except it 
didn’t have the red Ozarka shrink wrap on it. It was just clear shrink wrap 
and she would heat it up with the blow dryer and shrink the plastic down 
so that it looked like a sealed case of water that she was bringing into 
work and then one day she fucking thought they knew what was going on 
and said something about it and when she got past the little guard booth at 
the front gate and then you walk down a long walk until you get into the 
building, well, she got past that and she got to the first trashcan and she 
was so paranoid that she just threw all the water away and the guard seen 
her do that and was like, why did she just throw away that case of water? 
And he went over there in the trashcan and looked at it and opened it up 
and took it back to the guard shack and was just going to keep it there for 
water, somebody opened it up and fucking realized one of these bottles is 
full of fucking vodka so that made them go start investigating her and 
watching her and they caught her bringing in some shit – bringing in weed 
for them and shit. 
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 Instances such as Tucker’s, mentioned in main theme four subtheme one, simply 
required the female correctional officer to bring in the food and perfume in her lunch 
sack. It was apparent that the relaxed nature of searching correctional facility employees 
was a major factor that led to the ease of correctional employees smuggling contraband 
into these facilities.         
Subtheme 2 - Free-world actors. For the purpose of this study Free-world actors 
include individuals who do not have entry access to correctional facilities outside of 
visitation hours. Visitors, like correctional facility employees, are not strip searched 
either, which creates a vulnerability in security as it relates to contraband. Further, 
vulnerabilities in the architecture of visiting areas, as described by Jack in main theme 
two subtheme four and in the following excerpt from Frank’s interview provide some 
insight into the lack of structural integrity in visitation areas that lead to contraband being 
smuggled into correctional facilities.  
Frank: When you have your visits, there is a glass window and there is a 
circle with holes in it that… the intent was to talk through it, now they 
have installed phones and we talk through those. Well, the metal that 
covered the hole on one of the visit things had been taken out. So, people 
were bringing in straws full of everything from cocaine to heroine to meth 
and somebody in my block got a visit every fucking day. And they would 
pack the contraband inside of that and slide it through the holes… they 
would come back with 20 or 30 straws every day… it was like a freaking 
bizarre when they got back from visits. I mean, they were literally 
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bringing in between $1000 and $2,000 worth of drugs a day in one cell for 
50 to 60 people. 
Jake also described how contraband is sometimes passed to inmates during 
visitation and the method used to conceal the contraband when the inmates return from 
visitation and go through a strip search. 
Jake: They get them in little balloons, and they swallow them, and you 
drink a lot of soda when you get back in the dorm. If you catch them in 
time, you can just throw up and get them out. If not, you shit them out and 
they just pick them out of their shit. 
This method of smuggling contraband into the facilities was commonly mentioned by 
participants (n=7), however the downside of this method was the amount of contraband 
that can be swallowed at a time, so the contraband was typically high ticket contraband 
such as heroin and cocaine. Jake also described a time where contraband was coming in 
through visitation by an inmate’s girlfriend. During visitation, she would visit the 
restroom and place a condom full of contraband in a bathroom trashcan under the 
trashcan liner. A trustee would later clean the restrooms, grab the condom, and smuggle 
the contraband back into general population by placing the condom in a mop head and 
put the mop head back in the mop bucket. 
Jake: The guy had his girlfriend from [city name] come visit him 
every Sunday and she would take whatever it is she was getting in. 
It could be Xanax or weed or whatever and she would put it in 
condoms, right? And she would like double wrap them three times 
or whatever and she would throw them in the trashcan on Sunday. 
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Well, that next Friday, bathrooms don’t get cleaned until that next 
Friday. And that janitor went in there and cleaned them and he put 
them in his mophead – the condoms. Put them right in the mop 
bucket and walked them straight out of there because they are 
never going to think to check the trashcans. 
Kim was also quite aware of the way that a woman was gaining access to 
methamphetamine in a correctional facility where she was incarcerated. Given the nature 
of the facility, visitors were allowed to bring certain items to the inmates, mostly 
described as hygiene products. This female inmate was relying on what Kim referred to 
as her “sugar daddy” to bring her a quarter ounce (7 grams) of methamphetamine during 
visitation each visit. 
Kim: Okay the only drug smuggling, I guess you could call it, that I saw 
was the bunkies right next to me, um they were bringing in meth, she was 
having this guy, it was her sugar daddy, bringing it in through tampon 
boxes… he would come see here every Saturday, and bring her a quarter 
ounce every Saturday.  
Several participants also discussed how contraband would come in through the 
mail system. Jake, Blair, Jack, Chris, Jessie, Jordan and Todd all told stories of 
contraband coming in through the mail. Carlos mentioned receiving both LSD and 
Suboxone through the mail system and described how this process worked in the excerpt 
below: 
Carlos: Through packages, mail, letters, books. I got some acid and 
Suboxone in from stamps… yeah, under the stamps, or a postcard. Slide it 
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up in there and then on the letter that you receive before or after tells you 
where it’s at. Or they will dip it and they will tell you that that part is 
dipped. 
Blair also mentioned that Suboxone was being sent into the facility via the mail system 
where she was incarcerated. 
Blair: The mail, ya they would get Suboxone melted down on post cards, 
they stopped allowing post cards after that was found out. 
Jake witnessed instances where free-world actors were liquefying methamphetamine, 
spraying the liquid onto coloring book paper, and cleverly disguising the watermarks and 
scent by coloring the paper and melting wax over the area where the liquefied 
methamphetamine was sprayed before sending it through the mail to inmates.  
Jake: I’ve actually seen it on some weird stuff. I’ve seen meth on a 
coloring book paper where they had turned it to liquid and sprayed it on 
the paper and covered it with wax and they would cut these sheets off and 
they put it in their coffee and drink it. Wiped out, dude. Strangest shit you 
ever seen. Yeah, they sell these little pieces of paper. It’s like they have 
their kid color a picture, but really, it’s covered in damn meth and they put 
another wax all over it and get it straight through the mail. 
Other methods used by free-world actors to smuggle contraband into correctional 
facilities exploited poor perimeter security. Along with Carlos, six other participants 
described how easy it was to simply throw contraband over perimeter fences of facilities. 
Jake describes instances where this was commonly done. 
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Jake: So, the guy had his people put it in whatever they would put it in a 
tennis ball, and they would just chunk it because it was that close to the 
road onto the rec yard. The rec yard was massive, and it was way away 
from the actual prison. Like the prison was there and the rec yard came 
back towards the road. So, they would throw it out there and the guards 
can’t walk this huge massive field, looking for it and they would get their 
stuff and they would smuggle it back in. Keester it (place inside the 
rectum), or tuck it (between their legs near their genitalia), or however. 
Both Carlos and Tucker, mentioned that they witnessed contraband packages coming 
over the perimeter fence via drone (quadcopters), and packages being shot over the fence 
by what Carlos called air rockets, or three-man slingshots typically sold to launch water 
balloons long distances. 
Carlos: Yeah, and they did the slingshots. You know, the two-man, three-
man slingshots – the air rockets. Yeah, or droning it over, I saw drones 
drop stuff a few times, they were loud. They will shoot it over before 
break or before door break and then hopefully you are the first one out on 
that door break and know where to go pick it up or somebody doesn’t see 
it before you get out there because if somebody sees it before you get out 
there, well then guess what? You just lost your shipment. 
Based on the interviews, architectural vulnerabilities, the mail system, a lack of searching 
visitors, and perimeter security vulnerabilities were all factors that were exploited by 
free-world actors in their efforts to smuggle contraband into correctional facilities.   
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Subtheme 3 - Inmate Trustees. Contraband was also smuggled into facilities by 
those inmates that were trusted to work outside of the correctional facilities on road 
crews, clean-up crews, and the proverbial “hoe squads,” (groups of inmates that would 
work in the agriculture fields of state prisons). When these inmates would bring 
contraband into facilities, this typically required cooperation with a free-world actor, 
where an agreed upon location was discussed between the inmate and free-world actor 
and a drop would take place. Chad described a time where a prominent prison gang 
would have free-world actors drive by the fields that he was working in and throw duffle 
bags full of contraband out of the back of a truck near the fields, including drugs and 
cellphones. When the correctional officers on horseback were not looking or were not in 
plain sight, member of this prison gang would go retrieve the duffle bags, divvy up the 
contraband between numerous other prison gang members in the field, and they would 
smuggle it back into the facility on or in their bodies. Chad noted that contraband 
cellphones were used by this prison gang in the fields to coordinate the drops without 
detection.  
Chris told a story about an inmate truck driver who was smuggling pounds of 
marijuana into correctional facilities on his food delivery truck. 
 Chris: I’ve seen pounds before. Like, for a while there were people getting 
like the trucks – they had the truck driver for one of the – Yeah, for the 
kitchen, the supply. He was a TDC inmate. He was a trustee but somehow, 
they were getting it sent on this truck, pounds, and they would bring it in, 




While working on a roads and bridges crew, Juan witnessed inmates picking up drops 
made by real-world actors and smuggling the contraband back into a correctional facility 
with the help of trustee inmates who were responsible for checking in the inmate’s shoes 
and uniforms after a day of work.  
Juan: But usually, when you go into the jail it’s full body search… Well, 
the easiest part of the loophole in that situation is even though they do a 
full body cavity search, get you butt naked and bend over and they don’t 
find anything, but they have trustees that clean the clothes and move the 
shoes and do all that so it’s up to the person smuggling it into the jail to 
get in touch with the trustees that do the shoe cleaning and the uniform 
changing because when you hide it in your shoe or hide it in your uniform 
and you put your uniforms up and your shoes up, they are not checking the 
shoes. They are not checking the uniforms. They are just checking your 
person, they just check you in and, you know, if you already talked to the 
trustees, all the uniforms are all numbered so you just have to relay your 
uniform number and they will go and you tell them where the location is 
(where the contraband is hidden in the uniform or shoes) so that that way 
they go and it looks like they are organizing but really they are pulling out 
all the contraband from the shoes and uniform. They (the trustees checking 
in the shoes and clothes) are not going to be searched because they never 
leave the unit so there is no reason to ever search them again once they are 
back in the trustee population, but by that time they have it and by dinner 
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time they are passing everything out to whoever is ordered or whoever 
paid these guys because usually that’s how it goes. 
Juan also suggested that contraband cellphones were necessary to set up the drop 
locations. This was possible because Juan mentioned that inmates would often ask the 
correctional officers where they would be working that day and what they would be 
doing, acting as if they were simply curious. If rapport was established between the 
correctional officer/s and the inmates, the correctional officer would tell them, and in turn 
this information along with a contraband cellphone would be used to set up an effective 
drop location. Juan’s extensive knowledge of this process allows for the following crime 
script analysis. 
1. Inmate would talk to the shoe and uniform trustee and an inmate that 
would receive the contraband from the trustee, warning them to be ready 
for a package to soon come through. 
2. Inmate would learn from the correctional officer/s where their roads and 
bridges crew would be working that day. 
3. A contraband cell phone call would be placed by the inmate to a free-
world actor regarding the location that the roads and bridges crew would 
be working that day. 
4. The free world actor would make the drop near the roads and bridges 
crew. 




6. Before arriving back at the correctional facility, the inmate would hide 
the contraband either in his shoes or somewhere in the uniform. 
7. While checking his shoes and uniform into the uniform and shoe 
trustees, the inmate would tell the trustee his uniform or shoe number. 
8. The trustee would then secretly retrieve the contraband from the 
uniform or shoe/s and pass it to the inmate who was expecting to receive it 
from the trustee. 
 Based on the interviews, inmates who were allowed to leave the correctional 
facility were also responsible for smuggling contraband into facilities. Relaxed security 
protocols and surveillance, good rapport between the correctional officers and the roads 
and bridges crew, and the use of contraband cellphones allowed for these smuggling 
efforts to prove effective.        
Main Theme 6 - The Impact of Contraband and Corruption on Perceptions of 
Punishment and the Criminal Justice System 
Based on the interviews, it came as no surprise that participants were well aware of 
correctional officer involvement in the smuggling of contraband into correctional 
facilities. As noted in main theme five sub theme 1, numerous (n=12) participant 
suggested that guards were the main source of entry for contraband. When participants 
were asked if the presence of corruption among correctional officers or staff had an 
impact on the way they viewed their incarceration as punishment and/or the criminal 
justice system as a whole, responses varied, and when the interviews were analyzed as a 




 Although some participants were coded as primarily having a c’est la vie 
perspective, some of these individuals also made critical statements about their 
experiences with contraband and their perceptions of punishment and the criminal justice 
system. This was also seen in those who held mainly critical perspectives, in that they too 
would occasionally make c’est la vie type comments. This was interesting as it suggested 
mixed feeling and/or contradictory perspectives. However, many of these participants 
were very good at rationally explaining both sides of an issue, which often result in what 
may appear to be contradictions at face value, or cognitive dissonance. In other words, 
deciding which subtheme an individual’s responses fit under was difficult and would be 
misleading. In turn, the following subthemes and quotes do not necessarily suggest that 
each participant held only one perspective, but rather highlight the many perspectives 
held by participants.   
Subtheme 1 - Critical perspectives. Five of the participants expressed their 
opinions and beliefs regarding the presence of contraband in correctional facilities and 
correctional officer corruption by taking a primarily critical perspective. Participant 
responses for this subtheme revolved around the hypocrisy that surrounds the correctional 
officers smuggling contraband into facilities (especially the same types of contraband for 
which people were incarcerated- drugs); the capitalistic nature of the prison industry; the 
lack of rehabilitation and criminalistics nature of prison culture; the relationship between 
contraband and the maintenance of prison order; and how these things play into what was 
considered to be an intentional revolving door put in place for profit and control by those 
with immense amounts of wealth and power. Some of the quotes in this subtheme are 
quite lengthy as participants provided several reasons why their perceptions of 
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punishment through incarceration and the criminal justice system as a whole have been 
impacted based on their experiences. The following quote by Frank highlights some of 
these sentiments. 
Frank: Yeah, it’s a fucking joke. I mean, look, if you have a dope case, 
you don’t need to be incarcerated… maybe you need a fucking jobs 
program… You know, back in the day, fucking John Dillinger went to 
prison and he turned into a badass in prison because all of the people there 
were fucking badasses… Like I said, all it does when you see everything 
coming in (contraband), all it does it show you that it’s all just a fucking 
game, man. It’s just a fucking joke system set up by a whole bunch of 
fucking rich-ass power hungry mother fuckers that are just trying to 
perpetuate their own fucking wealth and power. I mean, when you see the 
people that are supposed to be there to enforce the laws breaking the laws 
on a daily basis it kind of jades you to the law. It kind of makes you like, 
“hold on a second here.” The fact that you have to sit there in county jail 
and watch the exact same game that is going on in the free world go on in 
here, you know, with just double the prices and, you know, it jades you on 
the whole fucking process. We didn’t get rid of slavery. We just created a 
new fucking slave class… criminal justice is a fucking oxymoron. It’s not 
built for justice. It’s built for control, and that’s the problem. I think that’s 
why contraband is at the level that it is. Because the people that run the 
prisons and the county jails and stuff, they know. They know if I keep 
them (inmates) busy with their bullshit (sub-rosa economy), then we don’t 
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have to worry about riots… They are going to come in and get somebody 
every once in a while to make a fucking example and make it look like 
they are doing something, but every fucking person above and beyond the 
basic level of correction officer, they know it’s a delicate balance and it 
affects the entire prison ecosystem (the presence of contraband). 
Carlos expressed how his perceptions have changed since his incarcerations as it 
relates to contraband and corruption as well. Carlos also took a very critical perspective 
by highlighting the money-making aspect of the correctional industry; the hypocritical 
phenomenon of correctional agencies stake in “rehabilitation” as it relates to correctional 
officer involvement in contraband smuggling (by comparing it to his understanding of the 
CIA’s involvement in smuggling cocaine into the U.S.); and how these actions are a self-
feeding system that perpetuates crime, especially drug crimes. 
Carlos: Yeah, the United States criminal system is a money maker… The more 
people they can incarcerate, the more money they get. It’s not like other 
countries that are actual rehabilitative, you know, places… This is just a 
revolving door, and yeah, being that I see fucking CO’s bringing in 
fucking cell phones, bringing in heroin, coke (cocaine), and all that kind of 
shit, and then disbursing it amongst the prison population which is the 
reason why 90 percent of them mother fuckers are in there, that’s like, 
really? If that’s not the biggest slap in the face and hypocrisy, I don’t even 
know what to call it. For real, because you are enabling the behavior of 
somebody that got them into that situation by giving them what got them 
into the situation so that they can perpetuate that lifestyle in the system so 
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that when they get back out, they go back in because that’s what they were 
doing while they were in… So, fucking on the streets, the CIA brought the 
fucking coke into the United States. Right? Yes, we all know that… CIA, 
fucking brought in the cocaine. Then those mother fuckers get to 
distributing it to the inner city, inner city then gets addicted and gets 
fucking arrested and then while they are arrested, the CO’s then give the 
fucking people that were just arrested for the cocaine, they give them 
cocaine so that they can go on and continue the fucking cocaine that they 
were just arrested for by the CIA, which is now with the fucking CO’s. It’s 
like, are you fucking kidding me? But this is a system for the people to 
rehabilitate, make better, no it’s not. Yeah, it’s the criminal system is 
broken from the inside out and it starts with all what your report is about – 
contraband and contraband being brought in, the majority of it, by the 
CO’s. They are not breaking the cycle, it perpetuates into keeping the 
cycle going, keeping us in that system and rotating fucking rotunda… a 
fucking carousel.   
Jesus was not only perturbed by correctional officers bringing in contraband, but 
the fact that sometimes an inmate has to face the same correctional officer in disciplinary 
hearing, after that correctional officer wrote them up for the contraband that they 
smuggled in for them. Jesus also suggested the punishments handed down for 
correctional officer corruption were not substantial and did not serve as a deterrent. He 
suggests that the guards are just as corrupt as the inmates, and this corruption reduces the 
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legitimacy of the correctional system and led to him losing respect for the system as a 
whole. 
Jesus: I mean, um, it has to in a way, because you are thinking okay here I 
am in incarceration for something I did on the outside, like for me I was in 
for selling drugs, however though, here is a guy that is supposed to be the 
keeper of my punishment bringing in drugs, so what the fuck, like what 
am I really learning in here, you know what I mean?...  And secondly, like 
if you get caught with like a thing of bleach you have to go to court in jail 
and you are sitting there with the same dude that brought it in and he is 
now telling you “ya I’m going to take away all your rights, no 
commissary, no phone calls for 30 days,” so you are kind of like, what just 
happened?... So even outside the lack of legitimacy you seen, once you 
seen this corruption going down and now you have to go into the courts 
system inside and deal with the same people… but it’s almost like a 
double edged sword, like damn, this guy right here is a CO that’s 
supposed to be, you might even say someone you should be able to trust if 
something was going down, but you can’t because this guy that you trust 
is the one that is bringing in contraband… So there is no, people say there 
is convicts in prison, and guards in there, they are all cons, that’s all it is is 
a con farm, you know what I mean, crooks and criminal man, you are a 
criminal if you are incarcerated, you are a crook if you are a guard, you 
just haven’t been caught yet, and if you do get caught, I’ve seen guards get 
caught, they don’t go to jail, they just get sent to a different unit. I saw a 
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guard almost kill an inmate and the FBI came in there, state troopers, and 
investigators and everything, and a couple of months later we found out 
that this dude went from the 7th floor to the 3rd floor, that was their 
punishment... I learned more about how to get things done in there than 
anywhere else, like convict things more than anything else. So the return 
rate is crazy, I remember when I left the [name of release unit] you had 
someone who was like, CO: “this is like motel six, we’ll leave the light on 
for ya”… you can’t really say that someone is getting punished whenever, 
if you know the right people, what did you really take away? So are they 
really doing punishment or are you really just learning that as much as the 
prison system wants to say they are rehabilitating or succeeding a bunch, 
they are not, because half your fucking guards are worse than anybody 
else… so you know you lose respect for the system. 
The five participants that held these general sentiments towards 
corrections and the criminal justice system suggests that these individuals lost a 
sense of respect and legitimacy for the system, and the experiences they had jaded 
them to the ultimate goals of the criminal justice system and the correctional 
component, so much so that they appeared to have lost all faith in the system and 
were genuinely upset and mad at what they witnessed. 
Subtheme 2 - C’est la vie perspective. Despite these primarily critical views 
held by five of the participants, the other eleven participant’s responses suggested that 
their experiences did not have much of an effect on their perceptions of incarceration as a 
form of punishment or the criminal justice system as a whole. Again, this is not to say 
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that those with critical perspectives did not also have these preconceived notions of 
crime, justice, and punishment, but rather to suggest that the other eleven participants 
took more of a c’est la vie perspective to their experiences. Furthermore, some of these 
eleven participants occasionally took critical perspectives or made critical statements, but 
took an overall c’est la vie perspective. Results from the interviews suggest that c’est la 
vie participants already knew what to expect; were already jaded to the system; expected 
corruption to exist everywhere as a natural phenomenon; were aware of the nature of 
greed in all parts of society; were aware that everyone in prison (guards and inmates) is 
criminal in some form or fashion; or had come to terms with their punishment and 
accepted it regardless of the environment where the punishment took place.    
As Kim noted, “I mean, things are going to be what you make it, so there is going 
to be corruption in every facility, so it didn’t really take my view point away.” Blair 
actually appreciated the little favors that correctional officers did her while she was 
incarcerated as they relate to small arbitrary forms of contraband and suggested that both 
her incarceration and her subsequent community corrections experiences on probation 
actually saved her life from drug addiction and the possibility of death by overdose. 
Blair: not really, it was really just little favors, which were nice, it didn’t 
really change the way I thought about it, if anything, the county I was in 
had an awesome drug program, and that saved my life. The jail part helped 
me get sober, but the real rehab came from the classes and meetings and 
probation officer staying on my ass, and just wanting to stop using. 
Blair later went on to express her respect for the system she was passed through. She 
said, “ya it sucked, but I wouldn’t be doing this interview if I wasn’t arrested and had to 
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sober up and do all of that probation shit, seriously, I know it probably sounds crazy, but 
it saved my life.” 
 Juan also held this c’est la vie perspective as he mentioned  that corruption will 
happen in any setting so long as the human element is present, and that everyone is 
always out to make a little extra money. 
Juan: No, it just lets you know that when you apply the human aspect to 
that type of system that there is always going to be room for flaw, because 
in that sense any human person can be corrupted no matter if it’s through 
friendship, through a positive relationship, you know, through sexual or 
intimate relationship, your character can be broken down in some way… 
everybody either has that price or that one thing that they can work with or 
live with and getting something smuggled in for a certain something.  
Yeah, it’s just the human element. I mean, that’s the human condition. 
Everybody is going to want something for themselves. They are always 
going to try to make it better for themselves, no matter if you are an 
officer or if you are a garbage clean-up guy, you are going to do whatever 
makes your job easier and whatever gives you that extra bump in your 
pocket. 
Chris also suggested that his perception was not changed by what he saw and 
experienced as it relates to contraband and official corruption.   
Chris: Not really, man, because I mean, when I was 18 and I first went to 
prison, I had a completely different perspective about it, but after a couple 
of years of just realizing that all these people are just regular people that 
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didn’t get caught doing whatever they were doing or just didn’t, you 
know, have the courage to follow that impulse that one time, like, they are 
people. Definitely capable of selling drugs or prostitution or killing 
somebody and it happens all the time. Most of these people are just G.E.D. 
graduates that can’t get a job elsewhere or that feel comfortable with these 
4-12’s and four days off and their $2,000 a month paycheck with all their 
benefits. So it didn’t really change the way I saw things in a bad way, it 
just made me more aware, I learned a lot about people in prison. 
Blake shared a perception that was similar to Chris’ in that he was not 
surprised by what he saw and it did not necessarily change his perception of jail 
as expressed in the excerpt shown below: 
Blake: It didn’t surprise me at all because I already knew. I was a grown 
man when I went to jail for the first time. The first time I went to jail I was 
38 years old. I was a grown man and I heard stories. It didn’t surprise me. 
When Jake was asked this question, his response suggests that he was also not surprised 
by what he saw occurring as it relates to contraband and corruption. He suggested that 
everyone does some crime and corruption happens everywhere, but the inmates were just 
the ones that got caught. 
Jake: No, because I’ve always grown up with the philosophy that 
everybody does this shit. Everybody commits crimes and everybody does 
something wrong, just some people get caught and some don’t, you know 
what I mean? So, it didn’t really – I always knew that there was dirty cops 
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and dirty guards and no matter what position you are in there is corruption. 
So, no. 
Jordan’s perception of punishment and the criminal justice system was also unmoved, as 
he mentioned that the corruption is the same as it is in the free-world but it is more 
apparent given that it is occurring in such a confined space.  
Jordan: Not really, I knew what I did was wrong and I was just doing my 
time and trying to make the best of it. It didn't surprise me at all. It's the 
same shit as out here, you just see it more there because it’s so confined. 
  
Participants that were coded as primarily having a c’est la vie perspective 
suggested that their experiences did not impact their perceptions of corrections and the 
criminal justice system in a negative way per se, as they noted that guards are human’s 
too, and their job is just a job; greed and corruption happens in these facilities in the same 
way it occurs in the free-world; and as Chad put it, “I mean it is what it is. It was actually 
a relief to know that it was just as corrupt and business is run in the same way as out here 
(in the free-world).”  
Main Theme 7 - Perspectives on Curbing Contraband in Correctional Facilities   
Towards the end of the interviews participants were asked if they had any ideas 
about how correctional facilities can best keep contraband out of prisons. Responses to 
this question, subsequent probing questions, and other times where the nature of 
contraband and its presence in correctional facilities were discussed led to the emergence 
of main theme seven and its two subthemes. Participants expanded on the prison and 
contraband culture and provided reasons as to why they believed that correctional 
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agencies will never be able to fully stop contraband from coming into their facilities, or 
why they sometimes will use discretion in their enforcement of contraband policies, 
which make up subtheme one. Study participants also provided some perspectives on 
safeguards that if employed by the correctional agencies may partially help facilities 
better control the amount of contraband, which makes up subtheme two.  
Subtheme 1 - On why this is not feasible. The vast majority of participants 
(n=13) suggested that contraband will always be a part of the correctional system and 
there is little that can be done to completely remove contraband from prisons. However, 
most participants (n=12) provided at least some ideas (covered in subtheme two) for how 
to stop contraband from coming into correctional facilities (either hypothetic or realistic), 
but these suggestions were typically followed with perceptions of how contraband is 
defined by correctional policy, its enticing profitability, and the numerous ways in which 
contraband can be smuggled in their efforts to explain to me why this is simply not 
possible. For example, Carlos and eight other participants discusses the issue with 
stopping contraband, based on how contraband is defined in correctional policy:  
Carlos: Like we were getting onions from the kitchen – that’s considered 
contraband in the system. If you take contraband in its literal sense you 
couldn’t do that (get rid of all types of contraband) because contraband in 
its literal sense is if I grab that onion from the fucking kitchen and bring it 
into the dorm, that’s contraband because that wasn’t [agency name] or 
[agency name], you know, it’s already in the prison. 
 Participants (n=10) also mentioned that crime and criminality are inherent in the 
inmate culture, and that if there is a will to get contraband into facilities, the inmates will 
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find a way. When asked about removing contraband from correctional facilities, Kim 
suggested that “It’ll never happen (chuckles), it’s never going to happen, if there is one 
thing about criminals, we will find away.” Chris noted that if contraband was magically 
removed from correctional facilities overnight, “Immediately a large percent of the 
population would go about getting those things again. They would find a way, every 
single time, they would find a way.” Chris provided an example of inmate’s always 
finding a way to get contraband, and when it was confiscated, they simply got more 
contraband. 
Chris: I was on a unit, like the extra clothes thing (contraband), they 
would come through and every single week, they would search everybody 
and take any extra clothes you had. As soon as it was gone, they would go 
get more and every week they came and got it and you can’t just keep 
writing them cases. There is only so many places to put people in 
maximum security units unless you lock all of [name of state] down. 
Yeah, so eventually, they just have to let it go. You can’t take contraband 
out because the point of making it contraband is to take it out of prison, 
and the whole point is to get it back in for all of these other people. I 
mean, it’s what they do. It’s what they survive off of. It’s how they live 
life outside. It’s how they live it now. You can’t give somebody enough of 
an incentive if prison didn’t stop them from doing it in the first place, 
being locked up in prison definitely isn’t going to. 
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Jack couldn’t picture prison without contraband. He suggested that the criminal 
mentality that inmates possess combined with the constant desire for contraband and 
endless efforts to corrupt guards explains why this is not possible. 
Jack: I don’t know, bro, something would happen because somehow, 
someway, there is people that will sit in there and that’s all they got is time 
to think about things and they would think of a way. That’s what they 
would do, they would come up and think of a way to get it in there. It’s 
always going to be there. I just couldn’t imagine there not being 
contraband in there… It’s a building full of people who broke the rules in 
life and the majority of the people that are like that are not, “Oh, I broke 
the rule, I’m going to prison and I’m getting out and I’m being right.” You 
know, there is recidivism, everybody in there is criminals and they got that 
criminal mentality, and I just couldn’t imagine no contraband being in 
prison... I don’t know if there could ever be a way because there is a 
million ways, they do it. So no, there is too many avenues to get that shit 
in. They are always going to want something. So, it’s not going to go 
away. 
Other participants suggested that contraband will always be in correctional 
facilities because of the low wages that correctional officers earn, the profitability that is 
associated with smuggling contraband and into correctional facilities, the nature of 
human behavior as it relates to balancing risks and rewards, and because of the 
relationship between contraband and order that its presence establishes (also noted in 
main theme two subtheme three). Contraband appeared to provide both correctional 
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officers and inmates with profit incentives that far outweighed the deterrent effect that 
punishments for smuggling and possession carried. Interestingly, a commonly repeated 
phrase by the participant’s in relation to correctional officers smuggling contraband was 
“everybody has a price.” Carlos said, “Everybody has a price, and everybody has a 
breaking point. It’s just, what is that for you.” Frank noted, “The money you can make 
off contraband, they (correctional agencies) can’t pay their people enough.” Jack spoke 
about the profitability of correctional officers smuggling contraband, and how relaxed 
security with correctional officers reduced the risk of getting caught.    
Jack: Like I said, that’s how I seen people talk and groom correctional 
officers into bringing in contraband, was the fact that they didn’t make 
very good money and they were able to make as much money in one 
month in a matter of days. Maybe searching them (correctional officers), I 
guess. They could just walk in – like I said, that guy had a vest that he 
made and wore that in. you know what I mean? 
Chris also discussed the profitability of smuggling contraband as a correctional officer 
and the low risk of getting caught for this behavior. 
Chris: Yeah, especially if this guy is the guy that’s moving the contraband 
in there and he realizes how much money you can make being one of the 
guards bringing it in because that’s the biggest incentive. There is a shit 
ton of money to be made and you really – the risk, if you do it quietly, 
isn’t very great. Because like I saw however many people get walked off. I 
saw so many more that didn’t, and the contraband never stops, so you 
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know that was always somebody that you didn’t know about that was 
always bringing it in. 
Both Frank and Jack described situations where correctional officers 
overlooked drug and alcohol related contraband, as the presence of contraband 
created a sense of order and calmness which was described as being a better 
option when compared to the lack of order that results from removing the 
contraband, or because it was more of a hassle to write up an inmate than it was to 
let them continue having the contraband while more drastic things are occurring 
elsewhere. For instance, Frank described a situation where marijuana was being 
openly and obviously smoked in a wing of a correctional facility that was 
historically known for extreme violence. His story of this instance follows: 
Frank: Like the last facility that I was at, I was there for six months and 
for the first four, we didn’t have a fight – there was none – fifty, sixty 
people – people moving in an out, gang affiliations, color affiliations, all 
the different shit, there wasn’t a fight for four fucking months because we 
had weed almost every day. Everybody, they knew what was going on… 
The captain walked in at one point and was like, “Hey, um, this whole 
goddamn floor smells like fucking marijuana. You guys need to, um, you 
know, exhale and blow it down the toilet.” His reason for saying that, I’m 
pretty darn sure, was well, you guys haven’t fought in four months, so we 
are going to go ahead and let you get away with that as long as you kind of 
keep it on the down low a little bit. 
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Jack told a story about an experience he had when an officer caught him in the act 
of drinking prison wine, his second favorite past time activity. 
Jack: I’ve had a captain catch me drinking wine and just look at me, 
“Goddamnit [Jack], you are doing good because I can’t smell it, but keep 
it like that” and just walk away because it was more of a hassle for him to 
have to deal with me and bullshit wine when he had a current gang war 
going on or something was going on. He was more worried about shit like 
that, some violence, than he was some guy not bothering anybody sitting 
in his cell drinking some wine. 
When taken as a whole, the participants’ comments and explanation for why 
contraband will always be a part of correctional facilities and prison culture were 
nothing shy of compelling.    
Subtheme 2 - Ideas on how to best stop contraband. 
Despite the participants’ strong beliefs that contraband will never disappear from 
correctional facilities, some did provide ideas on how to best tackle the issue of 
contraband. However, many of these suggestions were immediately followed with 
explanations on why those ideas would not work, or were not feasible as expressed in the 
following quote by Jordan, “Nah, it'll always be there. Everyone has a price. Maybe 
paying them (COs) more money, but again everyone has a price and they don't make 
much as COs.” Frank also discussed the notion of paying guards more and increasing 
training, but he then explained why neither option would be effective. 
Frank: Maybe they could increase their pay and it would increase the 
percentage of correction officers that don’t compromise themselves for 
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that. They might be able to increase the pay, but that comes down to the 
state budget. Training might have something to do with it, but at the same 
time, it’s just a fucking personal decision. That’s all it is. These people 
know what’s right and wrong. They know the policy. They know exactly 
what’s going on. It’s just a personal decision they make, sometimes it’s a 
personal decision based on profits. Sometimes it’s a personal decision 
based on self-preservation, sometime it’s a personal decision based on 
laziness. You know, they could try to pay their people a little better and 
might be able to cut down on it a little bit… but training has nothing to do 
with it. They know what the fuck they are doing… So, training and classes 
has not a goddamn thing to do with it. 
 Other ideas seemed like reasonable suggestions, but also required more money to 
be spent on deploying these measures. For instance, Blair mentioned that mail scanning 
technology may decrease the presence of contraband coming through the mail, while Kim 
suggested paying the guards more money and providing them with better training, such as 
drug recognition training, may be helpful. 
Kim: unless they start paying the guards more, a lot of the reason the 
guards do it is for money, so unless they start paying the guards more, it’s 
going to happen because, it’s a hustle… Ya, I’d say if corrections officers 
were better trained and paid more then ya, maybe, it might help a little bit. 
Jesus provided one of the more policy-oriented suggestions by raising issue with 
how correctional policy defines contraband, and provided a suggestion that may reduce 
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the amount of contraband by reexamining and redefining contraband based on the impact 
that the item in question has on daily correctional facility operations. 
Jesus: Maybe what they should do is just really think about what 
contraband is, reevaluate what it is, if this guy is washing his clothes in his 
sink and goes to lay down in his bunk and read a book, is that really 
fucking up the day to day system? Is it really? Or this guy made cards out 
of his own paper that he bought from commissary, taking that away, is that 
seriously messing up anything, this guy is sitting on his bed playing 
solitaire. So maybe that’s what they should do at the end of the day is 
reevaluate what is what… But ya that’s what I feel, is if you want to 
positively change it, then you should positively change what contraband 
is. Like fight that fight first, and then go on to the next thing.   
Other suggestions were based around compromises between staff and inmates, and 
providing inmates with certain privileges in order for them to come to a middle ground 
with their captors and to keep the peace among the inmates. Blake suggested paying 
inmates an hourly wage “25 cents an hour” so that they could afford commissary and 
didn’t have to sell contraband to afford commissary items. Jake provided a suggestion for 
curbing the smuggling of tobacco into correctional facilities that relied on a compromise 
between gang leaders and staff. He also points out how the inmate’s system of self-
governance (re-enforced by prison gangs) would correct itself in an effort to maintain 
privileges discussed in that compromise. 
Jake: If you speak to the right people in prison systems and these guards 
know who they are. They the ones that have been there forever. They can 
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cause a movement at least across one unit. Say, “Look guys, we are going 
to come together. They are talking about giving us electronic cigarettes, 
but we got to cut all this violence down, this fighting, and this shit down 
or they are going to snatch them right back from us.” All these other gangs 
who want this stuff aren’t going to let any of these other things happen or 
it’s going to be problems. So, now it won’t be one gang versus another. 
It’s going to be all these gangs that disagree with what this one gang is 
doing to fuck over their rights. So, the system would correct itself… The 
people would correct themselves. You know, and it doesn’t necessarily 
have to be like electronic cigarettes. Like I was on a unit forever. I mean, 
[agency name], the worst thing is most of them don’t have A/C, and when 
you are hot and like I’m in [location of city with high summer 
temperatures], and it’s 110 degrees, and you are inside a brick building 
that is just baking, right? People’s fuses get real short. You know, and you 
are aggravated and pissed off and you can’t get cool. You can’t do it. All 
you got is a fan. They could be like, “hey, we will bring in A/C, buy y’all 
got to blah blah blah.” They (correctional officers) would have to talk to 
them eye-to-eye instead of them being up here and we are down here. 
They (correctional officers) will just have to kind of level with you for it 
to really work. 
In sum, outside of increasing spending for scanning and detection technology, and 
increasing drug recognition training efforts, reevaluating contraband related policies, and 
creating compromises between gang leaders and staff, participants seemed to agree that 
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in the end contraband will always be a part of the correctional system, and regardless of 
how many safeguards are put in place, correctional agencies suffer from far too many 
points of vulnerability and issues with order maintenance and  integrity for contraband to 
ever be fully removed for the prison culture.  
      
     














 Discussion and Conclusion 
This dissertation aimed to examine contraband in correctional facilities, the 
inmate economy, and the many facets of the culture that surrounds this sub-rosa 
economic system. By delving into the experiences and perceptions of individuals who 
had been previously incarcerated through the collection of primary data in the form of 
semi-structured in-depth qualitative interviews, findings from this study have provided 
opportunities to expand previous perspectives on inmate deviance, the inmate economy, 
inmate and staff relations, advancement that have been made in terms of contraband 
smuggling methods, and newer and less detectable forms of contraband and currency 
transfer. Given the grounded theory approach to this dissertation and the themes that were 
identified in the results section, this chapter will address each of the seven themes in 
relation to previous findings and theoretical perspectives that surround the inmate 
economy, prison culture, and inmate deviance in the key findings section. Each theme 
will be addressed in the order that they appeared in the results section, and will, per 
theme, be inductively examined in light of previous theories and findings on inmate 
deviance and the perceptions, experiences, and realities of the inmate economy and sub-
rosa economic culture. This will be followed by a section that notes the limitations of the 
study and areas for future research, and a section that identifies policy implications. 






Key Findings and Theoretical Relevance. 
The role of contraband in everyday life. Consistent with previous research, 
finding from the current study also suggest that contraband played a large role in the 
everyday lives of the participants (Clemmer, 1940; Kalinich, 1980; Sykes, 1958, 
Williams & Fish, 1974). Study participants continuously drew on correctional policy 
definitions of contraband and the wide net that these policies cast when identifying 
contraband. When policies are in place that essentially make anything that is not given to 
the inmate by the correctional agency contraband, it comes as no surprise that every 
participant in the study was in some way, at some point in time during their incarceration, 
involved with contraband and the inmate economy. Whether it was extra state issued food 
from the chow hall, a borrowed book, a higher quality hair tie, an article of clothing that 
an inmate had mended or altered, or something more serious such as drugs and alcohol, 
results suggest that at the most basic policy level contraband inadvertently played a large 
role in the lives of participants. 
Participants also suggested that contraband and the inmate economy served as 
way to socialize and that contraband was indeed interwoven into the daily patterns of 
socialization within correctional institutions. This finding is consistent with previous 
studies of contraband and inmate culture that suggest contraband serves as a tool for 
socialization among inmates (Clemmer, 1940; Kalinich, 1980; Sykes, 1958). 
Interestingly, some participants provided explanation of how observing the contraband 
market, the major players, and the inner-working of the social aspect of this sub-rosa 
economy was useful for the purpose of understanding the pecking order among inmates; 
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learning the ropes of prison culture; and for identifying and developing self-preservation 
techniques during their incarceration. This was evidenced by both first-timer participants 
who learned lessons based on their decisions and behaviors in the inmate economy while 
incarcerated, and by participants who were quite familiar with prison culture and what 
many called, being able to “read a hustle.” This finding provides some current insight 
into the role that contraband plays in the lives of participants, and expands what was 
previously known about the relationship between contraband, socialization, and 
adaptation. 
One’s ability to “read a hustle” in the free-world, and how this can prove 
beneficial while incarcerated, can be partially explained through the importation model 
(Irwin & Cressey, 1962). A portion of the importation model suggests that inmate 
behaviors are influenced by their experiences with societies, cultures, and sub-culture that 
they bring with them into correctional facilities. Participant’s explanations of the benefits 
of being able to read a hustle, i.e. cultural experiences that were learned and imported, 
suggest that this imported knowledge of the criminal-culture influenced their behaviors 
when engaging in the inmate economy. In other words, the knowledge that some 
participant’s had of the free-world criminal-culture/s informed and shaped the way that 
they behaved and the decisions they made surrounding contraband and the inmate 
economy. 
In further examining the role that contraband played in the everyday lives of 
participants, individuals suggested that contraband served as a form of entertainment and 
provided them with a sense of normalcy that made them feel as if, even for a short period 
of time, they were not incarcerated. From simple and benign contraband items such as 
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bleach, to intoxicants such as marijuana and alcohol, participants noted that having these 
luxuries allowed them some form of control over their individual situations and provided 
them with an avenue to escape the deprivations of prison life. Having contraband while 
incarcerated alleviated the deprivations of goods and services, provided them with a 
sense of autonomy and individualism, and gave them a sense of freedom and liberty over 
their daily routines. 
Given this finding, participant’s responses surrounding the role that contraband 
played in their everyday lives and why they engaged in contraband supports three of the 
five aspects of the deprivation model of inmate deviance, and previous studies that have 
connected motivations for engaging in contraband with this perspective (Kalinich, 1980; 
Sykes, 1958; Williams & Fish, 1974). Data from this study also suggested that 
contraband served as a way for participants to obtain some of the goods and services that 
they would otherwise be deprived of while incarcerated. Having these goods and services 
gave them something to do, helped them make money in the inmate economy, and made 
them feel more connected to the outside world and the routines they once had. 
In so far as the effect that contraband has on order within a facility, findings from 
theme one support previous findings as they relate to contraband presence and inmate 
violence (Kalinich, 1980; Skarbek, 2014; Trammel, 2012; Williams & Fish, 1974). In 
concert with findings from these previous studies, findings from the current study also 
suggested that there is a strong connection between the level of contraband that is 
available and the level of violence and order within correctional institutions. Participants 
noted that when contraband was readily available, or it was “flooded”, violent 
altercations were rare, and inmates were calmer and less disruptive. This phenomenon 
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was explained by participants as a way of keeping unwanted attention away from areas 
where contraband was present in order to reduce the chances of shakedowns and 
lockdowns, which ultimately disrupt the flow of contraband. On the contrary, when 
contraband was not present, participants suggested that inmates had no incentives to 
behave in an orderly fashion and violence and disorder increased. 
Taken together, the findings from main theme one provide support for three of the 
components of the deprivation model of inmate deviance (deprivation of liberty, goods 
and services, and autonomy) (Sykes, 1958). These results also shed further light on 
minute aspects of the importation model that have gone unexplored in relation the 
importation of pre-prison knowledge regarding criminal culture and the ways that this 
influences inmate behaviors in terms of contraband and the inmate economy (Irwin & 
Cressey, 1962). Lastly, finding from main theme one are consistent with, and show 
support for, the body of literature that discusses the relationship between contraband 
presence and order within correctional institutions (Kalinich, 1980; Skarbek, 2014; 
Sykes, 1958; Williams & Fish, 1974). 
The inmate economy. As participants described the inmate economy, it became 
very apparent that the governing body of the illicit contraband market was typically 
prison gangs. These prison gangs ranged from well-known and commonly discussed 
criminal gangs/organizations to religious groups. The male participants noted that these 
prison gangs were able to dictate and govern many aspects of this sub-rosa system 
because their members were great in number and they employed violence or the threat of 
violence in order to maintain power and influence over the inmate population. These 
findings are consistent with previous studies that have described the relationship between 
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prison gangs, informal governance, and the contraband market (Skarbek, 2012; Skarbek, 
2014). Interestingly, and despite the constant threat of violence that prison gangs present, 
some participants noted that there were times where different prison gangs would sit 
down and negotiate with one another in order to reduce gang conflict and continue the 
flow of contraband. These findings also nudge this body of literature forward by 
providing context as to how and why this phenomenon exists and how it plays out. 
Another contribution to the literature that this stud provided surrounds prison 
gangs, contraband, and access in that some participants noted that an inmate’s gang-
membership in conjunction with the proximity of the correctional facility played a large 
role in whether or not the inmate was involved in contraband smuggling. This was said to 
often be the case as these inmates would not only have power, but would also have access 
to, or import with them, connections with a number of free-world associates that may 
take the risk of smuggling contraband into the correctional facilities. This finding 
provided some qualitative support for the importation model of inmate deviance, and may 
suggest an extension of the importation model factors typically included in quantitative 
studies to include a measure that captures the distance between the inmate’s residence 
and the correctional facility. This finding also provides qualitative support for the 
importation model in terms of imported networks and criminal subcultures (Irwin and 
Cressey, 1962). In other words, quantitative predictive models of inmate misconduct may 
be able to improve their model-fit by including measurements that capture this 
phenomenon. 
In so far as who controls what type of contraband, participants noted that certain 
types of contraband were controlled by certain prison gangs, and when more than one 
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prison gang wanted to sell the same contraband, meetings would be held and rules were 
negotiated. Again, these meetings were described as being necessary to best address and 
avoid the possibility of conflict and violent confrontation, which in turn could draw 
unnecessary attention from the correctional staff and lead to shakedowns, lockdowns, and 
the eventual disruption of the flow of contraband. This self-governing market approach to 
the inmate economy is consistent with previous studies that describe how and why the 
inmate economy operates the way that it does (Kalinich, 1980; Skarbek, 2012, 2014; 
Williams & Fish, 1974). Furthermore, among the female participants, this system of self-
governance enforced by prison gangs was not seen, which extends the dearth of literature 
on contraband and the sub-rosa economy within female correctional facilities. 
Within the inmate economy, participants mentioned the breadth of items that were 
available which ranged in severity from shrimp gumbo, to tobacco and drugs, to 
cellphones, to homemade guns (zip guns) and handguns. When asked about the items that 
were available, the consensus among the participants was that if an inmate could afford a 
particular item and find someone to smuggle it inside of the facility, the possibilities were 
endless. This finding is particularly troubling as it suggested that there is no limit to the 
contraband items that are available at any given time in a correctional facility. 
Additionally, in relation to the homemade guns and hand gun discussed in the interviews, 
these items were described as being controlled by or related to prison gang activity, 
which further highlights the dangers of prison gangs and provides some insight into the 
level of power and influence that prison gangs have over the inmate population. Although 
frequencies were not explored in this study in relation to contraband type, these findings 
provide support for results from federal and state reports, and previous studies of the 
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inmate economy in that contraband, as a whole, is quite abundant and there is still a large 
amount of variation in the types of contraband items available (Bodnar, 2017; Burke & 
Owen 2010; Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, 2016; Dittmann, 
2015; Kalinich, 1980; McGreevy, 2009; O’Hagan & Hardwick, 2017; Ward, 2017; 
Williams & Fish, 1974). 
Perhaps one of the largest contributions to the body of literature that has 
examined the inmate economy were findings that surrounded the pricing dynamics of the 
contraband market in so far as who dictates prices; who can, and cannot, purchase 
contraband; the relationship between gang affiliation, access, and pricing; and the 
relationship between race, access, and pricing. It came as no surprise that first and 
foremost, participants suggested that the price of any particular contraband item 
(including the trade of rare or scarce commissary items) was based on the principle of 
supply and demand. Beyond the principle of supply and demand, participants provided a 
wealth of information that further explained under what circumstances prices would 
change and when access to contraband may be denied to an inmate or a group of inmates 
based on race, gang-affiliation, and criminal history. 
Results from the initial interview questions and follow-up questions surrounding 
pricing and access suggested that cheaper prices were often given to fellow gang 
members, and those fellow gang members would have first access to the newly arrived 
contraband as either a gang-loyalty discount or for the purpose giving the fellow gang 
members an opportunity to earn some money by selling the item/s to other inmates at a 
higher price. Interestingly, there were exceptions to the access and pricing phenomenon. 
Sometimes, access was not based on one’s gang affiliation, but on the sellers previously 
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conceived notions of one’s race and ability to settle a debt or pay the seller in full upon 
receipt of the item/s. 
Participants also noted that there were individuals that, due to their criminal 
history involving sexual crimes against children, were not allowed to engage in the 
contraband market. Inmates who were labeled child molesters or “chomos” were 
considered at large to be off limits in terms of having access to the inmate economy. 
Others inmates suggested to be off limits were those who were perceived to be snitches 
and those who would share information with correctional staff regarding inmate dealings. 
“Chomos” were denied access because of the nature of their crimes, while snitches were 
said to pose a threat to the flow of contraband within correctional facilities. Inductively 
related to the deprivation model, an interesting phenomenon that may be worth 
examining further emerged from this finding in regards to being denied access to 
contraband as an informal punishment enforced by those that govern the contraband 
market, and the inmates at large. According to Sykes (1958), one of the five components 
of the pains of imprisonment is the deprivation of goods and services that is felt by all 
inmates and influences one’s institutional behaviors (misconduct and prison experiences). 
This deprivation is handed down by the correctional staff in the form of correctional 
policy that denies certain luxury items as a formal punishment inherent in correctional 
facilities. Also, Kalinich (1980) suggests that inmates seek out contraband items (luxury 
items) while incarcerated in order to alleviate this pain of imprisonment. 
Interestingly, once individual’s obtain contraband and establish a power dynamic 
among the inmates and prison culture, snitches and inmates with criminal histories of 
undesirable crimes against children then receive an extra deprivation of goods and 
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services handed down by those who dictate the contraband market and who identify these 
inmates as off limits. Based on the participants’ perceptions and experiences with 
contraband access, these findings may be an indication that for some inmates (snitches 
and “chomos”) there could be a compounding deprivation effect, which may, in turn, 
influence their institutional behaviors in different ways than those who only feel the 
formal deprivation of goods and services based on correctional policy, yet still have 
informal access to these luxuries in the inmate economy. Based on this logic, quantitative 
studies may consider examining criminal histories and official data that identifies both of 
these types of inmates. These measures can then be examined through statistical models 
in conjunction with measurements of deprivation (goods and services-contraband) to 
further explore this phenomenon as it relates to predicting inmate misconduct and 
institutional deviance. 
When asked about financial transactions and forms of payment for contraband 
that occurred in the inmate economy, participants unanimously suggested that the most 
common form of payment (especially for low ticket items) was commissary. Participants 
mentioned that it was very common to simply trade an agreed-upon amount of 
commissary for contraband or other items of commissary. For those that sold low ticket 
contraband, they would either ask for commissary as payment or would trade an item of 
contraband for another item of contraband. Although commissary was most often the 
medium of exchange in the inmate economy, there were issues mentioned with having 
too much commissary. Participants suggested that having too much commissary in your 
possession could be problematic since you must have a receipt for the commissary you 
have in your possession. Having commissary without a receipt for that commissary is 
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against most correctional policies, and thus the extra contraband that an inmate does not 
have a receipt for is considered contraband and is subject to confiscation. Furthermore, 
some participants noted the dangers that are associated with having too much commissary 
and/or contraband as it could increase one’s chances of victimization in the form of theft 
or extortion by other inmates. This finding is consistent with previous studies that have 
suggested that the common medium of exchange in the inmate economy is commissary, 
and extends what is known about the reality of violence that is inherent in prison culture 
and the inmate economy. 
Another method of purchasing and selling contraband that was discussed during 
the interviews was referred to as “putting money on someone’s book”, or placing money 
onto another inmate’s commissary account. Different methods of doing so were 
identified, and the main difference in these methods were the speed at which the money 
was transferred, which in turn, affected one’s ability to sell contraband in a timely 
manner in order to avoid being caught with the contraband by correctional staff. Before 
electronic systems that allow an individual to transfer money into someone’s commissary 
account almost instantaneously, inmates relied on phone calls, face-to-face visits, and 
money slips to have money sent, which could take a few weeks. Newer technologies now 
allow for money to be placed on someone’s books very quickly and with ease, again 
affecting the brevity of sales and purchases within the inmate economy which dictate the 
flow of contraband. This finding provides some further details as to the newer methods of 
money transfers and how this is related to the inmate economy (Kalinich, 1980). 
Despite the illegality of possessing real-world paper currency in correctional 
facilities, some participants noted that cash was not only present but was also extremely 
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valuable in correctional facilities as 1) it was an enticing form of payment for guards, 2) 
it’s purchasing power was roughly two times that of other forms of payment, 3) it was 
easy to hide, 4) it allowed for quick transactions to take place. Given these realities noted 
by some participants, the flow of cash was also said to drastically affect the flow of 
contraband. Interestingly, participants noted that the presence of cash in a particular 
facility was based not on the level of security of the facility per se, but rather on the age 
of the facility. It was mentioned that in older facilities with architectural vulnerabilities in 
their visiting areas, cash was easily passed from visitors to inmates and vice versa.  Even 
more interesting is the relationship that was uncovered between the presence of cash, and 
the order and behaviors among the inmate population. Some participants noted that when 
cash was present so too was contraband; and when contraband was present inmates 
tended to be less violent. On the other hand, when cash was not present and contraband 
was scarce, inmates were more violent. This finding can be partially explained under the 
deprivation model, in that it qualitatively explains the relationship between being 
deprivation of goods and services (in this case, both cash and contraband) and how and 
why this affects inmate culture, and institutional behaviors. This finding provides further 
qualitative insight into both the importance of proper safety and security measures, and 
the relationship between cash, contraband, and order within correctional facilities 
(Kalinich, 1980). 
In cases where cash was not available, or the quantity and/or price of contraband 
far exceeded the possibility to trade commissary, some participants noted that electronic 
money transfer systems were used, including both PayPal and Greendot cards. Although 
both methods provided nearly the same speed of transfer, the big difference described 
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between both methods was the level of anonymity that each provided. Greendots were 
described as being nearly untraceable, while PayPal transfers were considered easier to 
trace. Participants noted that having access to a contraband cellphone to make the 
transaction, and/or having the ability to verify the funds for Greendot numbers and make 
transfers was paramount for the use of both PayPal and Greendot’s. This finding is 
consistent with findings in Dittmann (2015), and provides insight into why one may 
choose one option over the other, and how these electronic money transfers occur. 
Ultimately, participants responses that make up main theme two provide an up-to-
date inside look at the inmate economy; who governs the market and market access; the 
many types of contraband that are available; the relationships between inmates in terms 
of pricing dynamics; the many ways in which monetary transactions now take place; and 
the effect that different types of currency and transactions can have on both the flow of 
contraband and institutional behaviors such as violence. Based on the participants’ 
responses, the inmate economy has similar facets as before but has also changed quite a 
bit in relation to major works that have focused specifically on the inmate economy and 
the sub-rosa contraband market, such as Kalinich (1980). Participants’ responses 
suggested that the inmate economy still seemed to play a pivotal role in their everyday 
lives. Given this reality, it may behoove researchers and correctional administrators to 
continue to look at this market in the future as the ebb and flow of contraband was 
suggested to be strongly related to order within correctional facilities. 
The unwritten rules of the sub-rosa inmate economy. Given that contraband is 
suggested to play such as large part in prison culture, examining the specific behavioral 
expectations of individuals that engage in this market provides an opportunity to extend 
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what previous studies have identified as the convict code (Clemmer, 1940, 1950; 
Cloward, 1960; Crewe, 2005; Irwin, 1980; Mitchell, 2018; Sykes, 1958; Sykes & 
Messinger, 1960; Thomas & Pool, 1975; Tittle & Tittle, 1964; Trammell, 2012; 
Wellford; 1967; Wheeler, 1961), and when and under what circumstances these 
behavioral expectations might be relaxed (Clemmer, 1940, Sykes, 1958; Thomas, 1970; 
Wellford, 1967; Williams & Fish, 1974). In response to calls for a more in-depth 
examination on the convict code, the current study included questions regarding specific 
dos and don’ts of the inmate economy and contraband dealings. The context in which 
these rules are mentioned is likely the largest contribution to the convict code literature 
that this theme offers. When asked specifically about these unwritten rules of the inmate 
economy and contraband dealings, participants responses were coded into 14 separate 
categories. Here, each unwritten rule will be briefly discussed in relation to its meaning, 
its overlap or expansion of the convict code; and whether or not, and/or under what 
circumstances these unwritten rules may be broken. 
Unwritten rule number one (don’t snitch) was the most obvious rule mentioned. 
Noted as the golden rule in prison, snitching referred to leaking information about other 
inmates and their dealings to correctional staff. This unwritten rule overlaps directly with 
previous studies that have examined the inmate code as it relates to leaking information 
to correctional staff. Despite this being considered the golden rule of prison by 
participants, participants noted that snitching did occur, however the circumstances in 
which this behavior occurred and went unpunished did not emerge from the interview 
data. Perhaps the most important contribution this study has to offer in regards to 
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snitching is the way that snitches are handled in the inmate economy and the impact that 
they can have on the flow of contraband noted in main theme two. 
At first glance, unwritten rule number two (own up to your mistakes) appeared to 
be an unwritten rule that is unique to the inmate economy. This behavioral expectation, 
commonly referred to by participants as “taking your lick”, involves inmates accepting 
full responsibility for their actions and possessions (contraband) and accepting one’s 
punishment (both formal and informal) without involving other inmates. After an 
inductive comparison of this unwritten rule with previous studies of the convict code, it 
seems to fit somewhat in line with previously identified behavioral expectations. For 
instance, Clemmer (1940) noted that prisoners should not help correctional staff in 
disciplinary affairs, especially as it relates to information that could lead to the discipline 
of another inmate, or other inmates. Also, Mitchell (2018) suggests that being loyal to 
other inmates is an important aspect of the convict code. Loyalty, as it relates to this 
unwritten rule, can be interpreted as being similar to “taking the heat” as to reduce the 
chances that other inmates may also get involved in the disciplinary process. 
This rule is also not wholly separate from the golden rule of no-snitching, and in 
fact was mentioned as simply a different form of snitching. Despite these overlaps with 
previously identified convict codes, this finding extends the literature by providing 
qualitative insight into why this code exists, and how it applies to the contraband market. 
There were no instances discussed in which this rule did not apply which suggests that all 
participants were not only aware of this unwritten rule, but based on their experiences, 
this rule was adhered to in all cases of disciplinary response, both formal and informal. 
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Even being a high ranking leader of a prison gang did not exclude someone from the 
expectation to own up to their mistakes. 
Unwritten rule number three (don’t ask or go looking for contraband) referred to 
the expectation that an inmate should not approach, with the intent of seeking contraband, 
inmates they do not know or those with whom they have not established previous 
relations. This rule also may fall under previously identified convict codes such as 
keeping to yourself, and minding your own business identified in Mitchell (2018). This 
finding contributes to Mitchell (2018), and other convict code literature as it provides 
some qualitative context and explanations as to why this expectation exists, and how this 
general code specifically relates to the contraband market. Despite this unwritten rule 
being mentioned, instances were discussed where this rule was not adhered to and did not 
apply. For instance, if an inmate was well-respected or was a known ranking prison gang 
member, that individual had a reputation that allowed them to enter a new area of a 
facility and obtain contraband by asking those that he did not know or had not conducted 
business with in the past. This finding further extends the convict code and situational 
model literature in so far as it identifies instances where the convict code is not strictly 
adhered to, and that the adherence is more so based on who the individual is and what 
their reputation is rather than a strict adherence to the behavioral expectations loosely 
outlined in the convict code (Clemmer, 1940, Mitchell, 2018; Steinke, 1991; Sykes, 
1958; Thomas, 1970; Wellford, 1967; Williams & Fish, 1974). 
The fourth unwritten rule that was identified in the data (Don’t sell to those who 
are off limits), referred to the expectation that those who engage in the sub-rosa economy 
are not to sell or trade contraband with individuals who have been labeled as off limits. 
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Inmates labeled as snitches and “chomos” were typically labeled as off limits, and selling 
or trading contraband with these individuals sometimes resulted in the seller or trader 
being also labeled as off limits. This finding is partially related to the situational model as 
well (with whom the offense occurred), as a major factor here is the reputation or label an 
inmates has been given (Steinke, 1991). This unwritten rule identified by some 
participants falls outside of the purview of typical convict code behavioral expectations, 
and seems to be a rule that is specific to the sub-rosa economy. Given that contraband 
plays such a large role in the everyday lives of those that are incarcerated, perhaps this 
finding is worthy or further exploration through primary data collection in an effort to 
expand what is currently known about this expectation; the effects it has on prison 
culture; its relationship with deprivation, violence, and victimization within correctional 
cultures; and whether or not (if also found in future studies) this expectation should be 
kept separate from typical convict code expectations or added as a variable and measured 
in future studies that focus on prison culture and the convict code. 
Unwritten rule number five (Don’t show and tell) that was identified in the data 
suggested that when inmates do possess contraband, they are not to share information 
with everyone regarding their holdings or from whom they obtained the contraband. 
There were no instances mentioned in the data where this rule was considered to be a 
strict rule, but rather it appeared to more of a “best practices” suggestion. This rule 
appeared to exist for at least three reasons. First, and likened to similar mentalities held in 
organized crime circles in the free-world, keeping the contraband or business to oneself  
served as a self-protection mechanism from snitches and those who may want to deprive 
that person of their possessions through violence and theft. Second, keeping this 
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information to oneself also protected the seller of the contraband from exposure to 
potential snitches and correctional staff. Third, and likely the most interesting reasons as 
it relates to the inmate economy, is that keeping ones contraband holdings and seller 
secret can help protect the price of that contraband in the future. 
Expectedly similar to licit business, when a product makes its way down a supply 
chain from the original source to second and third-hand salespersons, the price almost 
always increases. Exposing one’s source of contraband in the inmate economy presents 
the possibility that another inmate may buy the seller out of all of their contraband 
product. In turn, this would force that individual, and everyone else who was previously 
purchasing contraband from the original source, to pay more for the same product since 
the product now sits with a second hand seller who is selling it for more. This unwritten 
rule partially overlaps with previously identified convict codes, such as not leaking 
information, however that convict code typically refers to not leaking information to 
correctional staff. This finding extends the convict code literature by suggesting that the 
leaking of information may also include the leaking of information to other inmates as 
well, and may not only be related to self-preservation, the protection of sources, and 
contraband pricing, but also other unexplored types of carefully guarded information held 
by inmates. 
Unwritten rule number six of the sub-rosa inmate economy (Don’t bring attention 
to your living quarters) summed up the behavioral expectation that when engaging in the 
sale, purchase, or consumption of contraband (especially odorous products such as 
marijuana and prison wine) inmates are expected to do so in a manner that does not put 
other inmates at risk. In other words, maintaining composure while intoxicated and 
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masking odorous forms of consumption such as smoking marijuana should be done so in 
a way that does not draw attention from correctional staff. Failing to do so could lead to 
unwanted shakedowns and exposing other inmates and their contraband holdings to 
correctional staff in the process. This rule appeared to be strictly adhered to, and no 
inmate was immune from informal punishments that would be handed down if their 
behaviors led to others being caught with contraband. 
This unwritten rule extends what is currently known about the convict code, and 
reaches further than the contraband market and contraband consumption. This 
expectation also refers to violence and is closely related to findings in Kalinich (1980) in 
that with contraband presence comes a sense of order and an expectation to behave. This 
finding is also related to both the deprivation model and the importation model as 
drawing attention to one’s living quarters may lead to further deprivations since 
contraband may be confiscated. Being deprived of luxuries in the form of contraband, 
again, was shown to have an effect on intuitional behaviors thereafter. 
Unwritten rule number seven (Do square business) referred to selling contraband 
at the agreed upon price without changing that price, and not selling contraband items 
that are misrepresented as something they are not. This rule was not strictly adhered to, as 
Todd mentioned a time when inmates were selling used stamps, however their behaviors 
did not go unpunished. The main reason that this unwritten rule was said to exist was 
because “square business” led to trust and repeat business. Despite the criminal nature of 
individuals in correctional settings, trust appeared to be an important factor, at least as it 
relates to the inmate economy. This finding overlaps completely with, and shows support 
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for, early convict codes and inmate culture expectations identified in Clemmer (1940) in 
regards to not exploiting other inmates or misrepresenting an item as something it is not. 
The eighth unwritten rule of the sub-rosa inmate economy (Don’t step on other’s 
toes), referred to the expectation that a prison gang should not sell the same form of 
contraband in the same area of a correctional facility where another gang is already 
selling that type of contraband, unless permission was given by the other prison gang. 
Doing so was a major form of disrespect and could potentially result in gang and race 
conflicts, violence, and unwanted attention by correctional staff. This unwritten rule 
boiled down to issues of respect and pricing/price-fixing, and there were no instances 
mentioned in the interviews where this rule was violated. This is not to suggest that this 
rule is always strictly adhered to, but rather to note that the interview data for this study 
only identified instances where this rule was followed, and why. Respect within a 
correctional institution appeared to be a very important component of the contraband 
market as well, especially as it relates to mutual respect among gangs who were engaged 
in the smuggling and selling of contraband. This finding appeared to be specific to the 
sub-rosa inmate economy. It also supports previous findings regarding the power and 
influence that prison gangs have over the contraband market (Skarbek, 2014), and 
extends what is currently known about the current state of this market by providing 
context for certain agreements and respect boundaries between prison gangs that 
participants experienced in relation to the inmate economy. 
Unwritten rule number nine (Don’t undercut the market) that was identified 
outlines the expectation that an individual should not sell a common form of contraband, 
such as rolling papers, for a price that is below the going rate. This rule appeared to be 
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separate from other previously identified convict codes/behavioral expectations within 
correctional facilities, and was unique to the sub-rosa inmate economy. This finding 
extends Sykes (1958) work in regards to merchants receiving disdain from other prisoner 
for charging very high prices for items, as this finding also suggests that merchants 
should not deviate their price of a common item from the typical going rate. Instances 
were discussed where this behavior was tolerated such as when an inmate was well 
respected and correcting that individual would cause more issues that what it was worth. 
Outside of this situation, interview data suggests that prison gangs would correct an 
individual if they were found to be undercutting the market. This finding further supports 
Skarbek (2014) in that prison gangs exhibit a large amount of power and control over the 
contraband market and the sub-rosa inmate economy, and extends what is currently 
known about this power and influence by proving qualitative explanations of how and 
why this occurs. 
Unwritten rule number ten (Don’t steal) of the sub-rosa inmate economy was 
commonly mentioned by participants, which suggests that one of the five convict codes 
mentioned in Clemmer (1940) still holds true in modern times despite the fact that this 
rule is not always adhered to and can go unpunished depending on the victims individual 
characteristics. The notion behind this unwritten rule is that theft is a major form of 
disrespect in correctional institutions, and one must defend their dignity once they are 
stolen from, often times in the form of violence or compromise. Common targets for theft 
were inmates that were labeled “chomos”, and those who had too much contraband and 
did not have anyone to help defend their property (non-gang members). Prison gang 
membership was noted as a way to reduce one’s chances of being stolen from, which 
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supports Skarbek (2014) in that prison gang membership can serve as protective measure. 
Additionally, “chomos” were not only considered off limits by participants, but they were 
often the victim of theft as well, which may suggest support for the aforementioned 
concept that the level of deprivation these individuals experience may be much higher 
than inmates who are not “chomos”. 
Unwritten rule number eleven (Don’t get in debt with guards and inmates) 
suggested that there is a behavioral expectation within the sub-rosa inmate economy to 
not go into debt with either inmates or guards. Furthermore, if an inmate does accumulate 
a debt they are expected to pay that debt in a timely fashion. Probing questions led to 
context being provided for the potential consequences of going into debt with both guards 
and inmates. For debts owed to inmates, consequences ranged from violent victimization 
to sexual victimization, while consequences for debts owed to guards were described as 
retaliatory in nature in the form of planted evidence resulting in false misconduct reports 
and formal punishments being handed down by administration. This finding supports a 
portion of the situational model as it relates to the officer who is writing the misconduct 
ticket (Steinke, 1991). This rule appeared to be specific to the contraband market, 
however, debts can also accumulate from illegal institutional behaviors such as gambling 
on sporting events, which suggest that this unwritten rule extends beyond the contraband 
market. Again, this unwritten rule centered around respect and the idea that one must 
defend their reputation if they are disrespected, which is consistent with and shows 
support for the masculinity component found in Mitchell (2018). 
Unwritten rule number twelve (Don’t interfere with inmate and correctional 
officer dealings) appeared to be unique to the sub-rosa inmate economy and the 
207 
 
contraband market, and shed more light on the many ways in which an individual can 
disrespect another individual or group of individuals in a correctional setting and the 
consequences of doing so. This unwritten rule suggested that inmates should not try to 
ask a correctional officer that is already bringing in contraband for another inmate or 
group of inmates to do the same for them. Another tenant of this unwritten rule was to not 
hassle or assault a correctional officer who is bringing in contraband for an inmate or 
group of inmates. Participants suggested that both of these instances would result in 
physical violence, since this valuable inmate-guard relationship is one that takes time to 
develop; and essentially stealing another inmate’s or groups of inmates’ contraband 
connection is a serious from of disrespect. 
This finding also shows partial support for the situational model (with whom the 
offense occurs), and extends what is currently known about inmate-guard relations by 
suggesting that correctional staff involvement in the contraband market may partially 
explain what at first might appear to be random inmate-on-inmate assaults. Given this 
possibility, detailed investigations regarding inmate-on-inmate assaults may consider 
investigations into correctional staff as well to help illuminate the causes behind some of 
these violent misconduct incidences. Doing so has the potential to provide a detailed 
report of the incident with a sense of due diligence, and it may also help identify 
problematic correctional officers that may be involved, in some capacity, with the 
contraband market and the inmate economy. Evidence that would allude to the level of 




Unwritten rule number thirteen (Always have a fall guy) referred to identifying an 
individual within a correctional setting that is tasked with, whether they know it or not, 
taking responsibility for the possession of contraband and/or selling contraband on behalf 
of someone else. This rule was expressed as a self-protection mechanism, and those who 
were “fall guys” were typically lower ranking gang affiliates or gang members compared 
to the ranking of those for which they were holding and/or selling contraband. This rule 
appeared to be specific to the contraband market and does not overlap with previously 
identified convict codes. However, it is not uncommon for lower ranking prison gang 
members to also be tasked with assaulting other inmates on behalf of a gang, and in turn, 
they earn credit or an increased sense of respect among their gang. In common instances 
such as this, they too are considered a fall guy, as high ranking prison gang members do 
not want to bring attention to themselves. Some participants who ran a “store”, explicitly 
stated that they were not gang affiliated and were in sole possession of the contraband, 
which suggested that this is more of an unwritten rule for the purpose of discretionary 
self-protection/preservation, rather than a hardfast principle of the sub-rosa inmate 
economy. 
Unwritten rule number fourteen (Keep the peace) referred to the notion that both 
inmates as individuals and as a whole benefit from reducing the chances that conflicts 
may arise from disagreements by coming to some common-ground effort at 
peacekeeping. Doing so reduced both conflicts and the possibility that any distractive 
behaviors may bring unwanted attention to that area of a facility, thus resulting a 
potential shakedown and a disruption in the flow of contraband. In turn, this disruption 
would also lead to increased deprivations felt by the inmates. Guards were also said to 
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benefit from keeping the peace by allowing certain contraband related behaviors to go 
unpunished. This was perceived by participants as being an approach to order 
maintenance used by correctional staff. Every participant noted, at least once, an instance 
where guards relaxed the enforcement of contraband-related correctional policies for one 
reason or another; and several participants noted instances where they had to keep the 
peace with other inmates to either get along or to avoid drawing extra unwanted attention 
to their area of the correctional facility. This finding shows support for previous studies 
that suggest that guards may relax their enforcement of some policies through a give-and-
take compromise simply for the purpose of ensuring some sense of order among the 
inmate population (Sykes, 1958; Kalinich, 1980; Williams & Fish, 1974). Based on the 
many stories of violent encounters discussed by the participants, this rule was obviously 
not strictly adhered to. 
These findings suggest that these unwritten rules are not always strictly adhered 
to, and in some cases are simply rules-of-thumb for ensuring self-protection and self-
preservation. Even in case where rules appeared to be steadfast principles, participants 
noted exceptions to these principles, which typically revolved around the individual’s 
social rank and reputation within the inmate’s social system (potential situational-model 
factors for future studies of inmate deviance and misconduct). These findings partially 
address issues noted in Williams and Fish (1974), where exceptions to behavioral 
expectations and the convict code were noted, but context was not provided. These 
findings provide some context for these exceptions, and help move this body of literature 
forward by identifying situations in which the more steadfast unwritten rules can be 
broken. Some of the unwritten rules slightly overlap with, or fit comfortably under the 
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umbrella of, previously identified convict codes while others were identified as 
behavioral expectations that are specific to the sub-rosa inmate economy and the 
contraband market. 
These unwritten rules that participants identified were said to exist for at least one 
of the following reasons: to reduce the chances that conflict may arise; to eliminate 
unwanted attention and subsequent shakedowns; to protect an inmate’s profits and 
preserve their illegal behaviors from detection; to guarantee responsibility for one’s 
behaviors; to protect information and contraband from those who may pose a threat to 
their business (snitches and thieves); to establish fixed prices and protect one’s seller and 
the market value of a particular item; and to ensure honorable and respectful business 
practices. Collectively, these rules, if followed by all inmates within a correctional 
institution, serve the inmates best by maintaining respect among the inmates and by 
ensuring a steady flow of contraband without disruption. Both of these overarching goals 
can lead to a reduction in the deprivations felt by the inmate population, and show 
support for previous studies that connect contraband with deprivations (Kalinich, 1980; 
Sykes, 1958; Williams & Fish, 1974). 
Grooming and inmate-correctional officer relations. A large component of 
prison life revolves around communication and socialization. These actions occur 
between inmates and between guards and inmates. On one hand the communication and 
socialization between guards and inmates is considered taboo in prison culture, as 
Clemmer (1940) and Mitchell (2018) state that an element of the convict code is to not 
talk to or become too friendly with correctional officers. However, Clemmer (1940) 
includes an exception to this rule where he suggests it is okay to do this for business 
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purposes and other necessary reasons. In instances where participants became friendly 
with correctional officers for the purpose of grooming them into becoming potential 
contraband smuggling actors and/or passive participants in the inmate economy, this 
behavior was acceptable so long as that correctional officer was not already working with 
another inmate or prison gang, as noted in unwritten rule number twelve (Don’t interfere 
with correctional officer and inmate dealings). 
In section two of the interview schedule, participants were asked to describe the 
relationship between inmates and guards that were involved in contraband smuggling and 
the contraband market, how this relationship was formed, and if there were any common 
traits among correctional officers involved in contraband smuggling and the contraband 
market. Participants’ answers to these questions and follow up questions provided a 
plethora of information regarding four areas of inquiry: 1) rapport building tactics used 
by inmates, 2) the grooming process, 3) how inmates influence and coerce correctional 
officers, and 4) endogenous and exogenous relationships between inmates and 
correctional officers. Much of the data collected during the interviews supports previous 
research into correctional officer corruption and grooming. The data also extends some of 
the literature in terms of the role that acts of sexual misconduct can play in this process. 
Beginning with rapport building, data for this study was quite consistent with 
previous research that suggest efforts to groom a correctional officer often begin with 
small talk and rapport building (Crouch & Marquart, 1989; Goldsmith, Halsey, & Vel-
Palumbo, 2018; Kalinich, 1980; Marquart, Barnhill, & Balshaw-Biddle, 2001; Sykes, 
1958). Participants suggested this small talk can include: 1) personal questions about a 
correctional officer’s family, 2) why they chose to become a correctional officer, 3) 
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learning what sports team a correctional officer likes best and striking up conversations 
over recent games played by that sports team, 4) making flirtatious, charming, and self-
esteem-building comments to female correctional officers, and likely the least obvious 5) 
exposing one’s genitalia to a female correctional officer. All of which are done for the 
purpose of building some form of rapport or trusting relationship with a correctional 
officers that they could later exploit. These findings extend previous studies by providing 
qualitative context for how these rapport building tactics play out, and which correctional 
officers are most often targeted, especially as it relates to those who share personal 
information with inmates, and female guards who may have low self-esteem and/or may 
fall below a certain level of attractiveness and above a certain body-weight preference. 
Based on the interviews, maintaining a consistent and professional social distance from 
inmates, refusing to share personal information with inmates, reporting and any and all 
sexual advances made by inmates may be the best way for correctional staff to stave off 
these rapport building tactics. Surely, training efforts to help correctional staff pick up on 
these tactics can be improved upon. 
Participants also provided information that was consistent with previous research 
on grooming and the grooming process in that it begins with small favors that may see 
menial at best, and slowly larger favors are asked of the grooming victim (Crouch & 
Marquart, 1989; Goldsmith, Halsey, & Vel-Palumbo, 2018; Kalinich, 1980; Liebling, 
Price, & Shefler, 2011; Marquart, Barnhill, & Balshaw-Biddle, 2001; Mcalinden, 2012; 
Sykes, 1958). Small favors such as providing an inmate with a cheeseburger, cigarettes, 
or a can of snuff were noted. Interestingly, one participant noted that tobacco was the 
“gateway contraband”, as he described inmates would often ask guards to first bring in 
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tobacco in order to get them familiar with the process and to warm them up to later bring 
in other forms of contraband. Another participant suggested that simply showing a 
correctional officer a large amount of cash was a quick and effective, yet risky, way of 
building rapport and grooming/convincing a correctional officer into smuggling in 
contraband, in this case it was numerous packages of loose tobacco. 
Participants also discussed the importance of small tests and efforts to find trigger 
points that help them identify certain correctional officer’s level of integrity and/or 
willingness to bend or ignore contraband-related correctional polices. Doing so allowed 
them to learn which correctional officers would allow what type of infraction to go 
unreported. In turn, this allowed them to navigate the contraband market unnoticed and 
helped them identify which guards to target for future potential grooming. This finding 
suggests that perhaps consistent individual policy enforcement (single correctional 
officer) and consistent group-level policy enforcement (all correctional officers in a 
facility) may be the best way to avoid these grooming tactics employed by inmates. 
Once a correctional officer had breached policy and allowed their integrity to be 
compromised through the grooming process and the smuggling of contraband, 
participants suggested that they would use blackmail, reminders of the correctional 
officer’s guilt, information about the correctional officer’s personal leisurely activities 
(drug use and solicitation for sexual services), and evidence building practices such as 
creating phone records between the inmate and the correctional officer in order to 
influence and/or coerce them into continuing their illegal institutional behaviors. 
Interestingly, many of these blackmail tactics were admittedly baseless (save the phone 
records and a potential random drug test for the drug using correctional officer), however 
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participants said they were often effective as some suggested that a guilty conscience 
provided enough leverage for them to maintain power over the correctional officer. 
Participants also provided context and supporting evidence of the role that both 
endogenous and exogenous relationships played in rapport building and efforts to corrupt 
correctional officers into smuggling contraband into facilities. Participants suggested that 
gang ties, neighborhood ties, and the proximity of one’s previous residence to the 
correctional facility played a large role in whether or not they could either develop or 
exploit both endogenous and exogenous relationships with correctional officers and free-
world actors for the purpose of obtaining contraband. These findings extend what is 
currently known about contraband smuggling (Kalinich, 1980; Williams & Fish, 1974), 
and may show support for the necessity to include measures such as these in future 
studies of inmate deviance and misconduct under both the importation (imported criminal 
network ties) and situational models (the officers involved) (Irwin & Cressey, 1962; 
Steinke, 1991). Doing so may serve the field of correctional research well as it could 
provide more explanatory variables that may help predict certain forms of misconduct 
and institutional deviance, particularly contraband related misconduct. 
Contraband smuggling methods. Interview data from this study also provided 
useful detailed information regarding the smuggling of contraband and how this is 
sometime done. Analysis of the data led to the emergence of three subtheme, which 
identify the main actor responsible for bringing or sending the contraband into the 
facility: 1) employees, 2) free-world actors, and 3) inmate trustees (those who work 
outside of the facility during the day, and return back to the facility). Consistent with 
previous studies, participants also noted that correctional employees were largely 
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responsible for the smuggling of contraband into the correctional facilities (Kalinich, 
1980; Ochola, 2015; Sykes, 1958; Williams & Fish, 1974). Three participants provided 
descriptions of how correctional employees would go about smuggling contraband 
(tobacco, vodka, free-world food, and perfume). A crime script analysis was formed 
based on detailed information provided that allowed for a step-by-step examination of the 
preparation and smuggling process which involved fashioning a tight-fitting vest made of 
tape and Bugler tobacco packets that was worn into a correctional facility by a 
correctional officer. Another participant provided an example of a correctional employee 
smuggling contraband and involved an individual who worked with the parole division 
who was smuggling vodka into a facility in Ozarka water bottles that had been 
repackaged to look as if they were in their original packaging. The last example provided 
by a participant suggested that he had guards bringing him contraband by simply placing 
the contraband in their lunch sacks. These example provide some insight into the detailed 
planning that is often required for employees to successfully smuggle contraband into 
correctional facilities, and may provide real-life examples that may be used to help 
identify specific security concerns. 
Interview data also suggested that Free-world actors were partially responsible for 
bringing or sending contraband into correctional facilities. Visitation was commonly 
mentioned as a way for free-world actors to smuggle contraband into facilities, especially 
during contact visits. This was also said to be easily done in facilities with structural 
vulnerabilities in visitation areas where contact visits were not allowed. COntrband was 
also said to be smuggled inside of products such as tampons that were allowed to be 
given to inmates by visitors at some female correctional facilities. Also consistent with 
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previous research, free-world actors also exploited the mail system to send contraband 
into facilities (Gearhart, 2006; Goodnough & Zezima, 2011; The RDI Blog, 2017). 
Several participants told stories of drugs coming in through the mail system such as LSD, 
Suboxone, and methamphetamine. Interestingly, one participant mentioned that he saw 
the same exact method of smuggling methamphetamine discussed in Goodnough and 
Zezima (2011), which involved liquefying the substance, spraying it on a coloring book 
page, coloring the picture, and putting wax over the watermarks. Michaels (2018) 
discssed likely the best approach to curbing this type of smuggling method by having all 
correspondence scanned and the scans being sent to the inmates rather than the actual 
document. 
Two other smuggling method were also discussed and required assistance from a 
free-world actor, and their willingness to exploit poor perimeter security measures. One 
method required a free-world actor/s to simply throw, or shoot a package with an air 
rocket (three-man sling shot) a package over the perimeter fence of a facility. The second 
method required a free-world actor to fly a UAV and drop a package inside of the 
perimeter fence. Both methods are consistent with previous research and required the 
package to be dropped in a pre-determined location and at a predetermined time, so that 
the inmate who ordered the drop could retrieve the package (Applin, 2016; Gearhart, 
2006; Goldsmith, Halsey, & Vel-Palumbo, 2018; O'Hagan & Hardwick, 2017; 
Northfield, 2018; Ochola, 2015; Sanchez & McKibben, 2015; Waldron, 2017). 
The last category of main smuggling actors discussed were inmate trustees. These 
methods typically required inmates to have efficient communication with free-world 
actors who would make drops of contraband at pre-determined locations, or 
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communications between inmates who work in uniform receiving when trustees return 
from their work detail. One participant mentioned a time when trustees who were prison 
gang members were retrieving drop of large quantities of contraband while working in 
the fields and out of eye sight of correctional officers who were in charge of supervising 
the trustees. These gang members would then divvy up the contraband among themselves 
and smuggle the contraband back into the facility on or in their bodies. Another 
participant discussed trustee truck drivers who were bringing in pounds of marijuana into 
facilities in the trucks they were driving, while another participant discussed, in extreme 
detail, the exact process of smuggling contraband into a facility with the cooperation of 
inmates who worked in trustee uniform receiving. This participant’s detailed account of 
the smuggling process led to the development of a crime script analysis that outlined the 
steps taken to successfully smuggle contraband into a facility through this avenue. 
In sum, findings from this main theme are consistent with previous studies, 
however they also extend the literature by providing some detailed accounts of the 
smuggling process and identify specific vulnerabilities in security currently employed by 
correctional facilities including perimeter security issues, structural vulnerability issue, 
visitation supervision, mail system issues, the presence of contraband cell phones, and 
trustee supervision. All of which are addressable issues, although addressing these 
vulnerabilities may require varying levels of funding. 
The impact of contraband and corruption on perceptions of punishment and the 
criminal justice system. Participants were also asked questions about whether or not the 
presence of corruption among correctional officers or staff had an impact on the way they 
viewed incarceration as punishment and how they perceived the criminal justice system? 
218 
 
Responses to this questions were coded into two subthemes: the critical perspective, and 
the c’est la vie perspective. Interestingly, the responses given by participants suggested 
that many participants often held both critical perspectives and c’est la vie perspectives 
and were very rational and thorough in explaining how their experiences and perceptions 
had shaped their views of both incarceration as punishment and the criminal justice 
system as whole. This finding is important because it suggests that the participants were 
both passionate and frustrated by their experiences, yet rational in understanding the 
human element that plays a pivotal role in correctional facilities and the activities that 
occur within them. Given these common two-sided responses, it was not appropriate to 
categorize each participant under one sum-theme or the other. Instead, the responses were 
categorized in a way that reflect several perspectives held by participants, and shed light 
on the realities of their perceptions and experiences. 
Participants that made critical perspectives focused on five areas of concern. First, 
some participants noted the hypocritical nature of correctional officers smuggling 
contraband into facilities. The fact that these individuals were responsible for ensuring 
that a punishment is handed down to the inmates for committing a crime, while at the 
same time committing crimes themselves by smuggling contraband (often the same 
products many inmates were incarcerated for possessing), was something that did not 
seem to sit well with some participants. Some suggested that this jaded them to the idea 
of a criminal justice system and noted that it was not built for justice, but rather control. 
Second, participants made critical comments of the contradicting nature of prison as a 
mechanism for rehabilitation. Given the criminal nature of both inmates and correctional 
officers, and the level of non-rehabilitative activities that occur with the correctional 
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facility environments, some participants were convinced that incarceration, at least in the 
U.S., does not come even remotely close to meeting the goal of rehabilitating inmates. 
Third, many participants throughout the interviews noted the relationship between 
contraband presence and order maintenance (noted in main theme one), and some were 
critical of this reality, suggesting that guards are well aware of this relationship and 
simply allow contraband related activities to occur in order to maintain some type of 
order within the facility. In an attempt to present a front to administration that 
correctional officers were indeed enforcing correctional policy, guards would 
occasionally catch an inmate with contraband and write a misconduct report for the 
incident, but the perception was that this was a ruse. Lastly, participants showed 
resentment for the capitalistic nature of the prison industrial complex, and allowing 
contraband in facilities was simply another way of keeping some form of control over the 
inmate population by creating a revolving door for future tenants. 
These perceptions held by some of the participants ultimately led to what some 
called a lack of faith in the system as a whole, and a jaded perspective on the system. 
Their experiences also led some of them to believe that prison, as a form of punishment, 
was a joke, and correctional officers were just as corrupt as the inmates they supervised. 
What some of these participants saw and experienced greatly reduced their perceptions of 
legitimacy for the criminal justice system as a whole. Despite these strongly held beliefs 
and perspectives, these participants also were rational in understanding why they 
experienced what they experienced. 
Those who made c’est la vie-type comments also made some critical comments as 
well. These participants were less perturbed at the corruption they witnessed and 
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suggested that they either knew what to expect from the criminal microcosm of prison; 
their level of perceived legitimacy for the system as a whole had already been deflated or 
jaded; they expected corruption to occur as it does everywhere in society based on profits 
and the human instinct to better one’s financial situation (inmates and guards); and/or 
they were accepting of their punishment and had come to terms with the realities of 
prison. These types of responses suggested that some participants were unaffected by the 
corruption they witnessed. Their perception of incarceration as a form of punishment 
appeared to be stable, and the way they viewed the criminal justice system as a whole 
was just as it was before their incarceration. This is not to say that they fully approved of 
the corruption they witnessed, but rather some participants simply explained their 
experiences and the corruption they saw as a part of life and human nature, thus this 
subtheme was named the c’est la vie perspective. 
Perspectives on curbing contraband in correctional facilities. The last theme 
that emerged from the interviews focused on participants’ perspectives on reducing the 
presence of contraband and ideas of how this may be possible. Interestingly, a vast 
majority of participants suggested that contraband will always be a part of correctional 
facilities and provided several reasons why they held these beliefs. First, when 
contraband is confiscated or smuggling avenues are disrupted, participants mentioned 
that inmates will simply find another way to obtain contraband because there are many 
more ways that this can be done aside from the original avenue. Some suggested that they 
can’t imagine correctional facilities not having contraband. Second, participants noted 
that contraband will always be a part of prisons due to the way that correctional policies 
define contraband. From an extra onion taken from the kitchen, to a book borrowed from 
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another inmate, these small and arguably undisruptive forms of contraband will always 
be present. 
Third, some participants noted that the combination of low wages, the low risk of 
correctional getting caught smuggling in contraband, and the profitability of smuggling 
contraband into facilities is simply too enticing to some correctional staff who wish to 
capitalize on this opportunity. Participants often noted that it is human nature to want to 
better one’s financial situation. Participants commonly mentioned that everyone has a 
price, and that when a correctional officer can make ridiculous profits from completing a 
relatively low risk act, it is simply too enticing for some correctional officers to refuse 
such an opportunity. Fourth, some participants mentioned instances in which they 
themselves, or other inmates were caught red-handed with contraband and they believe 
correctional officers overlooked their illegal behaviors because writing up a misconduct 
ticket was too much of a hassle, or because they had larger issues to handle such as 
violent assaults.   
Finally, some participants explained that when contraband was present, there was 
a sense of informal social control that existed among the inmate population, which 
resulted in far fewer violent assaults and confrontations and fewer disruptive behaviors 
among the inmates. This relationship was suggested to be glaringly apparent to both 
inmates and correctional staff. Ignoring certain contraband infractions was suggested to 
benefit correctional officers as it reduced instances that may require them to intervene 
(such as assaults and disruptive behaviors) and would cause unwanted attention to their 
area of the facility where they are responsible for maintaining order. These findings are 
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quite consistent with previous research that contend that contraband will likely always be 
present in correctional facilities (Kalinich, 1980; Sykes, 1958; Williams & Fish, 1974). 
When participants were asked about their ideas for best curbing the presence of 
contraband in correctional facilities, many of them provided suggestions, however these 
suggestions were typically followed by explanations as to why their ideas would either 
not work, were not feasible, or would only partially address the contraband issue. Some 
participants noted that paying corrections employees higher wages may partially reduce 
the presence of contraband, while other suggestions centered on improvements in 
correctional officer training (drug recognition training). Two of the more promising 
suggestions that was mentioned focused on the mail system and adopting similar mail 
scanning technologies used in Pennsylvania and noted in Michaels (2018), and 
corrections officials redefining what exactly contraband is and is not based on sort of 
litmus test of the danger that an item poses to inmates, staff, and the day-to-day 
operations in a correctional facility.   
Other suggestions that were provided included paying inmates a small hourly 
wage for their work so that they do not have to engage in the contraband market to be 
able to purchase commissary; and reasoning with influential groups of inmates (prison 
gangs) in the form of a give-and-take compromise where inmates would receive certain 
luxuries such as air conditioning or electronic cigarettes if they were willing to address 
certain inmate behaviors. Again, all of the suggestions (aside from mail scanning 
technologies, drug recognition training, and redefining policies) were discussed more so 
in a hypothetical manner rather than being actual realistic suggestions, as the participants 
were either well aware of the budget constraints that correctional facilities, the overly 
223 
 
hopeful or absurd nature of their suggestions, or the beneficial role that contraband 
played in order maintenance. In sum, participants suggested that contraband will always 
find its way into correctional facilities, despite any and all methods that may be deployed 
to curb its presence. 
Limitations and Future Research.  
Limitations. As with all studies, this dissertation also has some limitations. First, 
there were only two participant race categories that were examined (White and Hispanic). 
This is problematic because the perceptions and experiences of a large portion of inmates 
(particularly Blacks) were unexamined in this study. This unfortunate outcome was likely 
the result of snowball sampling, as individuals typically have relationships with those that 
are most like them (in this case race and skin color) and the sample, based on 
participants’ references, naturally evolved in this manner. Given this limitation, the 
findings from this study can only speak to the experiences and perceptions of the 
participants included in the study, none of which were Black. It would be unwise to 
suggest that the experiences and perceptions of potential Black participants, as it related 
to the sub-rosa inmate economy and the contraband market, would the same as the other 
16 non-Black participants without interviewing any Black participants. To avoid this 
issue in future studies, researchers that are interested in collecting in-depth qualitative 
interview data through snowball sampling for the purpose of examining perceptions and 
experiences of individuals of major race categories should consider beginning their study 
with at least one gatekeeper of each race, if possible. 
Second, this study was conducted in the free-world and included participants who 
were previously incarcerated and fit the selection criteria for the study. This is a partial 
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limitation because there may be very recent developments in smuggling methods that are 
now being used, and without interviewing current inmates, these methods were not 
discussed, and thus were not able to be included in the study findings. This is not to say 
that the data is outdated by any means, but rather that perceptions and experiences of the 
participants’ were not extremely recent. This limitation most likely exists because of the 
inherent administrative and bureaucratic barriers that make correctional research 
challenging in general, particularly for studies of this nature that examine sensitive topics 
that may shed unwanted light on a large problem that is, arguably for good reason, kept in 
the dark, such as contraband and correctional officer corruption. 
Despite this being considered a limitation, it can be argued that this study actually 
benefitted from the interview setting (at the participants’ leisure and preferred location), 
as it allowed for a more relaxed atmosphere; it provided a sense of comfortability for the 
participants as they were in their own element; it gave them a sense of ownership and 
agency over the study as it was being conducted on their turf and on their time; and in 
many cases it allowed for the principle investigator to build a more natural rapport with 
the participants. For example, before one of the interviews began, the interviewer and the 
participant played two quick games of billiards (8-ball) in the participant’s garage. This 
rapport building activity created a very friendly atmosphere and undoubtedly 
strengthened the relationship between the participant and their subsequent references. In 
sum, it is safe to say that trust, rapport, and the level of depth that participants were 
willing to go into regarding their perceptions and experiences would have been far less if 
these interviews were conducted in a correctional setting. Nonetheless, this study was 
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limited to previously incarcerated individuals, and thus may have missed out on the most 
recent developments in regards to smuggling and currency transfer methods.    
Third, some researchers may suggest that that the sample size is relatively small 
(N=16), and the findings, in turn, are subjective and ungeneralizable. These individuals 
would be correct, if the purpose of the study was to come to findings that were based on 
participant objectivity and were generalizable to the broader population of all individuals 
incarcerated in the United State of America. However, the aim of this study was not to 
come to generalizable findings, but rather to examine individuals’ perceptions and 
experiences (obviously subjective) in order to learn more about a relatively unexamined 
and neglected aspect of their lives while incarcerated. Crouch and McKenzie (2006) 
argue that not only are in-depth qualitative interviews extremely valuable, but exploratory 
and analytically inductive qualitative in-depth interview studies of individual’s 
perceptions and experiences are best done with smaller samples, so long as they are 
relevant to the field and are conducted for the purpose of knowledge-building. Based on 
this notion, it can be argued that sample size, in this study, is irrelevant, however a larger 
sample would have been nice. 
In line with concerns over sample size, is the concern over whether or not 
saturation was reached. Given the focus on individual experiences and perceptions in this 
study, and the reality that everyone perceives and experiences their social world 
differently, saturation might never have been reached, and the data collection process 
may have never ended. However, based on the data, saturation could be partially 
measured when examining the unwritten rules of the contraband market. As analysis 
progressed through the interviews (grounded theory approach) it came to the attention of 
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the principle investigator that after twelve interviews, redundancy was abundant and there 
were no new rules being mentioned, even though the remaining four participants had 
years of in-depth knowledge and experience with the inmate economy and the contraband 
market. This finding by itself is not intended to suggest that saturation was reached for all 
elements of the interview schedule, but it can be used to support the contention that 
saturation, at least as far as the unwritten rules are concerned among the sample of 16 
White and Hispanic participants, was most likely reached. 
Redundancy and saturation in qualitative studies is important to ensure that the 
study is not missing any important aspects of a social phenomenon. Reaching saturation 
with relatively small sample sizes is not extremely uncommon in qualitative research. In 
fact, one qualitative study of 20 female prostitutes in Pakistan reached saturation at just 
16 interviews (Khan, et al., 2010), while another study of reproductive health and social 
desirability using a sample 60 in-depth interviews with women from West African 
Countries reached saturation at just 12 interviews, and meta-themes were identified after 
the first six (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006). The fact that this portion of the current 
study (unwritten rules) reached saturation at just 12 interviews is likely an artifact of 
targeted recruiting efforts by participants. Several participants asked the interviewer what 
type of person he would like to speak to, to which he typically replied in words similar to 
the following:  “Anyone who fits the selection criteria really, but hopefully you can refer 
people who have done a lot of time and might have the most experience with 
contraband.” Given that they often referred those who were well experienced, the 
information received in the interviews was not only fruitful, but thorough as well. 
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Future Research. In regards to future research on the inmate economy, 
researchers may consider further examining experiences and perceptions of contraband 
and the inmate economy from ex-inmates of other race categories such as Blacks, Asians, 
Middle Easterners, Pacific Islanders, and Indigenous populations. This study focused, 
albeit by a default of the snowball sampling method, on the perceptions and experiences 
of White and Hispanic males and females. For those that choose to use a snowball 
sampling method to collect such data from multiple races, it would be wise to begin with 
several gatekeepers of varying races in order to avoid the limitation that the current study 
experienced. Beyond the experiences and perceptions of those who have endured 
incarceration, future research may also consider examining the experiences and 
perceptions of other individuals who may be knowledgeable of prison culture, 
contraband, and the inmate economy such as correctional officers, medical staff, 
wardens, OIG investigators, and perhaps even family members or criminal associates 
who have engaged in the smuggling of contraband on behalf of incarcerated individuals. 
Both of these areas of research may provide this field of study with a better 
understanding of the ins and outs of this market and whether or not experiences and 
behavioral expectations vary by race. 
Although data for the current study included many findings regarding the 
relationship between prison gangs and the inmate economy, this specific area of inquiry 
is ripe for future research. Future studies might benefit from examining these 
relationships in much greater detail in an attempt to shed further light on the role that 
prison gangs play in this economy, and the power and control they have over the 
contraband market. It is not enough to say that prison gangs simply play a role. 
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Answering how, why, and under what circumstances and context (situational) they play a 
role would certainly advance the body of literature surrounding prison gangs. This area of 
research remains relatively untapped, outside of a few important works noted in the 
literature review of this study. 
Lastly, future research that focuses on inmate misconduct and institutional 
deviance (especially contraband related misconduct) may benefit from including 
theoretically relevant variables (deprivation, importation, and situational) that were 
identified in this study, such as the proximity of an inmate’s previous residence to the 
correctional facility they are housed in; the relationship between co-conspiring inmate 
and correctional officer; differences across original offense type in comparison with sex-
crime offenders; and differences among confirmed gang members of different rankings. 
Doing so may allow for researchers to explore the fit of their models, and can either 
confirm or refute the importance of such variables as having or lacking quantitative 
explanatory power. Gaining accessing to official data that would allow for these 
measures to be developed may prove to be challenging, or may not exist, which may 
require primary data collection. However, confirming or refuting qualitative findings of 
relatively unexplored areas of inquiry with quantitative data are often the beginning 
stages of solid theoretical developments and advancements, and thus may be necessary to 
move the field forward. After all, quantitative researchers must know how certain 
variables may be relevant to a research question, and why, before they can be logically 
included and accurately measured. This study provides some useful information that may 
further justify the use of such measures. 
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Policy Implications. Findings from this study have the potential to provide policy 
implications and ways to prevent contraband and contraband related issues form arising, 
however these suggestions certainly come with their own challenges. Many suggestions 
and their subsequent challenges in implementing them are noted in this section. First, 
corrections agencies may consider requiring more training for CO’s on how to spot 
inmate and guard behaviors that may be related to contraband, contraband smuggling, 
and the inmate economy. Expanding training in this manner may provide correctional 
staff with examples and the necessary knowledge to pinpoint specific behaviors and 
relations between guards/staff and inmates that may help identify individuals for the 
purpose of further investigation and disrupting contraband smuggling and dealing. 
Challenges to this suggestion include funding; the oftentimes immediate need for 
correctional officers, the time it takes to train them, and agencies unwillingness to 
sacrifice short staffed facilities for more training; and the level of willingness of 
correctional staff to out one of their co-workers for illegal and/or suspicious activity once 
they are identified. 
Second, and also related to training, is the need for expanded training on the 
importance of correctional staff not sharing details of their personal life with inmates, as 
this can often lead to targeting for grooming and blackmail. Again, this requires more 
funding and more time spent training correctional staff on best practices; something that 
also requires willingness and financial capability. Third, OIG investigators may need to 
attend seminars on new technologies used in the smuggling of contraband, such as the 
use of electronic money transfer systems, contraband cell phone uses, and UAV’s for the 
purpose of strengthening their investigative methods, bolstering the level of evidence 
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they may be able to collect for future prosecution, and to disrupt the smuggling of 
contraband by UAVs. This can prove to be challenging as it also requires funding and 
OIG investigators to take time away from their already busy schedules. Furthermore, 
since technology changes at astronomical rates, these seminars may need to be attended 
quite frequently. 
Fourth, agencies may consider applying for funding for more drug and rare earth-
metal sniffing K9s, managed access systems for blocking contraband cell phone calls, 
mail scanning technologies to curb contraband being sent through the mail, and perimeter 
security technologies such as DroneShield that can disrupt signals used to navigate 
contraband smuggling UAV’s. The most obvious challenge to these suggestion is 
funding. Although correctional agencies often have extremely large budgets, these 
budgets are mostly allocated to healthcare needs and other human rights and operational 
necessities, not advanced security measures. Also, technologies such as managed access 
systems and DroneShield require immense amounts of training and maintenance in order 
to operate effectively and efficiently; something that also requires more funding, and in 
turn, a higher rate of correctional officer retention to reduce the amount spent over time 
with training. 
Fifth, OIG investigators may be able to strengthen their relationships with 
common electronic money transfer system companies through MOUs (memorandum of 
understanding), and may benefit from inter-organizational coordination efforts with these 
companies. Although systems such as Greendot are nearly untraceable, this type of 
coordinated effort may provide OIG investigators with more useful meta-data that may 
lead to more effective party-identification for prosecution in the laundering of contraband 
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proceeds. This approach could prove challenging as these coordinated efforts, if made 
public, may negatively impact these electronic money transfer companies’ profits. Aside 
from this concern, OIG investigators may find this approach to be useful, but it may 
require court orders in some instances where fourth amendment violation of free-world 
citizens may be violated. Nonetheless, this is an avenue worthy of inquiry. 
Sixth, correctional agencies may consider examining their facilities, especially 
older facilities, for structural vulnerabilities in their visitation areas where contraband 
may be passed from visitors to inmates. Doing so may help identify facilities that need 
reconstruction to curb the entry of contraband. Not surprisingly, funding will need to be 
secured and allocated to this reconstruction effort including, at the very least, funds for 
inspection, engineering, materials, installation, and maintenance. Seventh, agencies may 
consider strengthening security and supervision measures in exchange areas where 
trustees and inmates work in conjunction to turn over their uniforms and work-related 
artifacts upon return to the facility from their off-site job duties. Employing extra 
correctional officers to conduct strip searches of uniform intake inmates and oversee their 
duties is one suggestion that may prove to be useful in disrupting the flow of contraband. 
This suggestion may fall on deaf ears as correctional agencies have a tremendously hard 
time finding individuals that want to work for their agency to being with. 
Eighth, agencies may consider paying their correctional officers a higher salary. 
These agencies may benefit from doing this in the following ways: Higher salaries may 
lead to less turnover; higher salaries may lead to more individuals wanting to apply for a 
job positon with correctional agencies; and higher salaries may slightly reduce the 
enticing financial incentives that contraband smuggling offers correctional officers. This 
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suggestion, while at face value seems logical, requires, again, large amounts of funding to 
incorporate. Additionally, this wage increase may not stop those correctional officers 
who are already smuggling from continuing their illegal behaviors. Ninth, legislation can 
be improved to heighten the level of punishment correctional officers may receive for 
being found guilty of smuggling contraband into correctional facilities by relying on the 
age old principle of general deterrence. 
Lastly, given the broad and overarching nature of correctional policies 
surrounding contraband and contraband related activity, correctional agencies may 
consider revisiting these policies and re-focusing them on contraband that are most 
dangerous to the safety and security of employees and inmates and pose considerable 
dangers and disruptions to the day-to-day operations of a correctional facilities. Items 
such as high quality feminine hygiene products, headbands, durable hair ties, shared 
books and magazines, tank-tops, cleaning supplies such as Fabuloso, and extra slices of 
cheese are things that, arguably, pose little to no danger to safety and security and do not 
disrupt day to day operations. In fact, some of these items could even be sold in 
commissary for a profit. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this study’s findings suggest that many facets of the inmate 
economy and prison culture still hold true decades after they were identified (Clemmer, 
1940; Davidson, 1977; Irwin, 1980; Irwin & Cressey, 1962; Kanich, 1980; Sykes, 1958; 
Sykes & Messinger, 1960; Thomas & Pool, 1975; Tittle & Tittle, 1964; Wellford; 1967; 
Wheeler, 1961; Williams & Fish, 1974). Evidence emerged in regards to the consistent 
relationship between contraband and order within correctional facilities, in that informal 
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social control exerted by the inmates encourage good behavior and fewer disruptive acts 
so long as contraband is present. Interestingly, as prison gangs have grown in number, 
presence, power, and influence, these gangs appear to control the contraband market by 
way of dictating the rules of the inmate economy; punishing those who do not follow 
their rules; dictating prices and coming to compromises with other gangs who engage in 
the contraband market; and maintaining connections to the outside world and their 
criminal networks which allow them more opportunities for financial gain. These gangs 
were, by and large, suggested to serve as the overseers of the inmate economy. 
Findings for this study showed support for previous perspective of inmate 
misconduct, institutional deviance, the inmate economy, and prison culture (deprivation 
model, importation model, situational model, and the convict code), by contributing 
contextual evidence that broadens these perspectives to include other relevant factors that 
may partially explain the how and why of behavioral expectations, the inmate economy, 
and the complicated political environment that exists in correctional facilities.         
These findings show support for these perspectives and can partially extend these models 
to include other potentially relevant measures that, if held true through future studies, 
may prove to be beneficial in improving model-fit for quantitative studies that seek to 
predict inmate behaviors.  
Results from this study also suggest that correctional officer-inmate relations are 
still present, however advances in technologies make the development of exogenous and 
endogenous much easier. These advances in technologies have also led to more 
opportunities to communicate and coordinate both the smuggling of contraband and the 
transfer of proceeds earned through the wheeling and dealing of contraband within 
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correctional facilities, especially big ticket items. These big ticket items have also 
changed a bit over time, and now include less detectable drugs such as K2 and Suboxone, 
which further complicate detection by correctional staff and the few K9s they have access 
to for this purpose. Undoubtedly, the two most notable differences that have 
revolutionized the contraband market are the presence of contraband cell-phones and the 
advent of electronic money transfer systems. 
As technologies have advanced, so too have contraband smuggling methods. 
Results suggested that the use of cell phones for coordinating drops are crucial for 
successful smuggling operations, while two participants noted the use of UAVs as being 
a new development. UAVs, may prove to be the biggest threat in the future, as they are 
quickly becoming smaller and quieter, and can travel longer distances and carry larger 
payloads. This may seem quite trivial to corrections officials at first glance, as these 
UAVs typically carry contraband such as cell phones, drugs, tobacco, and alcohol. 
However weaponized UAVs are increasingly being used around the world to cause 
damage to infrastructure, such as in the case of the Iran-backed Huothi attacks on the 
Khurais oilfield and the Abqaiq oil processing facility in Saudi Arabia on September 14th 
2019 (Safi & Wearden, 2019). Given the rare use of signal disruption technologies in 
U.S. correctional facilities, such as DroneShield, similar attacks that may breach 
perimeter security and damage structures intended to keep inmates confined and the 
public safe may become serious issues in the future. 
When taken together, the findings from this study suggest that prison gangs 
literally dictate and shape just how much order is present in a facility by controlling the 
contraband market and inmate economy. As contraband increases, so too does their rule-
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enforcement and their handling of disruptive behavior through violence or the threat of 
violence. When contraband is not present, it is still clear that gangs have some influence 
over the behaviors of both inmates and guards as they try to reduce deprivations and 
unwanted attention, and coerce or groom guards into smuggling in more contraband. 
Given this dynamic, it may be right to say that prison gangs serve as the real influencers 
of institutional order. Based on these findings that connect prison gangs with the 
contraband market and the power that follows, it may be safe to say that most modern 
institutional behaviors are shaped, and corrected by extremely violent criminal 
enterprises that operate not for the purpose of rehabilitation, but for profit, secrecy, and 
control; all while the agency/ies in charge of handing down a punishment willfully 
provide them with this power through smuggling in contraband. So long as this remains 
true, perhaps correctional agencies will continue to serve as breeding grounds for 
violence, crime, and perceptions of illegitimate authority/captors; instead of 
rehabilitation, law-abiding behavior, and respect for one’s authority.    
Considering together the issues that contraband can cause (safety, security, 
conflict, corruption, reductions in perceptions of legitimacy, gangs as institutional order-
influencers and dictators of behavior), and the lack of funding for the more promising 
ways in which contraband can be partially stopped (drone signal disruption technology, 
mail scanning technology, addressing structural vulnerabilities); the perception that 
contraband will continue to play a large role in correctional facilities is likely here to stay 
— especially as long as prison gangs exist and corruption occurs. If correctional agencies 
do not have the wherewithal to address the issue of both prison gangs and official 
corruption, then perhaps the goal of correctional agencies to ensure the safety and 
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security of their inmates may very well continue to rely on the presence of this decades-
old order maintenance mechanism — contraband — or now, and by proxy, those who 
have near-full control over both institutional order and the contraband market — prison 
gangs.    
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Sam Houston State University 
Informed Consent for Participation in Research 
Perceptions of, and Experiences with, Contraband in Correctional 
Facilities: 
A Qualitative Examination 
My name is William Dittmann, and I am a doctoral candidate in the Department 
of Criminal Justice and Criminology at Sam Houston State University. I would like to 
take this opportunity to invite you to participate in a research study that focuses on your 
perceptions and experiences with contraband in correctional facilities. I hope that data 
from this study will better inform practitioners, researchers, and the public of the role that 
contraband plays in the everyday lives of those incarcerated. You have been asked to 
participate in this study because 1) you are between the ages of 18 and 64, 2) You have 
been previously incarcerated in a correctional facility, and 3) You are not currently 
involved with the criminal justice system, which includes being on parole, probation, or 
electronic monitoring. 
The research I am conducting is very straightforward, and I do not expect the 
research to pose any risk to any of the volunteer participants. If you consent to participate 
in this study, you will be asked to check the box on the back of this document that says “I 
understand the above and consent to participate”. You will not have to provide your 
signature. Once you have agreed to participate, an audio-recorded interview will begin 
where you will be asked questions about your perceptions of, and experiences with, 
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contraband while you were incarcerated. Any information you provide during the 
interview will only be used for research purposes. Under no circumstances will you or 
anyone else who participates in the study be identified. I will not be seeking the names of 
inmates, correctional officers, facilities, or any other identifying information that can be 
traced back to anyone or any facility discussed during the interview. In addition, the 
information you provide will remain confidential and any identifying information that 
can be linked back to you will be de-identified in order to maintain confidentiality and 
protect your identity. Participation in this research will require up to an hour and a half of 
your time, depending on how much you want to elaborate in your response to the 
questions. Participants will not be paid or otherwise compensated for participating in this 
study. Upon completion of the interview, participants can choose to review the recording. 
Once the audio files have been transcribed, the audio files will be destroyed in order to 
further protect your identity. 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. Your decision whether or 
not to participate in this study will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are 
otherwise entitled. You may refuse to answer any questions, and you may discontinue 
participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise 
entitled. If you are interested, the results of the study will be available at the conclusion 
of the project.   
If you have any questions about this research, please feel free to contact me 
William Dittmann, or my faculty supervisor Dr. Willard Oliver using the contact 
information provided below. If you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights 
254 
 
as a research participant, please contact Sharla Miles, Office of Research and Sponsored 
Programs, using her contact information provided below. 
 
William Dittmann 
SHSU Department of 
Criminal Justice and 
Criminology 
Huntsville, TX 77341 
Phone: (---) --- ---- 
Dr. Willard Oliver 
SHSU Department of 
Criminal Justice and 
Criminology 
Huntsville, TX 77341 
Phone: 936-294-4173 
Sharla Miles 
Office of Research and 
Sponsored Programs 
Sam Houston State 
University 
Huntsville, TX 77341 
Phone: (936) 294-4875 
Email: irb@shsu.edu 
   
  
I understand the above and consent to participate. 
 
I do not wish to participate in the current study.  
 
A copy of this consent form is available for your records 
 
 




Sam Houston State University 
 
Recruiting Flyer for Study Participants 
 
Perceptions of, and Experiences with, Contraband in Correctional 
Facilities: 
A Qualitative Examination 
 
What am I being asked to do?  
You are being asked to participate in a study that examines your perception and 
experiences with contraband while incarcerated in a correctional facility. This study is 
being conducted by William Dittmann who is the principal investigator and a doctoral 
student in the Criminal Justice program at Sam Houston State University. This study is 
being conducted as a as part of a dissertation and the faculty supervisor/sponsor who will 
be overseeing this study is Dr. Willard Oliver. Your participation is completely voluntary 
and will consist of you meeting with the principal investigator and participating in an 
audio taped interview which seeks to understand your feelings, perceptions, and 
experiences with contraband while incarcerated. 
What are the qualifications to participate in this study?  
This study is looking for male and female individuals who have experienced 
confinement in a correctional facility. These facilities include county or city jails, state 
prisons, state jails, and federal facilities. You cannot currently be under any form of law 
enforcement supervision including parole, probation or electronic monitoring and your 




What kind of questions will be asked?  
Questions will cover the following topics: 1) Experiences and perceptions of the 
contraband market 2) Knowledge of, and experience with, contraband and contraband 
networks, and 3) Personal feelings towards contraband and contraband markets. 
How long will the interview last?  
The interview will last up to an hour and a half depending on how much 
information you are willing to provide. If you volunteer to be in the study, you may 
withdraw at any time without consequence of any kind. You may also refuse to answer 
any questions you do not want to answer and still remain in the study. This study should 
be completed by May of 2019. 
What about privacy and confidentiality?  
No one besides the PI conducting the interview will have access to your 
individual responses and your identity will be strictly protected. Any information that is 
obtained through this interview and that can be identified with you will remain 
confidential and will not be disclosed in order to protect your rights and welfare. All data 
will be kept in a secure location under lock and key on two encrypted and password 
protected external hard-drive, accessible only to the principal investigator. All identifying 
information will be de-identified, recoded, and properly destroyed. When the results of 
the study are published or discussed, no information will be included that would reveal 
your identity. Your answers will be combined with other participants so that no one can 
be identified. In all phases of the study your identity will be protected or disguised. I 




How do I participate?  
If you choose to participate in this study please contact the principal investigator 
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